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FOREWORD 
The report is being produced at the request of the Ministry of Industries & Production & Special 
Initiatives, and the Ministry of Labor & Manpower, Government of Pakistan (GoP). The request 
emerged from the on-going policy dialogue under the Poverty Reduction Structural Credit (PRSC) 
programmatic lending operation, which supports, among other areas, labor law reforms.  The study 
is directly linked to the GoP’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Pakistan Country 
Assistance Strategy (CAS, 2006-08) which foresees labor market reforms as a key element in 
improving investment climate, accelerating growth and job creation in Pakistan.  
Recognizing that fostering a conducive investment climate (IC) is a prerequisite for private sector 
development, the government has put in place an impressive array of reforms for addressing the key 
constraints faced by the business community. This report centres its lens on two elements of IC 
constraints – labor regulation and skills gaps. In an effort to improve employment outcomes 
and industrial productivity, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) has launched an impressive dual-
track reform process involving broad-based overhaul of labor laws and institutions, and expansion 
and reform of the vocational and technical training (VTT) system. Accordingly this report (i) 
assesses the effectiveness of the existing LM regulations and practices, including social security and 
welfare program, and VTT system; (ii) analyzes the trade-offs by examining the relationship between 
regulation, job creation and skills formation; and (iii) based on the analytical findings, it presents 
policy options for strengthening the design of the on-going twin track reform strategy. It also 
identifies priorities within (a) labor regulation i.e. labor legislation and its supporting institutions (b) 
social security and welfare program; and (c) VTT system. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.1 In an effort to improve employment outcomes and industrial productivity, the Government 
of Pakistan (GoP) has launched a dual-track reform process involving broad-based overhaul of labor 
laws and institutions, and expansion and reform of the vocational and technical training (VTT) 
system.   This is very much in line with the concerns raised by the private sector: about 30 percent of 
survey respondents in Pakistan identify labor regulation and skill shortages as major obstacles to 
business growth and productivity.  
   
1.2      With the aim of helping inform the ongoing reform, this report investigates the links that exist 
in today’s Pakistan between labor regulation and the pace of job creation by the private sector, on 
the one hand, and skills formation, on the other. It also reviews the existing VTT system as the 
subject of the second reform track. The report shows that the rate of job creation we observe in 
Pakistan at the moment is far below what it should be partly because of the excessive regulatory 
burden existing labor laws impose on businesses. It also offers evidence that, beyond suppressing 
job creation, excessive regulation tends to aggravate the shortage of industrial skills by discouraging 
firms from sponsoring on-the-job training (OTJ) schemes. Because excessive regulation generally 
reduces the demand for skilled labor, it also has the potential to undermine the government’s effort 
to expand and reform the current VTT system. The report relies primarily on the global Investment 
Climate Surveys (ICS) and Doing Business databases, and the Pakistan Labor Force Survey (LFS). It 
also draws heavily on a series of new background papers on labor market institutions and VTT in 
Pakistan and on case studies and stakeholder consultations held as part of the underlying study.  
   
1.3  Labor market regulation and laws are useful economic and social institutions designed to 
protect workers from undesirable consequences of market failure such as arbitrary or discriminatory 
actions by employers. They also help stabilize employment and household incomes against aggregate 
business cycles and shocks. Labor regulation is also an important element of society’s instruments 
for the provision of social security and the maintenance of health, safety, and environmental 
standards in economic activities. The stable and longer-term employment relationships that labor 
laws are intended to promote are also a source of productivity growth from the employers’ point of 
view in as far as they foster employee loyalty and provide the incentive for innovation and on-the-
job skill formation. On the other hand, when excessive, labor regulation tends to choke off job 
creation; it can also undermine innovation and the development of industrial skills by raising the 
cost of durable employment relations. Unfortunately, this is what seems to have happened in 
Pakistan in recent years. Existing labor laws and regulation seem to have raised the cost of long-term 
employment relationship so high that the private sector is not creating good-quality jobs as fast as it 
should. Nor is it helping finance the training that Pakistan’s industrial workforce needs to effectively 
compete in global markets. The challenge of the ongoing reforms of labor laws is to reverse this 
situation by reducing the burden of labor regulation on businesses while helping provide workers 
with adequate protection from employment and income volatility and the adverse consequences of 
market failure.  
   
1.4    Labor regulation in Pakistan is excessive by international standards, as can be seen from data 
on a number of indicators of labor market flexibility.   For example, Pakistan’s overall indicator for 
restrictiveness of employment laws is the highest in the South Asia region, and is much higher than 
indicators for the East Asian countries including Malaysia and Singapore. The most immediate 
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consequence of excessive labor regulation has been that, by the standards of countries with less 
stringent labor laws, recent employment growth by Pakistani firms has been too low for their rates 
of sales growth. In other words, the output elasticity of employment is lower than what would be 
expected with less restrictive laws. Indeed, the actual job creation gap between Pakistan and other 
developing countries would have been higher were it not for the fact that the effect of labor 
regulation in reducing demand for regular or permanent labor has been mitigated by its having led to 
greater reliance by firms on temporary labor than would have been the case with less regulation of 
permanent labor.  
   
1.5  Thus, ironically, the most significant piece of evidence that labor regulation is excessive in 
Pakistan happens to be that the share of temporary workers in Pakistani businesses is one of the 
highest by any international standard, standing at about 36 percent against, for example, 15 percent 
in India, and 3 percent in Bangladesh. Since temporary workers are effectively denied coverage of 
the binding employment protection provision, firms that have a larger proportion of their workforce 
on temporary contracts would seem to have greater flexibility in adjusting their manpower to 
technological or product market developments. However, this advantage in the flexibility of staffing 
has to be weighed against the obvious advantages of stable and longer-term employment 
relationships from the point of view of both employers and workers. Key advantages of 
employment stability are loyalty and the constant upgrading of skills firms need to sustain within 
their workforce in order to remain competitive through innovation and the adoption of new 
technology. If firms choose to forgo these advantages of stable employment relationships, then it 
can only be because excessive regulation has raised the cost of the relationships to prohibitive levels. 
This indeed is the case in the Pakistani industry at the moment. Firms seem to have responded to 
what seems to be costly regulation of permanent employment by relying on temporary labor to a 
greater extent than they would in a less regulated environment.  
   
1.6  One aspect of the importance of long-term employment relationships to the productivity 
and international competitiveness of industry is that heavy reliance on temporary employment 
undermines the incentives workers and firms would have to participate in or sponsor on-the-job 
skill formation. As a result, although a far higher proportion of Pakistan firms reports skill shortages, 
only 15 percent of them sponsor on-the-job training, which is very low, even by developing country 
standards. This is significant for a country like Pakistan, where average levels of schooling are 
particularly low, as a result of which industrial skill shortages are acute. In the long run these 
shortages can be met only through improvement in enrollment and school completion rates and the 
expansion of tertiary education catering to the needs of industry.   In the short run, however, OJT is 
the only means firms have of alleviating the shortages to any degree.   Even in the well-developed 
educational setting of advanced economies, on-the-job-training is probably as important as formal 
education as a source of industrial skills.    
   
1.7   All things considered, Pakistani industry and workers would seem to be better off with a 
more flexible labor market. This would mean higher wage and output elasticities of industrial 
employment than is actually the case at present, which in turn would mean higher job creation rates 
at existing rates of output and wage growth. Although high output elasticity and high wage elasticity 
mean greater volatility of employment incomes when taken in isolation from one another, in practice 
the risk of greater volatility is likely to be low, as the two tend to compensate each other. At the 
same time, greater labor market flexibility in the sense used here would put the economy in a 
position to   cope better with exogenous shocks to aggregate demand or to labor supply, or to other 
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factor markets than would be the case if labor demand were inelastic with respect to wages or 
output.  
   
1.8    Because labor demand is derived demand, its elasticity depends on the elasticity of product 
labor demand, and hence on the competitiveness of the goods markets. One way to help Pakistan’s 
industrial labor market be more flexible is thus to help make domestic industry itself more 
competitive. A second and more direct, and probably more effective way is to reduce the cost and 
scope of regulation of permanent labor. The most immediate outcome of this would be faster job 
creation. An indirect benefit would be that greater demand by firms for skilled labor would also 
provide a sound basis for the GoP’s on-going effort to improve the VTT system, because such 
improvement would assume sustainable growth in demand for skills that excessive labor regulation 
could only hold back.  
   
1.9     The report analyzes the existing labor laws and institutions, along with the new draft laws, 
from this point of view. It also provides a review of the current VTT system and proposed changes 
for it. We identify below a set of recommendation for further strengthening the labor law reforms 
and the reform of the VTT system.  
   
Policy Recommendations on Labor Regulation Reform  
   
1.10 To fully capitalize on the impressive on-going labor reform process in Pakistan, the 
Government needs to undertake a more concerted and multidimensional approach. That includes 
reform of the key binding elements in the existing federal legislation, re-engineering provincial 
enforcement and strengthening dispute resolution mechanisms. Reform in labor regulation should 
reduce firing and hiring costs as well as the cost of complying with legislation. It should also allow 
greater flexibility in staffing levels by allowing redundancy as a legitimate ground for dismissal and 
removing time limits on term contracts. Significant reduction in compliance costs can be achieved 
by simplifying inspection schemes, working condition norms, and mechanisms for the collection of 
social security contributions. Decreasing hiring and firing costs of permanent workers requires 
action on industrial dispute resolution and litigation rules and on severance pay schemes.    
   
1.11  Reducing hiring and firing costs: Decreasing hiring and firing costs of permanent workers requires 
changes in both legal provisions and implementation processes. Specifically, it should lower 
severance payments and reduce time required to report and resolve industrial grievances by 
simplifying and streamlining dispute arbitration and litigation rules. Currently, severance pay as a 
proportion of base wages for a given period of continuous employment in Pakistan is twice 
what it is in India or Bangladesh.  
   
1.12     Allow redundancy as fair grounds for dismissal.   If a firm cannot fire excess workers in times of 
low demand, it is less likely to hire in high times.   This hurts both the worker and employers by 
leading to  fewer jobs overall and less flexibility for the firm to grow.   Australia, Denmark, Malaysia, 
Taiwan (China), Thailand, and Vietnam are some of examples of economies that permit redundancy 
firing. Pakistan should pursue a similar policy.  
   
1.13     Remove time limits on term contracts.   Pakistan permits term contracts for a maximum of only 
nine months for jobs of a temporary nature.   Such inflexibility in the timing and use of employees 
limits companies’ ability to grow and thrive. Countries like China, Malaysia, Singapore, and New 
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Zealand place no limits on the duration of fixed-term contracts, and in so doing increase job 
opportunities for workers.  
   
1.14      Recognizing the binding nature of this constraint, the Employment and Services Act (ESCA) 
2006 introduces a major and laudable change to the classification of workmen by eliminating the 
current classification of permanent (more than nine months) and temporary (less than nine months) 
worker. The abolishment of ‘temporary worker’ will increase labor market flexibility by 
eliminating the time limit on term contracts. The newly expanded conditions requiring that all 
contracts be in writing and allowing termination conditions to be incorporated is also a welcome 
addition, given that high explicit and implicit firing costs are important reasons why employers try to 
avoid hiring permanent workers.  
   
1.15  One particular area of concern in the ESCA draft that may benefit from careful re-
examination relates to the introduction of joint liability between principal employer and 
‘contractor’. This proposed change is motivated by the ground reality that much of the labor force 
has been able to operate outside of the law due to a high degree of non-compliance. However, 
laudable the intention, the proposed approach may not be the right one. In addition, it may lead to 
other undesirable effects. The definition and use of the term contractor (and sub-contractor for 
labor) confuses whether a worker is an employee or a true contractor (in an outsourcing sense) by 
combining the two conflicting concepts.   It is highly unusual, in conflict with case law, and likely 
inoperable, to have a both a contractor and his client to be jointly responsible for ensuring that the 
law is applied to an employee of the contractor.   The provision requires that the client (principal 
employer) be ultimately responsible for compliance expenses which can then be recovered from the 
contractor.   It is likely that this approach will lead to considerable contract disputes between 
businesses (contractors and their clients). This approach will ultimately prevent the emergence of 
“outsourcing” a key business relationship to enhance productivity and competitiveness and to 
encourage the development of SMEs.    
   
1.16  Reduce compliance costs associated with labor regulation. As part of the scheme for cutting down 
compliance costs, Pakistan should simplify labor inspection schemes, working condition norms, and 
mechanisms for the collection of social security contributions. It should also draw up a well-
structured set of national regulations to guide inspection policy toward ‘best practice’ management 
characteristics. These could provide opportunities for federal and provincial authorities to limit rent 
seeking by consolidating the number of inspectors by introducing the concept of regulated limits on 
the discretionary power of inspectors, and by enabling the notion of a ‘risk-based’ inspection 
approach. In this regard the program would include: (i) the design and implementation of a 
nationwide inspection policy and implementation of regulations that may include a model regulation 
to guide provincial authorities responsible for the enforcement of the law; (ii) new business process 
systems preferably with electronic components to ensure efficient and equitable implementation; (iii) 
a training program for inspectors in the new aspects of the law, social skills and dispute resolution; 
and (iv) a centrally or provincially managed third-party monitoring and evaluation system to ensure 
that inspections are taking place in the prescribed manner. Technical assistance should be sought to 
draw on global experience and apply best practice principles in design and implementation of a 
comprehensive program.  
   
1.17 Compliance costs of social security contribution. The hassle and corruption involved in the 
administration of social security contributions are major component of the cost of complying with 
labor legislation. To reduce them, the system of levies involved should be rationalized and its 
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administration streamlined. Rationalization could be achieved by merging some of the existing 
schemes, maintaining only those services that workers appreciate, and passing on the resulting cost 
savings to employers. Merging the various programs would also help reduce the number of different 
inspections. To streamline administration, the system should be simplified into at most one or two 
programs providing umbrella services that could invest in modern administrative systems, with 
smart cards or similar ID-based technologies that ensure portability and coverage of workers and 
their dependents wherever they reside.  
   
1.18     Increasing the effectiveness of social security contribution. Because the ultimate aim of the 
contributions is to provide social security for employees, reforms should also help assure their 
effectiveness from that point of view by expanding coverage and improving the governance of the 
scheme.  
   
a. Improve governance. Meaningful representation of workers and employers providing 
external control on the allocation of funds and the type of services could help improve 
governance.  
   
b.  Expand coverage. Coverage can and should only be expanded after undertaking 
reforms that ensure meaningful, high-quality services for covered workers at a reasonable 
cost to employers. Expansion of the formal sector and reduction of evasion would 
ensure wider coverage at least in the formal labor market. Expansion to the informal 
sector will be slow and difficult, as the experience of other developing countries has 
proven, as it requires voluntary contributions by workers. The most appealing product, it 
seems, is often life insurance, as it is usually more difficult to get informal workers to pay 
for pension and health coverage. However, any expansion of the system will be 
conditional on prior reform that ensures the system provides benefits and services 
valued by workers and employers.  
   
Policy Recommendations on VTT Reform  
   
1.19    To meet the needs of several and growing client groups including matriculation (class 10) 
graduates, dropouts and the unemployed, and currently employed workers, the government has 
announced plans to expand the quantity and improve the quality of VTT system.    
   
1.20 The government is considering major new investments to strengthen and provide leadership 
for VTT, coordinate what is now a rather fragmented system, and administer the construction of 
2,949 new institutions with a total capacity of about one million. This would increase current 
capacity by 500%. To manage this expansion efficiently and to address problems with the existing 
VTT system, the National Vocational and Technical Education Commission (NAVTEC) has 
recently been established. The approach, while conceptually sound, has been implemented with 
varying degrees of success in other countries. Pakistan needs to move forward carefully to ensure 
that the proposed NAVTEC is effective, that new resources are used efficiently, and that 
implementation is sustained after initial investments. In general the most successful NTEVTA 
organizations appear to have the following characteristics: (a) are governing, not advisory boards, 
having a majority of private sector members representing broad groups of employers in the large 
and small scale sectors; (b) are removed from government civil service administration and hiring 
regulations, are able to pay market rates for staff, are linked to broad high-level government 
structures;   (c) provide leadership in policy development, standards and accreditation, but in many 
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cases do not actually own and operate their own training institutions; (d) have a core of stable 
financing, often from state budgets or payroll taxes, but generate considerable revenue from sale of 
services to client groups; (e) have strong evaluation and planning units, and (f) at times are involved 
in curriculum development (but not always as this work is often left to service providers).  
   
1.21 There is clearly a need to address problems with the existing VTT system including 
fragmentation, quality, scale, and lack of private sector ‘ownership’. The system suffers from a lack of 
proper targeting, and an overly bureaucratic approach that stresses delivery over quality. If it is to be made more 
relevant, it needs to be made more flexible and responsive to market needs. There is also a need to reassess where 
public intervention is most needed, and what form this intervention should take.  
   
1.22  Vocational & Technical Training for School Aged Youth : VTT policy makers are attempting to 
address the school drop-out issue by determining how more youth can be retained in purposeful 
education up to matriculation (grade 10), which is increasingly becoming the minimum requirement 
for entry and upward mobility in the world economy.   In order to address this issue, Pakistan first 
needs to focus a significant portion of its limited education resources on upgrading quality and 
access to primary and intermediate general education in order to reduce dropouts. This level of 
education forms the base of all future education, including VTT, and provides essential skills for 
labor market entry in the emerging knowledge economy. Pakistan should not (as it has considered in 
the past) attempt to introduce VTT in intermediate schools, or a matriculation-tech stream at the 
secondary matriculation level (grades 9-10).   Pakistan should, in addition to improving the quality of 
intermediate and secondary education, take specific steps to make this level of education, as well as 
grades 11-12, more purposeful and linked with the economy, labor market, and careers.   Pakistan 
needs to expand and upgrade its vocational and technical education capabilities to provide skills 
training to individuals completing matriculation.  
   
1.23   Vocational and Technical Training and Labor Services for School Drop-outs and the Unemployed.   There 
is a need to help the large number of job seekers who are unemployed but want to gain entry to the 
labor market. Two approaches are recommended: (i) expand the VTT facilities in the country to 
provide additional infrastructure to address the skill development needs of the large number of 
unemployed and skill drop-outs who may lack skills or be structurally unemployed; (ii) pilot and 
experiment with provision of other labor services, in addition to institutional training, as is done in 
other developed and developing countries (including those with high levels of employment, uneven 
economic development, and specific problems in rural areas). NAVTEC should advertise the 
availability of funds, and contract with existing private, public, or NGO service providers to provide 
such services as: (a) in-depth job placement services, (b) subsidized on-the-job training (to be 
provided by enterprises), (c) institutional training, (d) small business technical assistance, and (e) 
incubator services including small amounts of working capital, and (f) local economic development 
planning grants. Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA) should 
strengthen its leadership for small business development activities.  
   
1.24   Continuing Education and Training for the Employed: There is a need to improve the skills of the 
existing labor force, which in general has low levels of education and training compared to other 
middle-income countries. It should also upgrade the skills of new labor force entrants. Pakistan 
should support three existing and developing institutions which can directly address Adult 
Continuing Education (ACE): the Technology Upgradation and Skills Development Company 
(TUSDEC); the ongoing Skill Development Council (SDC), and SMEDA, which organizes a wide 
range of technical and entrepreneurial services for micro, small, and medium businesses.   All three 
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have different clientele and the initiatives should be supported and enlarged purely within the private 
sector. The above initiatives should be demand driven, and financed primarily on a pay-as-you-go 
basis by the enterprises requesting training services for their employees. Finally, existing VTT 
training institutions could organize themselves to provide customized quick start training for 
enterprises, although this requires highly entrepreneurial and flexible VTT institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Overview of Labor Markets in Pakistan 
 
“The employment strategy must be embedded with an overall strategy for integrated human resource development that combines investment in 
human capital, the ‘supply side,’ with the creation of productive employment, the ‘demand side,’ to lead fuller utilization of human 
resources…”  
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), Govt. of Pakistan, Dec. 2003. 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Strengthening labor outcomes: The Pakistan PRSP recognizes the centrality of employment generation for 
poverty reduction. Indeed poor labor markets (LM) outcomes would seem to explain a big part of the poverty 
problem in Pakistan.1 The growth rate of the economy has been improving during the last four years but job 
growth remains slower than the increase in the labor force, which now includes more than 45 million workers 
(see figure 1.1). Job growth is slower than the rate of growth of GDP—while GDP grew by 3.5 percent p.a. 
from 1993/94-2003/04, employment grew by 2.4 percent, corresponding to employment elasticity of 67 
percent. There is little indication that the slow rate of job creation was compensated by  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
improvements in the quality of jobs; in fact, wages in existing jobs are low, especially in rural areas, and have 
stagnated in real terms over the last decade—real earnings declined during the second part of the 1990s and 
recovered somewhat thereafter, although casual workers still earn less in real terms than they did in 1993/94 
(see Table 1.1). Formal sector jobs are scarce; most workers are either self-employed or employed in the 
informal or agricultural sectors, often at very low productivity. There has been no trend towards rising 
formality. Nor has there been a trend towards industrialization, at least in the sense that the share of workers 
employed in manufacturing and mining today, at 13 percent, is the same as it was 20 years ago (see figure 1.2). 
Child labor persists, and some 2.5 million children in the 10–14 year age group and an unknown  
                                                 
1 Poverty in Pakistan has persisted at more or less the same level since the nineties. According to the World Bank’s Poverty 
Assessment Report 2002, one third of the population in Pakistan can be classified as poor. Recent data indicates some improvement. 
Fig 1.1: Pakistan: Growth trends in GDP, Employment and Labor Force 
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Figure 1.2: Share of employment in manufacturing and mining 
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number of younger children are working.2 The challenge for policy-makers is not only creating jobs for 
the unemployed3 and for the new entrants to the labor force but also further improving the 
productivity and earnings of the available jobs in order to reduce the very large number of ‘working 
poor’, and to improve the welfare of a large number of poor , marginalized or exploited workers. The 
rest of this chapter provides a brief summary of Pakistan’s labor market situation.  
Table 1.1: Real job earnings, 1993/94-2003/04 (Rs. per year) 
 1993/94   1999/2000   2003/04   
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
          
Salaried 46624 67532 58188 44622 61582 55857 52150 71753 63162 
Casual 
wage 
36274 47628 39873 31458 41682 35777 34063 41125 36513 
Total 40534 60586 49336 36440 54026 46022 41457 60275 50036 
Source: Staff estimates from LFS, various years 
1.2 Key questions to consider are: were these not-so-positive labor market outcomes caused by too low 
employment content of the economic growth in Pakistan or was growth too slow to absorb the increase in 
the work force? This report argues that the second issue was at work—had economic growth been faster, 
labor outcomes would have been more favorable. In fact, there is emerging evidence that some labor market 
indicators have started to improve in response to the growth upsurge in recent years. Open unemployment 
has started to recede (fig. 1.3). The decline in real earnings appears to have halted and indeed begun to reverse 
since around 2001. The share of workers in self-employment has fallen a little. And more impressively, this 
has happened at a time when the labor market participation rate grew, especially for women. Despite these 
recent positive trends, Pakistan still has a long way to go to create more and better jobs.  
                                                 
2 There is also a persistent problem of bonded labor, although estimates of its extent vary widely. 
3 Creating productive employment has been identified as a development priority in key official documents, including PRSP in 
Pakistan. 
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Fig 1.3: Unemployment in Pakistan, 1993-94 to 2005-06 
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II Overview of Labor Market in Pakistan 
 
1.3  Pakistan has a low labor force participation rate  (Fig. 1.4).4 Pakistan has a labor force of 45 
million in a population of 150 million. This gives a so-called ‘crude activity rate’ of 0.3. The crude activity rate 
has stayed roughly constant since 1980, but has started to rise in the last few years: from 29.6 percent in 
2001/02, to 30.4 percent in 2003/04, and 32.7 percent in second quarter of 2005/06. The so-called ‘refined 
activity rate’ (workers as a share of population age 10 and above) has also started to increase, from 43 percent 
in 2001/02 to 47 percent in second quarter of 2005/06.5 Participation rates are highest in the Punjab and 
lowest in the NWFP. Participation in the work force rises with the level of education of the worker (see 
fig 1.5). 
 
1.4 Activity rates of prime aged males (25–54 years) have declined since the mid-1990s while those for 
teen-agers and youth rose. The female refined activity rate rose from 12.5 percent in 1990/91 to 15.9 percent 
in 2003/04 and 20.7 percent in 2005/06 (2nd quarter only). This is a remarkable demographic change, 
although female participation remains low when compared to men and in international perspective (see Box 
1.1). Female participation in Baluchistan, NWFP, and Sindh are especially low. Male participation also rose, 
but less than that of women (see figure 1.4). All of this means that Pakistan could potentially see a 
dramatic expansion in the labor force as more men and especially women choose to enter the labor 
force in the future.  
                                                 
4 Labor force participation rate (LFP) is conventionally measured as the sum of the employed and unemployed divided by the working age 
population, (of those 10 years and over). An employed person is someone who worked during the reference period (for example, last 
week) for gain or family profit. The employed workers are usually divided into salaried, self-employed, unpaid family helpers, and 
employers. An unemployed is someone who was available for work and actively searching for work during the reference period. This 
group is sometimes referred to as ‘open unemployed’ in order to distinguish them from the underemployed, who are those that have 
some work, but not enough. Although underemployment is difficult to measure with any precision, there is no doubt that it is very 
prevalent in Pakistan, and from a poverty perspective, probably a much bigger problem than open unemployment. 
5 According to estimates by the FBS based on the LFS data for the respective years. 
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Figure 1.4: Refined Labor Force Participation Rate, 2001/02 to 2005/06 
(workers in percent of population age 10+) 
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Source: FBS, various years, Government of Pakistan. 
 
 
Box 1.1: Women and Work in Pakistan 
 
While female labor force participation is low across South Asia, it is even lower in Pakistan, despite recent increases. 
According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) from 2001/02, only one in four women above age 10 
work, far lower than the 70  percent of men in that age who work (although still a higher figure than the Labor Force 
Survey, which undercounts female work due to short recall period). Why is it so low? It appears that both cultural and 
economic factors are involved.  
 
Cultural explanations. A recent study (World Bank, 2005) investigated the reasons for low female work force 
participation in Pakistan, and concluded that mobility restrictions pertaining to women who have reached puberty play a 
major role in keeping women out of paid and unpaid labor. These mobility restrictions have at their heart genuine 
concerns about the safety of women in the public space, particularly safety when venturing outside the immediate 
settlement (the same mobility restrictions negatively impact female schooling). However, social concerns relating to the 
prestige and social stature of the family also have an impact — some male breadwinners are concerned that community 
members will perceive them to be inadequate and unable to provide for the economic needs of their family if their 
women work. Thus, there is social stigma attached to female work. For this reason, women in even quite poor 
households who desperately need additional income often refrain from working. The study concludes by recommending 
a comprehensive strategy to promote women’s work: investing in education and skills; facilitating women’s work, e.g., 
through job quotas; investing in time-saving infrastructure to free up women’s time (for example, easier water 
availability); and creating a legal environment to encourage women to participate in work. 
 
Economic reasons also play a role. Poor households respond to economic opportunities that become available. Their 
most important and sometimes only asset is the labor of their members. When job options appear, male and female 
workers respond to them. A good example is that of Bangladesh’s garment sector. 
The decade-long boom of the urban garments industry has had a major influence on Bangladesh’s female labor market, 
creating more than 1 million formal sector jobs for women. Previously, women with low educational attainment or from 
rural areas had been confined to the informal labor market, and female formal sector employment had been the preserve 
of a small educated elite. The speed with which families began allowing unmarried rural girls to take up urban 
employment, often away from the home, suggested that it was lack of economically rewarding employment 
opportunities more than cultural and social beliefs that discouraged Bangladeshi women from participating in the labor 
market. The willingness of rural households to send girls to the cities for work also suggests that the geographic mobility 
of the rural female labor force should not be underestimated. Formal sector employment opportunities for young 
women have proven to be an attractive alternative to early marriage, contributing to reductions in fertility and health-
related problems caused by early marriage in Bangladesh. The Pakistani evidence also points in that direction: the rate at 
which the female activity rate has expanded during the recent growth period suggests a positive response to new 
opportunities.  
Sources: Pakistan Country Gender Assessment: Bridging the Gender Gap – Opportunities and Challenges. The World Bank, October 2005. Labor Markets in South Asia, 
World Bank, 2004b.. 
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Figure 1.6: Labor force participation rate (refined activity rate) for men and women, 
by age, 2003/04 
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Source: LFS 2003/04. 
 
Figure 1.5: Labor Force Participation rates (refined activity rate) for men and women,  
by education, 2003/04 
 
Source: Staff estimates based on FBS, 2003/04, Government of Pakistan. 
 
1.5 The labor force has been growing at 3 percent per annum in recent years against total employment 
growth of 2.75 percent. The incremental labor force, in other words, is not being fully absorbed. The rate of 
open unemployment has been growing from 4.8 percent a decade back to a peak of 8.3 percent in 2001/02 
before falling back more recently to 7.7 percent in 2003/04, and 6.2 percent in second quarter of 2005/06 
(the latest period for which data is available (Fig. 1.3). The burden of open unemployment falls 
disproportionately on youth, particularly the urban, educated youth, and the females (Fig. 1.4; Box 1.1). 
Educated youth prefer to wait for lucrative work in sectors/jobs that are protected or provide greater job 
security (like government employment) and can afford to remain unemployed because they have fewer 
responsibilities and get income support from the family. This pattern is seen in many countries—open 
unemployment is a luxury the poor cannot afford. The real unemployment problem is much larger than 
implied by these numbers and comprises both chronic and seasonal underemployment of informal and 
agricultural workers, and a large but unknown number of ‘discouraged workers’ that have given up altogether 
and ceased to figure in the labor force, causing the low participation rate in Pakistan. Many women, in 
particular, can be considered discouraged workers. Once employment conditions improve many of these 
discouraged workers, including a large number of women, are likely to join the labor force, as indeed appears 
to have started to happen already. 
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1.6  Occupations in Pakistan are dominated by ‘skilled agricultural worker’ (35 percent of the 
employed workforce), followed by ‘elementary occupations’ (20 percent).  Over the last decade, there has 
been a more than 5 percentage-point decline in the share of agricultural workers (fig 1.7). Most of this 
decline was compensated by increases in the share of craft and unskilled occupations. Occupations in the 
‘higher end’ that tend to pay better (managers, professionals, technicians, and clerks) constitute 19.3 percent 
of the employed in 2005/06 (Q2), and this share has only risen little (by 1.8 percentage-points) since 
1996/97. The industrial employment structure for males differs substantially from that for females. Almost 
two-thirds of women are engaged in agriculture compared with 38 percent of men. Outside agriculture, 
female employment tends to be restricted to occupations such as teachers, doctors and domestic helpers (fig 
1.8). 
Figure 1.7: Occupational Composition of the Employed Pakistani Labor Force, in percent 
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Source: FBS, various years, Government of Pakistan. 
 
Figure 1.8: Occupational Composition of the Employed Pakistani Labor Force 
by gender, 2003/04 
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Source: Staff estimates based on LFS, 2003/04, Government of Pakistan. 
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1.7  Sectoral levels and trends in employment. The agricultural sector employed 43 percent of the 
employed workers in 2003/04, down from 47.5 percent in 1990, with manufacturing and trade and services 
absorbing a growing share of the workforce (fig. 1.9). Agriculture always declines as part of the development 
process,6 and this speed of decline is not particularly high compared to many other countries. In Pakistan, 
industry is not the growth engine that it is in economies that have recently developed rapidly such as those in 
East Asia. Manufacturing activity accounts for only 18 percent of GDP, and despite some important 
early successes has performed far below potential. While the share of manufacturing in total employment 
displayed a rising trend during 1950-70, since then employment in manufacturing as a fraction of total 
employment has declined, remaining more or less constant at barely 10 percent in 1980s, rising 
slowly to 13.8 percent in 2003-04 (figure 1.2). Realizing the potential of industry is a top priority of the 
government.7  
Figure 1.9: Sectoral Composition of the Employed (1990/91 - 2003/04) 
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Source: FBS, various years, Government of Pakistan. 
1.8 Within manufacturing, some 80 percent of workers are employed in the informal manufacturing 
sector (defined according to the LFS as enterprises with less than 10 workers) (see table 1.2). This share has 
been constant in the last decade, except for a spike in 2001/02, where it was 90 percent. Most manufacturing 
workers are casual or self-employed. Casualization of the workers has been on the rise. Only 13.6 percent of 
all manufacturing workers are regular salaried and less than half of these are in the formal sector. Not 
surprisingly, the regular salaried workers are on the decline although the trend may be beginning to change.  
                                                 
6 During the period 1950-70 the share of agriculture in total employment saw a steady decline in total employment from 65 percent to 
55 percent, and 49 percent in 1986/87. 
7 See Towards a Prosperous Pakistan: A Strategy for Rapid Industrial Growth, Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives, 
Government of Pakistan, January 2005.  
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Table 1.2: Distribution of manufacturing sector workers, by employment status 
and formality, 1996/97-2003/04 
 
  1996-97 1997-98 1999-00 2001-02 2003-04 
Informal      
Salaried 11.9 10.5 9.0 8.7 7.6 
Casual wage 28.6 27.8 27.1 35.8 31.4 
Employer 2.7 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.1 
Self-employed etc 37.3 38.4 42.7 43.6 40.7 
All informal 80.5 78.6 80.4 89.6 80.8 
Formal      
Salaried 8.4 8.1 6.7 2.7 6.0 
Casual wage 8.8 9.0 10.3 6.1 9.8 
Employer 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.9 
Self-employed etc 1.7 3.7 2.0 1.2 2.6 
All formal 19.5 21.4 19.6 10.4 19.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Staff estimates based on LFS, various years 
1.9 Informality is widespread and has been growing. The informal sector (defined as those with less 
than 10 workers and engaged in non-agricultural, non-governmental activities) accounts for 70 percent of 
non-agricultural employment, and 55 percent of wage employment. Informal comprises 73 percent of 
workers in rural areas and 67 percent in urban areas (fig. 1.10). Informality overall grew by 5  
Figure 1.10: Formality (percent of workers in non-agricultural employment) 
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Source: LFS, various years, Government of Pakistan,  
percentage-points from 65 percent in 2001/02 to 70 percent in 2003/04. Some 61 percent of the 
employed labor force in 2003/04 was self-employed or unpaid family helpers--up by 2 percentage-points 
from 2001/02, although data from 2nd quarter of 2005/06 suggest that share may now have started to fall (see 
table 1.3). Lack of job opportunities rather than inherent entrepreneurial spirit is the main reason people 
become self-employed. Piece rated and casual employees account for 48 percent of total employees in 
2003/04. Only one-fourth of workers in the informal sector are regular employees in contrast with 97 
percent of those in government employment. The share of workers with job regularity fell from 55 
percent in 1997/98 to 50 percent in 2003/04 partly because of the declining share of government 
employment. Job security, therefore, is non-existent for a large and growing majority of workers outside 
9 
government. Informal workers are not covered by most labour regulation, labor protection, or social security 
laws. They receive no pension when old. They often work very long hours at low pay.8 
Table 1.3: Employment status (in %) 
 1993-94 2001-02 2003/04 2005/06 
(Q2) 
Employer 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.79 
Self-employed and unpaid family helper 65.7 59.3 61.2 59.85 
Employees 33.3 39.8 37.9 39.36 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: LFS, various years, Government of Pakistan,  
1.10 Job earnings are low and Pakistan faces the double challenge of providing more jobs while 
also improving earnings and the quality of jobs. Average earnings for salaried employees in 2003/04 were 
Rs.4, 088 per month, equivalent to US$68. For a typical family of six with one person employed the average 
earnings places that family below the poverty line. Earnings for the self-employed are not available in the 
LFS, but from other surveys we know that the self-employed are more likely to be poor than the salaried. The 
Pakistan Social Safety Nets Survey, conducted in 2005, revealed much variation in the wage rate across 
interviewed households. The average wage received by households in the bottom quintile was Rs.86 per day, 
and many individuals in the sample received a much lower wage.  
1.11 Underemployment—seasonal or chronic—is another problem facing many workers, especially those 
in self-employment or agriculture. Underemployment translates into income losses. Many workers in rural 
areas have three “inactive” months in a year where they are mostly unemployed, with some 40-60 idle days 
per year. Average earnings for poor rural workers are less than Rs.2000 per month.  
1.12 Earnings differentials are large -- average earnings in rural areas are 68 percent of earnings in urban 
areas, while female wage employees earn 59 percent of males (although it is not clear if it is for similar work). 
Earnings differentials between rural and urban areas have been diminishing, while those between men and 
women have been increasing. There is a high wage premium to education and to the regularity of the job.  
1.13 Real earnings declined markedly from 1997/98- 2001/02, and recovered somewhat thereafter. 
However, real earnings remain lower in 2003/04 than in 1997/98 (by some 3.5 percent). The main 
reason for declining real earnings is a combination of high labour force growth rate, drought, and sluggish 
economic growth. There is little doubt that the low and declining real wages attenuated by the casualization of 
the job structure provides a key explanation of the increase in poverty during much of this period.  
1.14 Wage outcomes are not equally negative for all groups (see Table 1.4). For elementary workers, the 
focus of the Minimum Wage Legislation, average real earnings eroded by 11 percent from Rs. 2,671 in 
1997/98 to Rs. 2,374 in 2003/04 (in 2000/01 prices). Real earnings in the private sector fell more in the 
informal than in the formal sector. In contrast, government employees saw real wages improve by 21 percent 
on average. Real earnings improved in some industries -- community, social and private services, finance and 
real estate, transport and electricity/gas -- some of which are dominated by the public sector. Real wage gains 
were also made by some of best-paid professional categories. The rest experienced falling real earnings, with a 
sharp fall in real wages of illiterate or less-educated workers.  
                                                 
8 Special surveys of informal sector workers have revealed that they work long hours, in some case beyond 60 hours a week (Kemal 
and Mahmood, 1993). 
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Table 1.4: Nominal and Real earnings by Occupation 1997-98 to 2003-04 All Wage Employees (Pakistan) 
Occupation  1997-98 2001-02 2003-04 
Legislator Senior Officials and Manager  9043 
(10340) 
9475 
(9151) 
12413 
(11117) 
Professionals  4858 
(5589) 
7194 
(6948) 
9905 
(8871) 
Technicians and Associated Professionals 3898 
(4457) 
4239 
(4094) 
5214 
(4669) 
Clerical  4379 
(5007) 
4852 
(4686) 
5243 
(4659) 
Service Worker and Sales  3020 
(3453) 
3227 
(3157) 
3729 
(3339) 
Skilled Agriculture and Fishery Workers  2352 
(2689) 
2853 
(2755) 
3194 
(2860) 
Craft and Related Workers 2840 
(3248) 
3148 
(3040) 
3347 
(2997) 
Plant and Machine Operator  3837 
(4387) 
3888 
(3755) 
4274 
(3828) 
Elementary Occupation  2336 
(2671) 
2305 
(2226) 
2651 
(2374) 
Total  3279 
(3749) 
3432 
(3314) 
4043 
(3621) 
Source: Based on tabulations of the LFS data. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the real wages of the corresponding category with CPI 2000-01 = 100; 1997/98 =87.45 and 2003/04 = 
111.63. 
 
III. Summary and report outline 
1.15 In order to reduce poverty, Pakistan will have to significantly improve its labor market outcomes by 
providing more and jobs.  In the past, the approach taken was often to create jobs in the public sector or in 
publicly owned enterprises. This benefited only the few that were fortunate enough to avail of these 
opportunities. It also created unsustainable fiscal pressures. Another response was migration, which continues 
to bring significant income and foreign exchange to Pakistan thanks to remittances.9 Migration, however, is a 
limited answer and is very dependent on entry restrictions in foreign countries. To improve workers’ earnings 
in Pakistan, better jobs and higher productivity is needed at home. Expansion of private, formal sector 
jobs would go a long way towards accomplishing this. Realizing the potential of industry is a top 
priority of the government.10  This motivates the rest of this report, which focuses largely on 
opportunities for higher job growth in Pakistan’s manufacturing sector.  
1.16 Recognizing that fostering a conducive investment climate (IC) is a prerequisite for private sector 
development, the government has put in place an impressive array of reforms for addressing the key 
constraints faced by the business community. This report centres its lens on two elements of IC 
constraints – labor regulation and skills gap – and reviews labor market (LM) reforms that involve 
broad-based overhaul of labor laws and institutions, and expansion and reform of the vocational and 
technical training (VTT).  
                                                 
9 Pakistan is among the top 20 receivers of remittances, with estimated receipts of US$4.2 billion in 2003. The Government of 
Pakistan has a comprehensive system of emigration under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor, Manpower, and Overseas 
Pakistanis. Under the Emigration Ordinance of 1979, the Ministry’s Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment regulates labor 
emigration in the private sector, while the Overseas Employment Corporation deals with labor emigration in the public sector. For 
further details, pl. see “Migrant labor remittances in South Asia: Development impact and future prospects, The World Bank 2004. 
10 See Towards a Prosperous Pakistan: A Strategy for Rapid Industrial Growth, Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives, 
Government of Pakistan, January 2005.  
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1.17 Chapter Two presents the importance and motivation of labor markets reforms in the Government’s 
policy for private sector development and enhanced competitiveness within the larger context of business 
climate issues in Pakistan. Chapter Three examines the linkage between labor regulation and job creation. In 
particular, it investigates whether labor legislation reduces job creation and employment and pushes firms into 
strategic behavior (for example, employment under temporary appointment) to reduce costs. Chapter Four 
assesses the effects of restrictive labor legislation on training and skills formation.  It also provides an 
overview of the VTT system which has been put in place in Pakistan as a response to skill shortages. In 
Chapter Five current labor market institutions, are reviewed with a focus on employment protection laws and 
institutions and social security provision to workers at the federal and provincial levels. Chapter Six concludes 
with a set of policy recommendations.   
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CHAPTER 2: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, LABOR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS AND LABOR OUTCOMES 
 
I. Introduction  
 
2.1 This chapter discusses the importance and motivation of labor markets reforms in Government of 
Pakistan’s policy for private sector development and job creation. If the objective is to have more and better 
jobs, understanding the larger context of business climate issues that constrain private sector growth and 
productivity is key. We begin with a brief review of the performance of the manufacturing sector in Pakistan 
over time and in comparison to other fast-growing economies.   
 
II. Manufacturing sector’s performance11 
 
2.2 Manufacturing activity has played a lead role in many fast-growing East Asian economies, sustaining 
long term rapid economic growth and employment generation. In Pakistan, as well, the manufacturing sector 
holds great potential for generating economic activity, boosting exports and creating jobs. Despite some 
important early successes, the manufacturing sector performed far below potential. In fifty eight years since 
independence, industry’s share in GDP is still a paltry 18 percent and the share in employment is equally 
unimpressive at 14% (fig. 1.2, Annex table 2.1). Over a period of 33 years (1968-2001), industrial value added 
has increased by a multiple of only 7 percent compared to Korea’s 40, Malaysia’s 27 and Thailand’s 17. East 
Asian economies have also achieved high rates of economic growth over sustained periods of time largely due 
to their strategy of promoting export-oriented industrialization.12 Pakistan’s share in total world exports 
declined slightly between 1990-2002 and the share of manufacturing exports was stagnant at 0.18 percent 
 
Table 2.1:  Pakistan's Share of World Exports 
Total merchandise exports 1990 2002  Export of manufactures 1990 2002 
  % %      
World 100 100  World 100 100 
Top 5 exporters (on 2002 exports):   Top 5 exporters (on 2002 exports):  
China 1.80 5.04  China 1.85 6.21 
Mexico 1.18 2.49  Mexico 1.06 2.88 
Malaysia 0.85 1.44  Malaysia 0.66 1.57 
Thailand 0.67 1.07  Thailand 0.61 1.10 
Brazil 0.91 0.94  Brazil 0.68 0.67 
India 0.52 0.76  India 0.52 0.70 
Pakistan 0.16 0.15   Pakistan 0.18 0.18 
Source: Government of Pakistan, (2005). 
 
(see table 2.1). In sharp contrast China, Malaysia, Thailand and India have seen a rapid expansion in world 
shares of their exports. Exports from Pakistan have picked up sharply in recent years, increasing from US$9 
billion in 2000 to 12.3 billion by 2004 – an increase of 36 percent. The export growth was mainly textile 
driven due to increased access to key markets and large investments. Within the area of export specialization 
                                                 
11 This section draws on GoP’s recent publication titled, Towards a Prosperous Pakistan: A Strategy for Rapid Industrial Growth, 2005. 
12 Export-led industrialization means producing to world standards of competitiveness to enjoy scale economies and profitability. 
Furthermore, a strong export sector generates positive externalities for the non-export sector via transfer of modern management 
practices and production technologies. This leads to sustained long term economic growth and employment generation. 
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only a handful are dynamic products i.e. where world exports are expanding at an increasing rate (see Annex 
table 2.2). What really matters in an increasingly open and competitive world economy is the technological 
sophistication of manufactured exports. The evidence is that even though Pakistan’s share of resource-based 
exports in total exports has decreased in recent years, most exports remain characterized by low technology 
intensity. Low technology exports increased from 53.9% in 1985 to 76.2% in 2002 while the share of 
medium- (MT) and high-technology (HT) exports have barely increased from 7.8% to 8.4% and from 0.2% 
to 0.6% respectively. This is significantly different from the trend in comparator countries - notably in China, 
Malaysia and Thailand - where shares of MT and HT products have witnessed significant increases.  
 
2.3 Strong growth in productivity is often essential for maintaining the international competitiveness of 
domestic industry. As table 2.2 indicates East Asia outpaces Pakistan in the strength of productivity growth, 
along with capital accumulation.13 Although labor expansion is important as a growth source, it does not 
explain the growth variation across countries; it is almost as strong in Pakistan, other South Asian countries 
and East Asia. Driving the difference across countries are capital accumulation and productivity 
improvements. Within Pakistan, the growth decomposition by decades also shows interesting trends (table 
2.3). In the 1960s, growth was clearly driven by capital accumulation while in the following decades it became 
less important, albeit explaining at least one-third of GDP growth.  Productivity growth was quite low in the 
1960s and 1970s and then again in the 1990s. More than capital and labor, productivity expansions were 
behind the recoveries of the 1980s and 2000s. A growth accounting analysis shows that while capital 
accumulation and labor expansion are steady sources of growth in Pakistan, productivity changes accompany 
the fluctuations in GDP growth occurring over time in the country. The results also indicate that total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth itself has been particularly strong in periods when both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic dimensions of the business environment have improved. For example, TFP growth was 
particularly strong in the 1980s, explaining 38 percent of GDP growth rate; and after a fall in the 1990s, it has 
resurged to account for nearly 23 percent of GDP growth since 2001. These findings underline the critical 
importance of improvements in the quality of the investment environment as a critical determinant of factor 
productivity and of overall economic growth.   
 
 
 
2.4 More challenging international environment. East Asia’s experience indicates that by far the most important 
determinant of industrial growth is private investment. Real private investment in Pakistan has picked up in 
the last couple of years. However, there were long periods of investment stagnation (overall and 
manufacturing), most recently in the 1990s which has resulted in a large aggregate investment gap relative to 
comparable countries such as India and Bangladesh. Pakistan’s needs to do much better than the recent 
                                                 
13
 The growth accounting analysis – including tables 2.2 & 2.3 - is drawn directly from the recently completed World Bank report 
titled, Pakistan Growth and Export Competitiveness, April 25, 2006, Report No. 35499. 
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increase in the real rate of private investment to bridge the investment gap with competitors. With world 
markets increasingly more competitive, unless the structural weaknesses of industry are not addressed 
urgently, the gap may even increase over time. To meet these challenges, putting policies to work that 
stimulate private investment and higher productivity is key.  
 
2.5 While the report’s focus is on improving labor outcomes through reform of labor market 
institutions, it is important to reinforce upfront that labor market reforms represent only one – albeit critical - 
element of the reforms needed for creating productive jobs in Pakistan. LM outcomes depend as much on 
non-labor factors emerging from the microeconomic dimensions of investment climate as the functioning of 
labor markets. Policymakers in Pakistan recognize that in tandem with maintaining macroeconomic stability,14 
fostering a conducive investment climate (IC) for private sector growth, is pivotal to addressing the challenge 
of creating more and better jobs.15 The next section briefly discusses the gamut of investment climate 
constraints that the private sector countenance in Pakistan.  
 
 
III. Overview of Pakistan’s investment climate16 
 
2.6 Critical micro-level reforms are those that reduce the 'cost of doing' business through improvements 
in infrastructure (i.e. electricity power, transport logistics/trade facilitation); economic governance issues (i.e. 
factors like quality of public institutions, tax administration. regulation, law and order, political uncertainty, 
corruption, and contract enforcement); and efficiency of factor markets (particularly labor and access to 
credit); and skills gap. These core services constitute the 'enabling' Investment Climate (IC). Recent 
assessments of investment climate show that Pakistan still lags significantly behind many developing countries 
in both the quality of business environment and strength of growth competitiveness: out of 116 countries, 
Pakistan ranks 65th in global “Business Competitiveness’ with respect to the quality of its business 
environment, reflecting a substantial gap in Pakistan’s comparative standing in microeconomic fundamentals 
 
                                                 
14 For detailed analysis of macroeconomic dimensions of economic growth, refer to World Bank (2002b), Pakistan, Development Policy 
Review – A New Dawn?? South Asia Region, Report no. 23915-PAK; World Bank (2004a), Pakistan: Public Expenditure Management- Strategic 
Issues and Reform Agenda, South Asia Region, Report no. 25665- PAK. 
15
 See GOP (2005) and PRSP 2003. 
16
 This section draws on the recently completed World Bank (March 2006) report, Pakistan: Growth and Export Competitiveness, 
and the earlier Pakistan Investment Climate Assessment Report (Akhlaque et al.  2003). 
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Figure 2.1: Pakistan - Obstacles to business growth, 2002
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of productivity and competitiveness.17   With respect to ‘Growth Competitiveness’ – which captures the state 
of macroeconomic conditions, public institutions, and technology - Pakistan ranks  83rd out of 117 countries.  
Only Bangladesh and Sri Lanka ranked lower than Pakistan in South and South East Asia.  Pakistan appears 
even weaker in certain sub-components of the overall ‘Global Competitiveness’, including education and 
health in general, and higher education and training in particular.  
 
2.7 These findings are not a big surprise to Pakistan’s private sector as they are aligned to the reform 
priorities articulated by the country’s business community (see figure 2.1).18 There is indeed a consensus 
among the business community, policy makers,19 and academics20 that Pakistan’s below potential growth 
performance and low competitiveness is linked to these IC weaknesses, and that despite the gamut of on-
going reforms there is still a significant ground to cover in improving Pakistan’s investment environment. 
Labor regulation and skills gap constraints are two areas where this is equally true.  As figure 2.2 and 2.3 
indicate, stringent labor regulations and skill gaps are identified by managers in Pakistan as critical bottlenecks 
for business growth and productivity. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 See Global Competitiveness Report (2005-06). 
18
 The findings are based on an Investment Climate survey of nearly one thousand mainly manufacturing businesses in eight 
industries across Pakistan. The survey was carried out by SMEDA of the Government of Pakistan during 2002 in collaboration with 
the World Bank Group. This subjective evaluation of the main problems in the investment climate shows the percent of firms that 
rated the bottleneck as “severe” or worse.   
19 This is well-documented in Poverty Reduction Strategy paper document (2003), Pakistan Economic Survey (2005), and State Bank 
of Pakistan Annual Report (2005).  
20
 See for instance, Kemal, A.R. (2004). 
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IV. Labor regulation and skills gap constraints 
 
 
2.8 When evaluated through objective indictors, both labor market and skill gap constraints pose a far 
more serious constraint in Pakistan compared to other countries/regions than estimated by perception 
surveys (see Figure 2.4). Pakistan has rigid employment regulations – ranking 91st in the world on the ease of 
hiring and firing.21 Performance is particularly weak on indicators of hiring and the cost of firing. When an 
employer hires a worker in Pakistan, he must pay 14% of the salary in social security and payroll taxes, 
compared with 6% on average in the region. Regulations on hiring are even more burdensome, ranking 
Pakistan at 125th worldwide on the difficulty of hiring indicator. Term contracts can only be used for fixed 
term tasks, and apply for a maximum of just 9 months. An employer must pay 90 weeks in severance, 
penalties and notices to dismiss a worker – ranking Pakistan 126th on the cost of firing.  The discretionary 
approach of provincial inspectors, labor tribunals, and wage authorities in enforcing requirements and 
adjudicating disputes adds considerable uncertainty to labor market outcomes.  The result is that many, if not 
most, firms circumvent labor laws to some degree, most often by using contracted or piece rate labor on a 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Doing Business in South Asia 2006.   
Figure 2.2: Labor regulation as an obstacle (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
 
 
Fig 2.3: Constrained by Skill Shortages (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
 
Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
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very short-term basis and often hired through intermediaries.  While avoiding costs of complying with labor 
regulations, such practices not only undermine the social protection needs of workers but suppress labor 
productivity.      
 
Fig. 2.4 
 
2.9 The skills gap constraint is compounded by the fact that Pakistan is not investing in human capital 
development to the level achieved by some of its neighbors, and this under-investment has the potential to 
inhibit future investment and development of high value added products and services for external and 
internal markets. As table 2.4 indicates, the percentage of GDP allocated to education and training in Pakistan 
is far below its competitors, and below the average of South Asia. This has resulted in a serious short fall in 
secondary and tertiary enrollment, a low literacy rate, and low average years of schooling in the population.  
The percentage of professional technology workers in Pakistan is significantly lagging behind its competitors. 
Interestingly, the frequency and depth of “cluster development” is greater than neighboring countries which 
indicates that there is potential for increased internal and external investment if conditions, including the 
availability of human capital, are present. 
 
Table 2.4: Comparative Human Capital Indicators 
Indicator Turkey Malaysia Phil Pakistan 
South 
Asia 
Human Development Index 0.75 0.79 0.75   0.52 0.57 
Public spending on education (1999; % GDP) * 3.7 7.9 3.2 1.8 2.6 
Secondary school enrollment (%) 76 70 82 26 49 
Post Sec. Tertiary enrollment (%)  24   26 30 3.5 6.1 
Adult literacy (%) 86 88 95 47 57 
Professionals/technology workers as 
percentage of work force 
11 11 7.1 5.3 6 
Extent of staff training (1-7 scale) 3.6 5.1 3.9 3.0 3.1 
Cluster Development (1-7 scale) 3.6 3.9 3.3 4.2 3.8 
Average years of schooling 5.2 6.8 8.2 3.8 4.1 
   Source: World Bank Institute, Fretwell, 2005 
 
2.10 Labor regulation - objective versus outcome: In theory, labor market regulation and legislation are useful 
economic and social institutions designed to protect workers from undesirable consequences of market 
failure such as arbitrary or discriminatory actions by employers. Labor regulation is also an important element 
of society’s instruments for the provision of social security and the maintenance of health, safety, and 
environmental standards in economic activities. Labor laws help stabilize employment and household 
incomes against aggregate business cycles and shocks. The stable and longer-term employment relationships 
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that labor laws are intended to promote are also a source of productivity growth from the employers’ point of 
view in as far as they foster employee loyalty and provide the incentive for innovation and on-the-job skill 
formation. On the other hand, when excessive labor regulation tends to choke off job creation; it can also 
undermine innovation and the development of industrial skills by raising the cost of durable employment 
relations. This is what seems to have happened in Pakistan. As the analysis in chapters three and four 
underlines, labor regulation apparently has raised the cost of long-term employment relationship so high that 
the private sector is not creating good-quality jobs as fast as it should; nor is it helping finance the training 
that Pakistan’s industrial workforce needs to effectively compete in global markets.  
 
2.11 Major aspects of employment protection legislation (EPL) relate to (a) basic rights including the right 
to organize, join trade unions, form associations, undertake collective bargaining, hiring and firing policies, 
access to dispute resolution mechanisms, and procedures and costs imposed on employers when laying off 
workers; (b) working conditions, including minimum wages, working hours, overtime work, leave 
entitlements, and so forth; (c) social security and labor welfare schemes and programs supported through 
taxation of employers; and (d) working environment, including maintenance of occupational health, hygiene, 
and safety standards. Implementation and enforcement of labor laws is supported by an elaborate inspection 
system and dispute resolution institutions functioning at federal and provincial levels.  
 
2.12 While much of the labor regulation predates independence, over time a series of new laws were 
introduced22 culminating in the pro-labor reforms of 1972 by a government that envisioned an active role for 
the state in commercial and productive activities, as well as in extensively defining and protecting employment 
rights of workers.23 Key areas where laws were tilted in favor of employees during the 1970s included: 
weakening the power and freedom of employers to hire and fire workers; encouraging labor unionism and 
inducting labor representatives into management; imposing new labor levies; and introducing maximum 
working hours, special working regulations for women, and overtime and leave benefits.24 The overall effect 
of these measures has been increased cost of production and reduced flexibility for employers.25 
 
2.13 Aside from reducing labor market flexibility, there is evidence that the various labor regulations have 
failed to deliver on their purported social protection objectives (Issues and Policies Consultants, 2005). 
Specifically, the social security and welfare programs that aim to improve the welfare of workers in the formal 
sector - by providing services such as health care, education for their children, old-age income support, and 
other financial benefits26 - deliver very few benefits workers value. In fact, some employers choose to provide 
their own health coverage because of the perceived shortcomings of the social security system (Issues and 
Policies Consultants, 2005). With rigid regulation, employers also choose to hire conservatively, with young and 
female workers often being denied job opportunities.  Along with falling short of its objectives, the current 
                                                 
22 For instance, the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, removed all restrictions on registration of up to two unions in an industrial 
establishment. A third union could be formed only if the membership of the third union was no less than a fifth of the total 
workforce in that establishment. Following the 1961 Minimum Wage Ordinance that introduced minimum wages for industrial workers, 
the West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance 1969 was passed. 
23 See Issues and Policy Consultants (2005); Ilahi N., Z. Naqvi, A. Nasim, A. Akhlaque., “Policy-induced Distortions and the Demand for 
Unskilled Agricultural and Industrial Labor in Pakistan,” processed, April (1995), Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan; 
World Bank (1989). “Pakistan’s Employment Issues and Prospects”, Report No. 7523-PAK, World Bank, Washington DC. 
24 The reforms not only revised the limits of a number of welfare benefits which were already available to workers but also introduced 
additional pro-labor laws. For instance, the Workers’ Children Education Ordinance was passed - this ordinance is applicable to all 
establishments employing ten or more workers. The employer is required to contribute Rs.100 per worker to the provincial 
government as an education cess. The provincial government is required to provide free education to one child of every worker up to 
matriculation, and thereafter in a polytechnic or vocational training institution. In 1976, Employees’ Old Age Act came into effect, which 
led to the establishment of the Employees’ Old Age Benefits Institution (EOBI). This ordinance is applicable to all establishments 
employing ten or more workers. To obtain this benefit, 15 years of service is required, and the worker must contribute five percent of 
his/her wage to the plan. This Act fixes the retirement age for male workers at 60 years and for females at 55 years.  
25 See Ilahi, Naqvi,  Nasim, Akhlaque (1995).  
26 The programs are instituted under specific labor laws and implemented by provincial and federal governments. This paper takes the 
view that all the contribution-based labor welfare programs - despite their current fragmented administration - constitute a social security 
system with similar target groups and modes of financing. Social security is also the only formal safety net for this group of workers.  
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regulatory framework has had a negative impact on skills formation and firm productivity. This “unintended” 
consequence is played out, inter alia, through increasing reliance of the formal sector firms on “temporary” 
workers. 
 
2.14 Motivation for reforms: Cognizant of the need to reform the existing system, the Government of 
Pakistan (GoP) has announced a two track labor market (LM) reform agenda involving broad-based overhaul 
of labor laws and institutions, and expansion and reform of the vocational and technical training (VTT).  The 
impetus for LM reforms has come from two quarters: the private sector and employee associations. Within 
the private sector, the primary lobby for reform, not surprisingly, has emerged from the textile and clothing 
sector, which comprises more than 70 percent of total export revenues in Pakistan. With the abolition of the 
system of quotas on January 1, 2005, installed under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), this sector faces 
the brunt of global competitive pressures, with survival depending on improved productivity.  At the same 
time, the government confronts mounting pressures from labor unions and employees’ associations seeking 
reform of the dysfunctional social security and welfare programs. The challenge is to strike a balance by 
reducing the burden of labor regulation on businesses while helping provide workers with adequate 
protection from employment and income volatility and the adverse consequences of market failure.  
 
2.15 In 2002, a new labor policy was announced which set in motion a wide-ranging program of labor 
market reforms. The policy sought, among other things, consolidation and rationalization of labor laws, 
revision of key legal provisions related to enhancing the autonomy of enterprises in retrenchment, flexible 
working hours and flexibility in hiring, institutional reform to facilitate bilateral dispute resolution 
improvements in social security and labor welfare programs, structural changes relating to the accessibility 
and speed of justice in labor-related matters, and strengthened regulation of contract labor. 
 
2.16 From the supply side, worker productivity levels depend as much or more on investments in human 
capital through education and training as they do on labor market institutions. Weak skills also impede the 
ability of the poor to benefit from economic growth through participation in the labor market. The expansion 
and reform of vocational and technical training VTT is being undertaken with an aim of addressing both 
these concerns. Scaling up and improving the quality of the output of technical manpower from these 
institutions is considered critical to meeting the competitive pressures resulting from globalization. The 
government is planning major new investments which would strengthen and provide leadership for VTT, 
coordinate what is now a rather fragmented system, and administer the construction of 2,949 new institutions 
with a capacity of about one million students.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
2.17 Existing labor regulation in Pakistan is considered antiquated and rigid. It is neither conducive to 
factor market fluidity of the type needed to reduce informality and support dynamic competitiveness nor does 
it deliver on its social protection objectives. Labor policy, nonetheless, is a highly contested area of reform in 
many countries, and Pakistan is no exception. From the worker's point of view, the trade-off is between job 
security for incumbents versus the creation of more (new) jobs. From the employer’s perspective, the key is 
to strike a balance between increased labor flexibility and improving productivity growth through continual 
improvement of skills (that is, skill formation). Understanding the nature and costs of these trade-offs is 
essential for the successful design and implementation of reforms. 
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CHAPTER 3:  LABOR REGULATION AND JOB CREATION 
I. Introduction 
 
3.1  While the earlier chapter argued that the existing labor regulation in Pakistan has reduced flexibility 
for employers, it still does not say exactly how labor laws affect flexibility. This chapter examines this second 
question and provides an assessment of the impact of labor regulation on job creation. 
 
II. Regulation and Rise of “Temporary” Labor 
 
3.2.  Do Unions Matter? A possible measure of the extent to which the labor market is regulated is the 
power that unions might play in employment protection or wage determination. Part of the difficulty in 
assessing this power is that firms might engage in union avoidance by, for example, staying smaller than 
the size threshold specified in union laws. The effect of unions on labor market flexibility cannot 
therefore be evaluated simply by looking at the correlation between unionization rates and labor market 
outcomes. Still, the degree of unionization of Pakistan’s industrial labor force is so low that it does not 
seem that unions have anything to do with the performance of the industrial labor market (figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Ironically, the most significant evidence of the rigidity of employment protection laws is that nearly 
one third of employees of businesses work on a “temporary” basis,27  which is very high by almost any 
standard.28 Compared to its South Asian neighbors, Pakistan has one of the highest shares of temporary employees, as a 
percentage of the total formal manufacturing sector labor force: India stands at 15 percent, Bangladesh at 3 percent, 
whereas Pakistan is at 36 percent (Figure 3.2). Earlier studies have shown that these figures may be much 
larger as employers tend to underreport temporary workers, thus avoiding the provisions of the law.  
                                                 
27 This figure is based on the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) survey data that covered formal sector businesses in Pakistan. In 
the Pakistan IC survey instrument temporary workers were defined as “all paid short-term - i.e. less than a year - employees with no 
guarantee of renewal of contract.”   
28This figure is not very different from earlier estimates. According to Ilahi. et al. (1995) 32 percent of the total workforce in the 
manufacturing sector in Pakistan comprised contract and irregular workers. When only production workers were considered, 
percentage increased to 36. This figure is estimated to have reached 45-50 percent in the early 1990s. In fact in the textile sector alone, 
it is estimated that almost half the unskilled and semi-skilled work-force is employed through contractors and that the trend is on the 
rise. It has been argued by many studies that businesses usually under-report employment of temporary workers, so these figures may 
be under-estimated (see System Ltd. (1989). 
Fig. 3.1: Unionization (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
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III. Impact of “Temporary” Labor 
 
3.4  The system of “temporary” or “contract” labor in manufacturing is neither a new nor necessarily a 
bad phenomenon. In globally competitive, time sensitive and sometimes volatile international markets, 
employing temporary workers may be the rational and agile choice. Indeed, the practice has been in existence 
in many different forms and sectors as an effective medium of employment in many developed and 
developing countries, including Pakistan. What is noteworthy, and of concern, is the increased magnitude of 
“temporary” workers in the manufacturing sector, subsequent to pro-labor legislation of 1972.29 Studies have shown 
that after the labor reforms of 1972, formal sector firms have found alternatives to mitigate the effects of 
labor laws by resorting to a combination of subcontracting of production, and hiring of “temporary” labor or 
piece rate labor on a short-term basis - hired often through intermediaries.30 The legislation was considered by 
industrialists “a reflex action to the nationalization policy and vocalization of labor and unions activities in the 1970s. 
Specifically, contractors and contract workers were the tools in the hands of industrialists to counter balance the forces of the labor 
unions, to stop the declining profits rates and operate firms with minimum owners personal involvement” (Systems Ltd. 1989). 
The phenomenon of hiring of temporary or contract labor received a tremendous boost during the 1982-4 
period when numerous firms closed down for a short period, fired the regular employees and re-opened their 
units with a new organization or a new name but with a fewer regular and greater number of “contract” 
workers.31  
  
3.5  There are two main advantages from the employers’ perspective of reliance on “temporary” workers: 
(i) cost savings from not paying workers welfare/social security contributions; and (ii) flexibility in staffing 
patterns and levels by ensuring a hassle-free firing process. From the legal perspective, social security laws and 
taxes are applicable for both permanent and “temporary” workers.  In practice however, because of weak 
enforcement and corrupt practices, temporary workers seldom receive any benefits. If abused by the 
                                                 
29 An earlier study estimated that 32 percent of the total workforce in the manufacturing sector in Pakistan comprised contract and 
irregular workers. When only production workers were considered, the percentage increased to 36. This figure is estimated to have 
reached 45-50 percent in the early 1990s. In fact in the textile sector alone, it is estimated that almost half the unskilled and semi-
skilled work-force is employed through contractors and that the trend is on the rise ( see Ilahi., Naqvi, Nasim, Akhlaque, 1995).   
30 See Ilahi, Naqvi, Nasim, Akhlaque (1995); and System Ltd. (1989). 
31 This was implicitly encouraged by the policies of the then-martial regime that took over power from the populist government of 
Z.A Bhutto. Restoring private sector confidence and investment was the motivation.  
Fig 3.2: Share of Temporary Workers (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
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employer, they have no recourse to the courts, because the employment relationship is not documented and 
is “quasi-legal.” 
  
3.6  Since “temporary” workers are effectively denied coverage of binding employment protection 
provisions32 a firm which has a larger proportion of its workforce on temporary contracts would seem to 
have greater flexibility in adjusting its manpower to technological or product market developments. However, 
this advantage in flexibility of staffing has to be weighed against obvious advantages of stable and longer-term 
employment relationships, both from the point of view of employers and that of workers. Key advantages of 
employment stability are loyalty and the constant upgrading of skills firms need to sustain within their 
workforce in order to remain competitive through innovation and the adoption of new technology. If firms 
choose to forgo these advantages of stable employment relationships then it can only be because excessive 
regulation has raised the cost of the relationships to prohibitive levels. This indeed seems to be the case in 
Pakistani industry at the moment. Firms apparently have responded to what seem to be costly regulation of 
permanent employment by relying on temporary labor to a greater extent than they would have in a less 
regulated environment. 
 
IV. Job Creation in Manufacturing Sector 
 
3.7  Recourse to high rates of temporary workers has no doubt helped increase the job creation rate of 
Pakistani firms beyond what it would otherwise have been. The job creation rate is, nonetheless, too low for 
the observed rate of growth of output. Given Pakistan’s status as a labor surplus economy, this should be of 
significant concern to policy makers.  As figure 3.3 indicates, industrial employment in Pakistan appears to 
have grown recently at a far smaller pace than would have been expected for the observed growth rate in 
output. Over the two-year period covered by survey, manufacturing employment grew at about 5 percent in 
the typical establishment.  
 
3.8  This is not necessarily too small a figure in and of itself. Although it is significantly less than the pace 
of net job creation in countries such as Sri Lanka and South Africa, and less than the average for developing 
economies as a whole (3 percent), it is also substantially higher than that registered in, for example,  China (-
2.0 percent) and the Philippines (0 percent) (figure 3.3 and table 3.1). The problem is that the rate is only a 
third of the average sales growth rate per establishment reported for the same period (figure 3.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 As discussed later in chapter 4, even when laws – particularly, the social security laws and working conditions -  are applicable to 
temporary workers, their implementation is so poor that workers are, de facto, unable to access any benefits legally due to them.  While 
full coverage and enforcement of legal provisions may also be lacking for permanent workers, the fact that it is easier to ‘hide’ 
temporary workers makes the latter’s predicament much worse. 
Fig 3.3: Two-year employment growth rate (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
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Fig 3.4: Two year sales growth rate (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
 
 
 
Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9 Table 3.2 shows this is the outcome of an unusually low industrial employment output elasticity and 
significant increases in wage rates, and would have been worse had it not been for exceptionally low wage 
elasticity of labor demand. The table is based on the estimation of establishment level labor demand functions 
based on the World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys dataset. Details of estimates and the underlying 
methodology are provided in Annex 3.1 A. 
 
3.10 The average factory level output elasticity of employment for businesses and periods covered by the 
World Bank IC surveys is less than 20 percent as compared to an average of 40 percent for the rest of South 
Asia and an average of 31 percent  for all developing and transitional economies (see table 3.2). This means 
that, setting aside wage developments, more than twice as many jobs would have been created elsewhere in 
South Asia at Pakistan’s average industrial output growth rate. The growth rate of employment that the 
average sales growth rate of Pakistani firms implies at the average output elasticity of employment of rest of 
South Asia is 4.7 percent as opposed to the actual employment growth rate of 2.1 percent (table 3.3). The 
counterfactual number of jobs created is even higher if we use, instead, the average output elasticity estimate 
for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean or the average for Europe and Central Asia.  
 
3.11 The actual job creation gaps of Pakistan compared to other developing countries, as indicated by 
table 3.2, are not as high as what is suggested by Pakistan’s relatively low output elasticity of employment 
figure of 20 percent. This is because the wage elasticity of employment is also exceptionally low (-3.5 percent) 
Pakistan South Asia China East Asia Mid East & Africa ECA LAC All 
excl. Pak excl. China North Afr. 
(1) Proportion of businesses  rating the following 
as a major/servere obstacle to business growth 
Labor regulation 0.37 0.28 0.18 0.49 0.14 0.49 0.27 0.46 0.31 
Skill shorages 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.44 0.20 0.53 0.28 0.54 0.35 
Entry regulation 0.53 0.47 0.20 0.54 0.72 0.53 0.47 0.56 0.46 
 (2) Sample averages of  
Proportion of temporary workers 0.32 0.22 0.31 0.06 0.29 0.26 0.08 0.11 0.20 
Log(ratio of unskilled to skilled workers) 0.29 0.17 0.58 0.62 0.51 0.25 0.91 0.43 1.22 
Log (ratio of skilled wages to unskilled wages) 0.74 1.01 2.72 0.93 0.80 1.37 0.70 0.99 1.29 
Percent with secondary education (completed) 31.11 50.32 52.90 38.70 64.60 59.04 74.50 41.13 35.30 
Proportion of business sponsoring OJT 0.15 0.24 0.85 0.24 0.23 0.53 0.38 0.59 0.48 
Proportion of unionized workers  0.07 0.15 0.94 0.28 0.20 0.57 0.98 0.79 0.50 
Proportion of foreign owned 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.05 0.09 0.11 
Proportion of exporters  0.19 0.41 0.24 0.42 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.36 0.33 
Average log employment 3.45 3.99 4.58 5.10 3.79 4.10 3.41 3.27 3.92 
Average log age 2.57 2.83 2.62 2.84 2.84 2.89 2.76 2.76 2.75 
(3) Average annual growth rate of estab. 
Sales revenue 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Cost of labor 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.14 
Employment 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Table 3.1:  Means of key variables used in the analysis 
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in Pakistan while wages grew significantly in all countries, including Pakistan, over the same period. Also, 
although wage growth in Pakistan was significantly higher than that reported for the rest of South Asia and 
Africa, it was much lower than growth observed in other developing regions. This meant that employment 
was held down by rising wages more in other developing countries than in Pakistan. For example, industrial 
employment would have been lower by almost 2 percentage points in Pakistan if the wage elasticity of 
employment was as high as that of the rest of South Asia. The counterfactual employment losses that would 
have resulted from Pakistani wage increases had employment been as wage elastic as in other regions is 
shown in table 3.3 (column 1). For example, the wage increases observed for Pakistan would have resulted in 
a 2 percent fall in employment at the rest of South Asia’s wage elasticity. Although the losses are thus quite 
high, it is also clear from table 3.3 (column 2), they are more than outweighed by the higher job gains that 
would have been achieved if employment in Pakistan were as output elastic as it is in other regions. Again to 
pursue the same example, at the output elasticity of the rest of South Asia, the employment growth due from 
the Pakistan’s average firm output growth rate is 4.7 percent. We combine the opposing effects that 
Pakistan’s actual wage increases and actual output growth would have had on industrial employment but 
using other regions’ employment elasticity figures in table 3.3 (third column). What we see is that Pakistan’s 
job creation rate would have been significantly higher at everyone else’s elasticity figures, and much greater at 
those of Latin America and the Caribbean or those of Europe and Central Asia. In particular it would have 
been 0.63 percent higher at the output and wage elasticity’s of the rest of South Asia. 
 
                                   Table 3.2 :    Establishment Level Output Growth, Employment and Wages 
      
            Annual growth rate in establishment level     
  Employment     Annual wages per Annual output 
Elasticity of 
employment with 
              employee   respect to   
         Wages  Output 
Pakistan 2.13 % 9.36 % 11.82 % -3.50 % 19.58 % 
South Asia excl. PAK 3.05 % 7.11 % 11.00 % -21.14 % 40.01 % 
China 0.37 % 14.42 % 15.60 % -15.36 % 21.33 % 
East Asia excl. CHN 2.58 % 22.94 % 13.79 %             NA      NA 
Mid East & North 
Africa. 5.50 % 11.47 % 12.91 % -21.50 % 41.87 % 
Africa 5.59 % 8.53 % 9.95 % -16.95 % 36.09 % 
ECA 3.46 % 16.20 % 15.29 % -32.55 % 58.10 % 
LAC 5.32 % 20.56 % 13.95 % -12.11 % 48.26 % 
Developing/transitional 
economics  3.29 % 14.06 % 13.78 % -15.50 % 31.21 % 
 
 
Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
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3.12 It thus seems safe to conclude that low (output and wage) labor demand elasticity is part of the 
explanation for why industrial job creation rates are not higher. This is in spite of the fact that high output 
elasticity of employment and high wage elasticity of employment compensate each other, and, taken together, 
tend to stabilize employment over business cycles. This tendency is indeed one of the reasons why, in 
principle, high labor demand elasticities should be regarded as essential elements of a well-functioning labor 
market.  There is, of course, nothing inherently good or bad about low wage elasticity of labor demand or low 
output elasticity of employment from the social point of view if either is regarded in isolation from the other. 
Indeed, as highlighted in an influential paper on the consequences of globalization (Rodrik, 1997), high wage 
elasticity could have adverse distributional and stabilization implications if considered in isolation from the 
effect of growth on employment, or outside the context of the interaction between the labor market and 
product markets. In a general equilibrium setting, high wage and output elasticities of employment signify an 
economy that would adjust more quickly to aggregate demand or labor supply shocks. On the other hand, 
although fewer jobs would be lost to a recession in a system where labor demand is wage inelastic and output 
is inelastic for some reason, the same combination is capable of producing episodes of jobless growth in 
better times, as in the Indian industry in the 1980s (Bhalotra, 1998).33  In circumstances of “unlimited labor 
supply” characterized by low income economies such as Pakistan, low wage elasticity of labor demand in the 
“formal sector” is also a key ingredient of labor market segmentation: it provides greater security for formal 
sector job holders, but at the cost of lower capacity of industry to absorb new entries to the labor force.  
 
3.13 All things considered, Pakistan would thus seem to be better off if it had higher wage and output 
elasticities of industrial employment than it actually has at present. This is partly because greater elasticities of 
labor demand mean higher job creation rates. It is also partly because high output elasticity of employment 
and high wage elasticity of labor demand tend to compensate each other, offsetting the tendency of either to 
generate volatility of employment. Above all, it is because it seems to put the economy in a better position to 
cope with exogenous shocks to aggregate demand, to labor supply, or to other factor markets than would be 
the case were labor demand inelastic in other dimensions. 
 
3.14 While the concept of labor demand elasticity is distinct from that of labor market rigidity, the two are 
inseparable and almost synonymous in the present context. Since there are no effective administrative 
controls over wage rates or over the allocation of jobs or manpower across sectors or regions, rigidity in 
Pakistan’s industrial labor market is best understood in terms of labor demand elasticity. The fact that 
employment in Pakistan does not seem to respond as readily to output growth trends or to wage changes as 
in comparable countries is the outcome of low curvature of smooth labor demand and employment functions 
rather than the discontinuities government wage-price controls or administrative rationing of jobs would have 
introduced. The outcome, nonetheless, is the same in terms of the capacity of the economy to adjust to labor 
market or aggregate demand shocks. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
3.15 An analysis of the World Bank’s global enterprise level ICS database shows that both entry and 
product market regulation and labor regulation have had the effect of reducing labor demand elasticities in 
developing countries, including Pakistan. By entry and product market regulation we mean business licensing 
and permit requirements, as well as domestic and foreign trade policies that have a bearing on the degree of 
competition under which domestic firms operate. It turns out that employment is more responsive to changes 
                                                 
33 Formal manufacturing employment declined in India in the 1980s following measures that significantly deregulated industry and 
liberalized trade. This was in spite of the fact that output increased as a result of the reforms. However, as the reforms intensified in 
the 1990s formal manufacturing employment grew along with output, but at different rates across sub-national regions. Based on the 
estimation of a dynamic specification sector level labor demand, Bhaltora (1998) attributes job losses in the 1980s partly to increases 
in the product wage, but also and to a greater to increases in capacity utilization (or increases in hours and Total Factor Productivity 
TFP) that deregulation and investment in public infrastructure induced. Once the labor de-hoarding of the 1980s was over, she 
argues, “employment growth was restored in the 1990s [as] the rate of productivity increase slowed down.’  
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in output and wage rates in more competitive industries.  This is very much in line with what economists call 
Marshall’s Second Law of Derived Demand. The demand for labor that makes companies employ people is 
derived demand in the sense that it varies with the demand for the product that the labor is used to produce. 
By definition, the demand that any particular producer faces is more price elastic for any particular producer 
the more competitive the industry in which it operates. This means that firms that face less competition in the 
market for their produce would adjust their employment levels to changes in wage rates or product demand 
less readily than firms that face stronger competition. There is evidence that this association between the 
competitiveness of domestic industry and employment decisions is part of the reason why employment 
elasticities are low in Pakistan. Thus, one way in which Pakistan’s industrial labor market could be made more 
flexible is by making industry itself more competitive. 
 
3.16 A second and more direct way of achieving labor market flexibility is to reduce the cost and scope of 
labor regulation, the association of which with low labor demand elasticities currently characterizing 
Pakistan’s industries is even more evident from an analysis of Investment Climate Survey data. Labor 
regulation reduces the wage elasticity of employment because employment protection legislation and its 
practice restrict firms’ readiness to substitute labor for capital, or vice-versa, as one gets more expensive 
relative to the other. It is important to note that, as discussed later in Chapter 5, some of these laws are 
confined to permanent workers (for example, firing and industrial grievances provisions), while others are 
equally applicable to temporary workers (for example, social security laws) but because of weak 
implementation are de facto being violated. What is directly impacted by them is therefore the elasticity of 
demand for permanent workers rather than the elasticity of demand for temporary workers. However, since 
permanent workers and temporary workers are rarely perfect substitutes, employment would always involve 
some mixture of permanent workers with temporary workers no matter how stringent or relaxed labor 
regulation is. As a result, the overall labor-demand elasticity – that is, the elasticity of sum total of temporary 
workers and permanent workers -- depends on how stringent labor regulation is. For any given elasticity of 
substitution between temporary workers and permanent workers the proportion of temporary workers 
depends on the cost of permanent workers relative to temporary workers. The more stringent employment 
protection and industrial dispute resolution laws are, the more expensive the unit cost of labor under 
permanent contracts becomes relative to the cost of a unit of labor under temporary contract. As long as 
businesses are profit maximizers, this means the share of temporary workers becomes larger as labor 
regulation becomes more stringent.  Since temporary workers are more readily substitutable for non-labor 
inputs than permanent workers, this in turn means the overall elasticity of labor demand is greater where 
labor regulation is stricter. 
 
3.17 This is indeed what employment and wage data show (Table A3 in Annex A), not only for Pakistan, 
but also for developing economies generally. Paradoxically, it is a form of evidence that labor regulation does 
indeed reduce the elasticity of employment. For, although the overall labor demand elasticity rises as firms 
respond to more stringent labor laws by resorting to greater reliance on temporary labor, this occurs to the 
degree that regulation reduces the elasticity of demand for permanent labor. 
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CHAPTER 4: LABOR REGULATION AND SKILL FORMATION 
I. Introduction 
 
4.1 The discussion in chapter three has highlighted how firms have responded to tighter labor legislation 
in Pakistan by increasing the proportion of temporary workers among their employees. This, to some extent, 
helped mitigate the tendency of regulation to reduce the rate of job creation for a given growth rate of 
output.34 However, as already noted, this comes at the cost of all the advantages that accrue to firms and 
employees from stable and long term employment relationships. In particular, too much reliance on 
temporary employment undermines the incentives workers and firms would have to participate or sponsor 
on-the-job skill formation schemes. This should be of particular concern in a country like Pakistan, where 
average level of schooling is very low even by developing country standards, and the existing VTT system 
falls short of expectations.  
 
4.2 This chapter investigates and analyzes the effects of restrictive labor legislation on training and skills 
formation.  It also provides a critical overview of the VTT system which has been put in place in Pakistan as a 
response to skill shortages. The next section briefly presents the education and skills characteristics of the 
existing labor force in Pakistan. 
 
 
II. Labor force with low education 
 
4.3 The skills of Pakistani workers are improving, but from a very weak base. More than half (53 
percent) of the labor force is illiterate (fig. 4.1). However, this is a significant improvement since 1987/88, 
when 65 percent were illiterate. Only 21.5 percent of workers had matriculation (grade 10) or higher in 2004, 
up from 18.4 percent in 1998. There is no substitute for a basic school education: technical and vocational 
training can add to, but not replace the cognitive skills acquired from quality education. Pakistan has little 
hope to compete in the global knowledge economy before the skills of its workers improve. At the same time, 
weak skills also impede the ability of the poor to benefit from economic growth through participation in the 
labor market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Chapter 5 will review in detail the binding elements within the labor laws that negatively impact employers’ flexibility in terms of 
employment levels and staffing patterns. 
Figure 4.1: Pakistan: Skills of the labor force 
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Source: LFS, various years. 
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4.4 Table 4.1 shows the average levels of schooling of the labor force in Pakistan, compared to other 
countries, over the past decades; along with Bangladesh, Pakistan has consistently been at the lower end of 
the rankings. Worse, Pakistan’s normalized scores on the Human Development Index literacy and enrollment 
rates (Secondary and Tertiary) fell between 1995 and 2004, indicating that gains made in basic education were 
less than those achieved in other developing countries of the world. No surprise then that only about one-
third of the workforce of the manufacturing businesses in Pakistan completed secondary education, as 
compared to, for example, more than half for the rest of South Asia (see figure 4.2).35  
 
 
Table 4.1:  Education and workers skills 
 Barro-Lee Education Indicators Harbison - Myers Skills Index 
 
Average Years of Schooling 
Percent of Population without 
Schooling 
1998 1985 
 
2000 1985 1960 
200
0 
1985 1960 Rank of 98 Score Rank of 98 Score 
Pakistan 3.88 2.14 0.74 51.0 72.8 83.1 77 4.10 69 4.40 
Bangladesh 2.58 2.06 0.61 50.1 63.0 87.0 76 4.30 72 3.95 
Sri Lanka 6.87 5.88 3.94 14.0 11.9 37.1 58 10.15 52 9.10 
Singapore 7.05 6.10 4.30 16.4 28.2 46.2 29 23.05 37 14.08 
Malaysia 6.80 5.48 2.88 16.2 23.0 49.7 55 11.10 51 9.20 
Thailand 6.50 5.18 4.30 12.6 15.7 36.9 45 14.70 48 10.75 
China 6.35 4.94 - 18.0 31.5 - 59 9.75 67 5.15 
Philippines 8.21 6.65 4.24 31.0 8.3 25.6 32 21.60 23 21.25 
Turkey 5.29 3.69 1.92 20.8 39.1 59.2 49 14.70 50 9.80 
Indonesia 4.99 4.00 1.55 32.1 23.6 68.0 56 10.35 57 8.30 
India 5.06 3.64 1.68 43.9 61.6 72.2 69 8.10 60 7.10 
Mexico 7.23 5.20 2.76 9.7 22.2 40.1 51 12.95 40 13.15 
Peru 7.58 6.02 7.58 11.9 17.5 37.6 30 22.55 30 18.40 
Brazil 4.88 3.48 4.88 16.0 26.1 47.5 57 10.15 52 9.10 
Source: Barro-Lee indicators Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications, Harvard 
Center for International Development Working Paper No. 42, Harbison-Meyers skills index  from UNIDO, Industrial Development Report 2002/2003.   
 Note: Data on Bangladesh seems to be surprisingly low given other indicators that we have seen on recent trends. 
 
4.5 The lack of basic cognitive skills is a major constraint to the trainability and competitiveness of the 
Pakistani workforce. In the long run, the shortages can be met only through improvement in enrollment and 
school completion rates, and the expansion of tertiary education catering to the needs of industry. In the 
short run, however, on-the-job training (OJT) is the only means that firms have of alleviating the shortages to 
any degree. Even in the well-developed educational setting of advanced economies, on-the-job training is 
probably as important as formal education as a source of industrial skills. It should therefore be of concern to 
policy makers in Pakistan that only 15 percent of Pakistani firms covered by the investment climate survey 
reported to have sponsored OJT for their employees (figure 4.3). 
                                                 
35 The skills of Pakistani workers are improving, but from a very weak base. More than half (53 percent) of the labor force is illiterate. 
However, this is a significant improvement since 1987-8, when 65 percent were illiterate. Only 21.5 percent of workers had 
matriculation (grade 10) or higher education in 2004, up from 18.4 percent in 1998. 
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Fig 4.2: Employees with secondary (in purple) education or higher (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Incidence of OJT training 
 
4.6 Other things being equal, larger firms are more likely to train their workers, as are younger, foreign-
owned, or more export-oriented firms. Part of the reason for the low incidence of OJT in Pakistani firms is 
therefore that they are, on the average, smaller than their counterparts in comparable developing 
economies, and that a smaller proportion of them are foreign-owned, or participate in export markets. 
However, even having controlled for these factors, the average Pakistani firm is less likely to sponsor OJT 
than its counterpart in the rest of South Asia, or in comparable economies in other parts of the developing 
world (fig. 4.3). One major reason for this is that the average proportion of temporary workers in 
employment is higher in Pakistani firms. The fact that the proportion of temporary workers is higher in 
Pakistan is itself indication that labor regulation is tighter in Pakistan. In that sense stricter labor regulation 
could be blamed for the low incidence of OJT in Pakistani industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 We draw these conclusions from a formal analysis of the determinants of employer provision of on 
the job training based again on the World Bank Group Enterprise Survey datasets. Details of the analysis 
are provided in Annex 4.1 B. The reason that a higher proportion of temporary workers deters OJT is that 
firms will sponsor training only if they can share in the returns from the skills workers acquire through the 
training. Those skills could be general in the sense of being of value to the trained worker in alternative 
employment elsewhere. They could also be specific to the firm where they have been acquired.  Normally, 
Figure 4.3: Firms providing on the job training (percent) 
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Source: Investment Climate Surveys, Global database, The World Bank. 
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firms would be willing to share in the financing of the acquisition of specific skills by their employees 
provided the employees stay on the job long enough for the firm to recoup the cost of training with a 
normal rate of return on the outlay. While this condition is met where permanent workers are involved, it is 
unlikely to hold in the case of temporary workers the firm is not grooming for regular employment.  
 
IV. VTT as a response to skill shortages 
 
4.8 Similar to other developing countries, policy makers in Pakistan have responded to skill shortages by 
establishing vocational technical and training (VTT) institutions. The VTT system serves multiple objectives 
and clients. Developing skilled workers is instrumental for enhancing the efficiency and flexibility of the labor 
market and reducing skills bottlenecks. Skilled workers tend to be more easily absorbed into the economy, 
improving job mobility and lifetime earnings.  This is especially important in a country like Pakistan where a 
large part of the workforce remains in agriculture and the informal sector, and does not possess the skills to 
transit to more productive employment in other sectors. Further, VTT facilitates the effective school-to-work 
transition for “drop-outs” from elementary and intermediate schools. 
 
4.9 Structure and profile of VTT system: An extensive infrastructure exists for provision of training for both 
employed and unemployed workers in Pakistan. The VTT system is administered by a number of Federal, 
Provincial,36 and private agencies (National Training Board, 2005) including, but not limited to, Government 
Vocational Institutes (GVI) administered by Provincial Education Departments; Technical Training Centers 
(TTC), Vocational Training Centers (VTC), Government Vocational Institutes (GVI), and Apprenticeship 
Training Centers (ATC) administered by Provincial Labor Departments; In-plant Training Programs (that is, 
Apprenticeship Training under the Apprenticeship Training Ordinance of 1962) administered by the 
Provincial Directorate of Manpower; and Training of Labor Departments in establishments employing 50 or 
more workers, training within industry which is designed for individuals and for specific needs.37  A summary 
of existing VTT capacity is shown in  table 4.2 and includes about 52,000 places in public vocational training 
centers, 90,000 in private vocational training centers, and about 63,000 places in technical and commerce 
training.  
                                                 
36 In Punjab alone, there are more than 400 institutes that fall under the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA). 
Although in the public domain, the objective of the authority is to promote and provide demand-driven technical education and 
vocational training. Training facilities are provided through the following types of institutions: colleges of technology/polytechnics, 
colleges of commerce training institutes, technical training centers, vocational training centers, apprentice training centers, weaving & 
finishing institutes, agriculture machinery training schools, agriculture cooperative institute, and Dehi Mazdoor training centers. 
37 Other training programs are administered by various agencies such as the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF), Small and 
Medium Enterprise Development Corporations (SMEDA), and private vocational and technical training institutions (accredited by 
Provincial Authorities).   
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Table 4.2: Vocational and technical training institutions in Pakistan (2004) 
Province                                    Type of Institute                         Centers                    Capacity             
TEVTA Punjab Technical and Vocational  402 83,000 
Punjab Training Council Vocational. 60 15,000 
DMT Sindh Vocational 33 3,740 
TE and MT NWFP Technical and Vocational 35 3,300 
DMT Balochistan Vocational 12 1,730 
Skills Development Council  Contractual basis 25,000 
Federal Ministry of Labor 2 1,500 
 Ministry of Education 2 1,400 
Private sector and apprentice   70,000 
Total 546 204,670 
Source: Ministry of Industries   
 
4.10 At the national level, a Tripartite National Training Board (NTB) was established in 1980 by an 
ordinance updated in 2002.  The Board has 21 members (including five employer and five employee 
representatives).  The NTBoard was closed in 2001, but subsequently revived in 2002 by a decision of the 
Cabinet, and continued under the Ministry of Labor and Overseas Pakistanis to perform a coordinating role 
for VTT including: liaison with international agencies, providing a forum at the national level to discuss 
VTT policy, develop minimum training standards, curriculum and certification systems, strengthen VTT 
staff training, and establish a national center for use of advanced instructional technology techniques.  A 
National Training Bureau (NTBureau) was established in 1976, and acts as a secretariat for the NTBoard 
performing all functions assigned to it by the NTBureau.  The NTBureau does not directly manage training 
centers, but manages a teacher training function for VTT.  It currently has 85 staff, as compared to 257 
before 2001. The Technology Up-gradation and Skill Development Company (TUSDEC) was established 
by the Ministry of Industries, Production, and Special Initiatives in October 2004 as a Guarantee Limited 
Company. This company is owned by the government, but is run by the private sector and works to 
upgrade technology and skills in key industrial clusters/ sectors. 
 
4.11 The NTBoard has, in addition to its more general duties, been involved in helping administer a 
number of special initiatives including managing donor-funded investments for new VTT facilities, 
implementing crash programs for overseas employment, introducing training courses on a cost recovery 
through employer led Center Management Committees, and initiating the development of tripartite Skill 
Development Councils (SDCs) by the Ministry of Labor at the national and provincial levels in 1995-1998.  
SDCs organize in-service training for employees (about 100,000 to date) using existing providers and are 
financed by the Workers Welfare Fund and employers. The Workers Employers Bilateral Council of Pakistan 
(WEBCOP) is involved.  The National Staff Training Institute (NSTI) was established in 1998.  A recent 
initiative was a small Education and Vocational Training initiative by the Ministry of Labor & Manpower, and 
the SDC in Karachi (Skill Development Council 2005), which is being expanded to include 300,000 youth.  
 
4.12 At about 200,000 including apprenticeship (table 4.2), current VTT capacity is limited considering the 
demand from the three client groups mentioned above. Moreover, the public sector training programs are still 
predominantly supply driven and fall short of providing quality training. While the specific and technical 
challenges inhibiting the ability of the VTT system to deliver will be discussed in the next chapter, two broad 
underlying issues are the low enrollment and completion rates in basic education, and a lack of labor market 
information, both of which are essential building blocks of a modern VTT system that can respond to the 
needs of a competitive and changing knowledge economy (Fretwell, 2005). 
 
4.13 The cumulative result of this supply scenario is a workforce with a low level of education and 
training.  A recent review of technical manpower training in Pakistan (Ministry of Industry, 2004) highlighted 
the problems in the manufacturing sector: 
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Fourteen percent of the workforce is employed in the manufacturing sector, only 0.16 percent are 
degree holders, 0.19  percent technicians, 0.39 percent percent are machine operators, and 10.39 
percent are craftsmen and most of the latter are not appropriately and formally qualified…..the 
disconnect between supply and demand has led to significant levels of unemployed among all cadres 
of technical personnel…the absence of a registration body for technicians and craftsmen inhibits the 
availability of reliable data for planning purposes...the quality and output of technical institutions is 
poor and sub-standard…. 
 
Aside from the inadequacy of the vocational education stream in Pakistan, the quote above, and other 
research indicates that the existing system is not delivering on quality.  
 
4.14 The current occupational focus of the existing VTT programs is not considered appropriate by the 
private sector.  One of the reasons for this problem is the lack of labor market information and up-to-date 
skill standards. Public sector training programs are still predominantly supply-driven and fall short of 
providing quality training. Key issues that inhibit the ability of the VTT system to deliver include:  
 
 administrative and management procedures at the national and local levels which are driven by public 
sector government regulations and constrain the ability of the VTT system to react to labor market 
demand;  
 financing that is public and fragmented, often based on “crash” national investment programs with 
short term impact, and which lack recurrent financing as a result of being left to provincial agencies 
that may lack ownership of national initiatives; 
 training delivery strategies which are primarily public sector in nature, or if in the private sector are 
still regulated by the public sector with regard to content; do not use modern modular training 
techniques; lack articulation between different levels (that is, vocational, technical, and tertiary); and 
do not have outcome-based incentives (that is, financing based on graduate employment rates);  
 a private/public partnership that is often advisory, as opposed to policy making, and where when 
tripartite institutions are developed, they are often weighted heavily with public sector 
representatives, both of which discourage active private participation; and lack of evaluation of 
internal efficiency and outcomes (that is, job placement of graduates).  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
4.15 The preceding discussion has sought to show that Pakistan’s industrial labor market is overregulated 
to the detriment of workers and employers alike, and is one of the reasons why the private sector is not 
creating good jobs fast enough. The essential point is that regulatory reform, job creation, and skills 
formation are intrinsically linked. While heavy reliance on “temporary” workers may have helped mitigate the 
labor inflexibility resulting from stringent regulation, this has inadvertently incurred other “costs” – 
specifically, exacerbating the skills issue -- which the government is trying to address through the reform and 
expansion of the VTT system. Labor regulatory reform is thus fundamental for both job creation and 
sustainable skills training. Equally important to emphasize, increasing labor market flexibility through 
regulatory reform will be most effective in creating good jobs if it is complemented by policies that help 
workers obtain social protection, and skills for finding good jobs. 
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CHAPTER 5:  LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN PAKISTAN  
Issues in Labor Regulation and Social Security Programs  
 
I Introduction 
 
5.1 Recognizing the role and importance of labor regulation and skills formation in supporting increased 
productivity and competitiveness in industry, the government has been actively engaged in labor regulatory 
and VTT reform initiatives. However, to date, progress has been slow and mixed. The arena of labor laws and 
institutional reforms is rife with political economy ramifications demanding fractious trade-offs. Given the 
potentially controversial nature of labor reform, it is important to “un-bundle” the components of labor 
legislation, with a view to identifying the most binding of the constraints it imposes on employment and 
training decisions of businesses and workers. This chapter assesses key labor market institutions in Pakistan 
that impact on those decisions, with special focus on employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
supporting institutions, and on (ii) social security programs and implementing institutions.38 
 
II Labor Regulation 
 
5.2 A list of major labor laws and rules enacted in Pakistan is provided in annex 5.1. Based on a detailed 
review and analysis of labor laws, and consultation with private sector, this section pinpoints issues at three 
levels: federal legislation, provincial enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms. The discussion 
highlights hiring and firing regulations and their implementation; and social security and worker welfare laws and 
their implementation as the binding provisions.39 Other problematic areas of focus include the stringent 
provisions related to working conditions and the implementation aspects related to working environment 
regulations. Addressing these constraints may call for reform at both policy and implementation levels. 
Understanding where the key problem lies is at the heart of the reform design.  
 
(a)  Restrictive Firing regulation & implementation40  
5.3 As figure 2.4 in chapter 2 indicates, Pakistan ranks poorly on the ease of hiring and firing. 
Consultations with the private sector reinforce firing regulations and processes as a binding constraint and a 
major motivation for relying on temporary workers. An employer must pay 90 weeks in severance, penalties 
and notices to dismiss a worker – ranking Pakistan 126th on the cost of firing.  The discretionary approach of 
provincial inspectors and labor tribunals in enforcing requirements and adjudicating disputes adds significant 
uncertainty and transaction costs for the employers. 
    
5.4 Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is the relevant legislation dealing 
with “firing” matters. The Ordinance is applicable to commercial and industrial establishments employing 20 
or more workers. Establishments employing less than 50 workmen are exempt from certain provisions of the 
Ordinance including those dealing with stoppage of work and layoffs, terminations and retrenchment, and 
punishments and procedures for dismissal, disciplinary action, misconduct, fines etc., unless especially 
notified by the government. Table 5.1 presents the different scenarios under which workers can be “fired.”  
                                                 
38 This chapter is based on a series of background papers commissioned for this work, along with a review of existing literature, 
complemented by stakeholder consultations and interviews with government officials. 
39 The key binding provisions identified by the new work, along with consultation with the private sector, are broadly in line with the 
earlier work. This is not surprising given that there has been little change in labor laws during this period. See Issues and Policies 
Consultants (2005). 
40 The main relevant governing laws are the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968; and Industrial relations 
Ordinance (IRO). 
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5.5 Barring “lay-off”, all the other three categories present serious challenges for employers. The issues 
arise from both the law and its implementation. The critical area relates to the “Industrial Grievances” 
Table 5.1: Firing categories: Justification, process, issues 
Definition Justification Process Issues with law, 
implementation, or both? 
Dismissal: A worker 
found guilty of “misconduct”’ 
is liable to punishment 
including fine and dismissal.  
 
Misconduct includes 
disobedience, habitual 
neglect of work, fraud or 
misappropriation, 
absence without 
permission, illegally 
striking, and go-slow etc. 
 
i)Informing the worker in 
writing of the alleged 
misconduct; 
ii) Opportunity for a worker 
to explain his misconduct; 
iii) Approval of the employer 
who shall institute 
independent inquiries. 
Law: Firing costs too steep. 
 
Implementation: Industrial 
Grievances process fraught 
with problems; 
employers are generally 
reluctant to take 
disciplinary action against 
workers for fear of not 
following the letter of the 
law, lack of evidence, and 
risk reinstatement of a 
dismissed worker by a court 
of the law.  
Employer in ‘no-win’ 
situation.  
Lay-off: Employer can at 
any time stop any section or 
sections of an 
establishment for reasons 
which are not in his 
control.  
 
For e.g. fire, breakdown 
of machinery, stoppage 
of power supply etc. 
Laid off workers shall be paid 
one half of their daily wages 
for a period of fourteen days; 
 
If workers have to be laid off 
far an indefinite period for 
reasons of fire, catastrophe 
etc. beyond the 14 days, their 
services may be terminated. 
No binding  issues 
Closure: Except in the 
event of fire, catastrophe, 
stoppage of power supply, 
epidemics or civil 
commotion, no employer can 
terminate the employment of 
more than 50 percent of the 
workforce or close down the 
whole of the establishment 
without prior permission of 
the Labor Court. 
Other than for reasons of 
‘misconduct’, mainly for 
business viability 
considerations. 
i)Prior permission of the 
Labor court is required for 
terminating the employment 
of more than 50 percent of 
the workmen or close down 
the whole of the 
establishment; 
 
ii) All cases of termination, 
removal, retrenchment or 
dismissal must state in writing 
the reasons for the action 
taken. 
Law:  
i)Justification to a Labor 
Court;  
ii) Firing costs too steep. 
iii) 49 percent ceiling on 
termination; 
 
Implementation: 
Industrial Grievances 
process fraught with 
problems. 
 
 
Termination: For 
terminating employment of 
a permanent worker for any 
reason other than 
misconduct. Temporary 
workers and other category 
of workers are not entitled 
to any notice.  
 
For any reason other 
than ‘misconduct.’ 
All cases of termination, 
removal, retrenchment or 
dismissal must state in writing 
the explicit reasons for the 
action taken; 
 
One month notice or one 
month pay in lieu of notice 
shall be given by the employer 
or the workman.   
Law: Firing costs too steep. 
 
Implementation: 
i) Industrial Grievances 
process fraught with 
problems; 
ii) Weak judicial 
institutions. 
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Source: Doing Business Indicators, World Bank, 2004. Tables 
2.1 (see the tables for details about definition of indices and 
indicators) 
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provision.41 Indeed, “[by] far the greatest number of problems arising in an establishment are those involving 
individual workmen. Someone may claim to be unfairly dismissed, or claim that he/she is not getting the 
benefits he/she is entitled to, or may feel that he has been discriminated against…”42 A worker may bring the 
matter to the notice of the employer. If the employer fails to satisfy the worker the latter may take the matter 
to the Labor Court. Appeals from the Labor Court lie with the High Court, and from there on a point of law 
or question of public importance to the Supreme Court. Employers generally have little faith in the judicial 
system, and avoid getting embroiled in such situations. In addition, the capacity of the judicial system is 
limited and there is a high probability that the case would take years to get resolved. Employers are generally 
reluctant to take disciplinary action against workers for fear of not following the letter of the law and risking 
reinstatement of a dismissed worker by a court of law with back benefits (i.e. wages for the interregnum 
period). The presence of an unwilling worker is bad for workplace morale but so is the return of a 
dismissed/terminated worker. In this scenario, the employer finds himself in a “no-win” situation. 
 
5.6 Figure 5.1 and annex table 5.2 indicate the firing costs imposed, by law, on employers terminating 
workers. Indeed the firing costs – one months’ wages per year of service -- are very high in Pakistan and 
significantly exceed firing costs in East Asian countries and OECD countries.43 
 
 
                                                 
41 This provision falls under the Industrial relations Ordinance (IRO) and IRO Amendment 2002. 
42 See p. 57 Ilahi, Naqvi, Nasim, and Akhlaque (1995) 
43 See Holzmann et al., 2003, for evidence in non-Asian countries. 
 
Figure 5.1: Difficulty of firing, international comparison 
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Figure 5.2: Difficulty of hiring, international comparison 
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Source: Doing Business Indicators, World Bank. 
 
 (b)  Restrictive Hiring regulation & implementation 
5.7 Legislation limits the length of temporary contracts; fixed-term contracts are strongly restricted - by 
both allowing fixed-term contracts to be used only in “objectively” defined cases -- and by limiting their  
duration to nine months for work which is essentially of temporary nature.44 This restriction is starkly 
reflected when Pakistan is compared to most other South Asian countries and East Asian comparators (see 
figure 5.2; table 5.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Difficulty of hiring 
 
Ratio of minimum to 
average wage* 
Fixed-term contracts are 
only allowed for fixed-
term tasks? 
What is the maximum 
duration of fixed-term 
contracts (in months)?  
Index of the 
difficulty of 
hiring  
 Bangladesh 0.42 No No limit 0.33 
 India 0.24 Yes No limit 1 
 Nepal 0.54 No No limit 0.67 
 Pakistan 0.40 Yes 9 2.33 
 Sri Lanka 0.25 No 12*** 1 
 Comparator countries    
 China 0.36 No No limit 0.33 
 Hong Kong 0.00 No No Limit 0 
 Malaysia 0.00 No No limit 0 
 Singapore 0.00 No No limit 0 
 Taiwan 0.31 Yes 36 1.83 
 Thailand 0.17 Yes 24 2 
Source: Doing business database. 
Note: * Average wage approximated by the value added per worker. ** Maximum value of 3 (most difficult). 
***Hiring a worker for longer than 12 months on a fixed-term basis may be challenged in labor tribunals in Sri Lanka. 
 
5.8 Although there is no provision under existing law for fixed-term contract employment, research and 
stakeholder consultation have nonetheless consistently revealed that practice varies from the spirit of the law. 
While de jure formal sector firms can only hire temporary workers for up to nine months for work that is 
essentially of a temporary nature, employers have found ingenious ways of circumventing the law. De facto, 
workers are hired on temporary contract even when the work is likely to extend beyond nine months. The 
same workers are given a new contract at the end of their existing contract and the practice tends to be 
repeated frequently. A similar digression from the law takes place when a worker is hired against a permanent 
position vacancy. Legally, a worker hired for a regular position can become “permanent” after 90 days 
                                                 
44 This is governed by Section 2 (g) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. 
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probation – which entitles him to termination benefits of 30 days gross wages as gratuity for every year of 
service or his entitlement in the provident fund. This cost can be avoided if employers terminate the services 
of these workers during the period of probation. Some employers attempt to avoid the provisions of the law 
by rotating workers every 90 days, despite their being engaged for indefinite periods in regular positions. 
These practices are common and are often undertaken in collusion with officials.    
 
(c) Working conditions 
5.9 Working condition regulations prescribe working hours, overtime, leave, and other entitlements. As 
figure 5.3 and table 5.3 indicate, Pakistan imposes rigid working hours and generous entitlements. Current 
labor laws prescribe 48 working and 12 weekly overtime hours, double wages for overtime, a months’ bonus 
per year, 40 days of paid leave, and restrictions on women’s working hours. Cumulatively, these measures 
increase the cost of production and reduce flexibility for employers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Rigidity of working hours 
 
What is the 
maximum 
number of 
working hours 
allowed in a 
day? 
What is the 
maximum 
number of 
working days 
per week? 
Are there 
restrictions on 
night work ? 
Are there 
restrictions on 
"weekly 
holiday" work? 
Days of annual leave 
with pay in 
manufacturing after 20 
years of continuous 
employment? 
Index of rigidity 
of working hours 
 Bangladesh 9 6.5 No Yes 20 2 
 India 9 6 No No 12 1 
 Nepal 12 6 No Yes 13 1 
 Pakistan 11 5.5 No Yes 14 2 
 Sri Lanka 8 6 Yes Yes 14 2 
 Comparator countries      
 China 9 6 No Yes 8 2 
 Hong Kong 24 6 no No 14 0 
 Malaysia 12 6 No No 16 0 
 Singapore 12 6 No No 14 0 
 Taiwan 12 6 Yes Yes 24 3 
 Thailand 8 6 No Yes 12 2 
Source: Doing business database 2004. Note: * Maximum value of 5 (most rigid). 
 
 (d) Enforcement issues 
5.10 Along with rigid laws, implementation and enforcement institutions in Pakistan are dysfunctional and 
antiquated. Businesses are in frequent contact with regulatory agencies and inspectors seeking to enforce a 
range of labor norms and standards in working conditions, industrial relations, and occupational health and 
safety regulations. Inspectors are seldom interested in enforcing standards. Often-discretionary enforcement 
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and weak adjudication mechanisms are consequently associated with corruption and bureaucratic harassment 
of businesses at significant cost to the economy.45  
 
5.11 The compliance burden of regulation seems to be particularly heavy. Pakistani firms report spending 
10 percent of management time dealing with government officials of regulating agencies, compared to 7 
percent in China or 4 percent in Bangladesh (figure 5.4). Although laws and rules are usually poor it often 
produces binding constraints on businesses nonetheless. This is demonstrated by the high correlation 
between red tape and informality. Because of the high costs in terms of both time and harassment, too few 
entrepreneurs stay in the formal economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Security and Welfare Programs46 
 
5.12 A subset of labor regulations govern a patchwork of social security programs aimed at improving the 
welfare of workers and providing them with services and transfers such as health care, education for their 
children, old-age income support, and other mandated benefits (see annex 5.4).47 These programs - 
implemented by provincial and federal governments - are targeted at workers in the formal sector, and 
financed largely by employers. They impact labor markets through the costs they impose on employers in the 
formal sector as well as through their incentive effects on workers. In addition, the laws mandate regular 
inspections of establishments to ensure enforcement. Based on review, this section argues that the current 
system is deficient – it is costly for those employers who comply with it, yet provides very few benefits 
workers value, and achieves coverage that is much below potential.  
 
Since other safety nets programs outside the formal social security setup have low coverage and benefits, 
Pakistani workers are left without any reasonable safety net (Issues and Policies Consultants, 2005). Social 
assistance has low benefits and coverage and there is no real workfare program, despite a clear need for one 
to address employment shocks among the able-bodied poor. 
 
 
                                                 
45 An indicator of the magnitude of this cost is the frequency with which officials pay inspection visits to factory premises. Pakistan 
averages 36 inspection visits per year. Business people often see these visits as a form of demand for bribes or as the price of avoiding 
more visits and more loss of time in the future. Sometimes the visits can disrupt normal plant operations. 
46 The section is based on background papers by Issues and Policies Consultants (2005) as well as on reports commissioned by the 
ADB (2004) and the Private Enterprise Development Corporation of Asia (2001). This section also draws on the forthcoming World 
Bank report on Social Protection issues in Pakistan. 
47 These include: (i) Employees Old Age Benefit Act, 1976; (ii) Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965; (iii) Workers 
Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971; (iv) Workers Children Education Ordinance, 1972; and (v) Companies Profit (Workers Participation) 
Act 1968. 
Fig 5.4: Dealing with regulations and officials 
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Structure of programs 
 
5.13 The labor laws mandate that formal sector firms provide certain forms of non-wage benefits directly 
and levy charges used to finance three separate types of funds. Two of these – the Workers’ Welfare Fund 
(WWF) and the Provincial Social Security (ESSI) scheme – are managed at the provincial level, while the 
Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) is a federal institution. EOBI is by far the largest social security 
program in terms of coverage and funding. 
 
5.14 The employer-administered programs include several profit-sharing arrangements that affect the 
limited number of companies that pay corporate taxes. Bonuses and special payments to workers are 
mandated for profitable companies. Group life insurance must also be purchased to cover up to PRs. 
200,000. The mandatory severance payment found in the labor code is standard in South Asia (and often 
found in other regions), with a benefit equivalent to one month per year worked and paid upon separation 
under most circumstances. Few firms undertake to prefund this liability and it is thus not fully reflected as a 
corporate liability. Severance pay is a substitute for unemployment insurance but is not very efficient as such, 
as it fails to pool the unemployment risk across individuals. Formal unemployment insurance does so, but is 
not feasible in Pakistan with its high informality. While some developing countries have moved to systems of 
pre-funding the severance pay obligation, this also is unlikely to be feasible in Pakistan in the short to medium 
term given the low compliance with similar types of regulations.  
 
5.15 The Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) is also financed through a special 2 percent tax on income tax 
assessed48 with benefits including housing construction and a range of contingencies such as dowry payment 
and maternity benefits. It is managed at the provincial level as is a related “education cess”49, an earmarked 
tax that goes to finance education for up to two children of each employee. The WWF often makes the 
capital expenditure while the cess finances recurrent spending.  
 
5.16 The two remaining schemes are financed by a payroll tax. The ESSI is administered at the provincial 
level and financed with a payroll tax of 7 percent of earnings up to 5000 rupees per month for all “notified” 
firms. The EOBI is a national program. Its contribution rate for employers was increased from 5 to 6 percent 
of the minimum wage (currently PRs. 3000 per month) in July 2005 and is legally mandated for firms with at 
least 10 employees. There is an employee contribution of 1 percent of the minimum wage. The ESSI provides 
health services, mainly through its own facilities, while the EOBI was designed as a modest, defined benefit 
scheme to provide income during old age. However, both programs include benefits for disability and death. 
Men aged 60 and women age 55 with at least 15 years of contributions are eligible for benefits under EOBI.  
The pension is not indexed after retirement but the minimum, currently 1000 rupees per month, has been 
increased sporadically over the years.  An estimated 1.5 million were actively contributing to the scheme in 
recent years, although the reported number of members is much higher reflecting movement in and out of 
the formal labor market and other factors. 
 
III. Issues and Challenges 
 
5.17 The existing system does not appear to be cost-effective. Neither employers nor employees appear 
satisfied (Issues and Policies Consultants, 2005). On the one hand, the costs to employers are large, at least 
potentially, although evasion renders the actual costs much lower. On the other hand, few workers are 
covered and benefits to those workers that are covered are unfocused and sometimes of little value. 
 
(a) Potentially high costs to employers 
                                                 
48 If above 100,000 rupees. The program covers only 600 companies. 
49 This was recently eliminated in Punjab. 
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5.18 Contributions to the labor welfare schemes can potentially impose non-negligible costs.  According 
to the stipulated rules, these programs may potentially cost an additional 20-30 percent of the wage bill for 
employers who comply (see table 5.4).50 Many employers don’t comply, though, even in the formal sector. 
Costs are higher (as a share of salary) for low-income workers earnings less than PRs. 5000 per month.51  The 
potential cost burden of these levies is particularly high in sectors where wages constitute a sizeable share of 
total production costs, and who need to or choose to comply with the regulations. There is some evidence 
that firms in the export oriented manufacturing sectors, under pressure from overseas customers,  are under 
greater pressure than other firms to comply. Labor market regulations, including social security, therefore 
may be more pertinent for this segment of firms.  
 
5.19 There is also corruption and the additional hassle involved in the administration of social security 
contributions. The potential burden of these levies may be higher when compliance costs are factored in. The 
cumulative cost of these levies to enterprises is therefore difficult to estimate precisely, but is a combination 
of compliance costs (levies paid, paperwork) and evasion costs (bribing inspectors). Many employers also 
circumvent the law by under-reporting the number of workers – both permanent and temporary. One typical 
pattern seems to be that employers bribe labor inspectors to avoid registration of all employees for EOBI and 
Social Security by either understating their number or reporting them as contract workers.52 
 
Table 5.4: Structure of mandated levies  
Tax on profits Tax on payroll Tax on number of workers 
 
WWF (2 percent of profits) 
 
EOBI (5 percent) 
 
Group insurance 
 
WPPF (5 percent of profit tax 
amount) 
 
ESSI (7 percent) 
 
Education cess (PRs 100 per 
year) 
 Gratuity (implicitly 8.3 percent)53  
 10C bonus (implicitly 8.3 percent, 
if there is a profit) 
 
 Total 28.7 percent of wage bill   
Note: table shows the statutory costs. De facto costs are lower because of evasion. 
 
5.20 Although the true cost of labor levies is unknown and difficult to estimate precisely, its consequences 
are clear: discouraging formalization of employment, encouraging employers to remain small and informal 
and formal sector reliance on temporary workers.  
 
(b) Inadequate and unfocused benefits to workers 
 
5.21 Benefits. The benefits covered by the programs that currently comprise Pakistan’s social security 
schemes include traditional consumption smoothing schemes such as old age and disability, as well as other 
types of programs such as housing and education. While there may be a case for explicit linkages between 
sectors (for example, conditional cash transfer programs), the nature of programs that deal with social risks is 
fundamentally different from the provision of housing or other services. This not only complicates 
administration, it also may overlap with other government programs. For example, WWF and cess-financed 
schools operate in parallel to other government schools, duplicating costs.  
 
                                                 
50
 During the labor workshops held in Pakistan, some stakeholders questioned the 20-30% additional labor cost estimate to be 
questionable. For instance, there is the issue of incidence which may fall on the employee through lower net wages to some extent. In 
addition, there is a very low ceiling on the EOBI contribution and lots of companies do not report profits and therefore avoid part of 
the costs, so the effective contribution rate – when compared to the wage bill, not the wage of low income workers, is much lower.  
51 Some 85 percent of all regularly-paid private sector employees earn below PRs 5000. 
52
 Issues and Policies Consultants, 2005. 
53 Gratuity is one month salary for each year of service, corresponding to an implicit levy of 1/12 of the wage cost, or 8.3 percent.  
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5.22 The Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) pays rather limited pensions to formal, private 
sector workers.  The pension provided for civil servants is generally much higher than that provided by the 
EOBI.  Survey data reveal that the average pension in the civil service was approximately 45 percent higher 
than the EOBI.  This disparity between public and private sector pensions is exacerbated by the striking real 
decline in EOBI pensions over time due to lack of indexation.  Between 1988 and 2000, the minimum 
pension declined by half in real terms and remains lower even after the most recent increase. 
 
5.23 The objectives in terms of consumption smoothing for core social security activities are not well 
defined. Institutional duplication, for example, can be seen in the provision of disability and survivor benefits 
by both the EOBI and the ESSI. Benefit design is not linked to objectives. For example, old age pensions are 
calculated by a formula that implicitly has a 60 percent of final salary target benefit. However, these benefits 
are not indexed and as a result, most pensioners receive the minimum pension. The minimum pension, in 
turn, is determined on an ad hoc basis and is tied to the minimum wage, which is also determined ad hoc. Its 
real value is therefore volatile and unpredictable.  Similarly, the earnings ceiling upon which both the 
contribution rate and the benefit formula are applied is not indexed but is adjusted on an ad hoc basis. The 
core function of ESSI appears to be a kind of social health insurance where certain facilities are accessible to 
members and their families. Operating in parallel to public health facilities implies duplication. The 
appropriate role of ESSI should therefore be considered in the broader context of Pakistan’s public health 
strategy and would include a well-defined basket of basic health services and a clear financing strategy. 
 
5.24 There is at least anecdotal evidence that the benefits and services provided to workers can be of poor 
quality, being under-funded, underprovided and indifferently managed. Health and education facilities may 
not be located convenient to the residence of workers and many workers in fact do not utilize the facilities 
intended for them. In contrast, some of the facilities, e.g. social security schools, are often utilized by children 
from other families not covered by the system. Moreover, workers that have migrated but kept family 
members in their native place (of which there are many) find that they sometimes cannot claim health and 
education benefits for their family members. Not only may special facilities be located far from workers and 
their families, they may also provide services of lower quality than the private sector. Another part of the 
problem seems to be that workers often are not sure whether they are covered. They cannot be certain their 
employers contribute on their behalf, and they therefore face considerable uncertainty when claiming 
benefits.  
 
 (c) Financial management 
5.25 Establishing clear benefit targets for old age, disability, and survivors’ insurance as well as defining 
health coverage is critical first steps toward formulating a coherent social protection strategy. In order to 
finance these benefits, financing sources consistent with estimated costs based on actuarial calculations would 
be needed. Currently, contribution rates appear to be determined in an arbitrary manner. To our knowledge, 
no actuarial calculations are available for the provincial programs. In the case of the EOBI, actuarial reports 
find that long-term benefits are not sustainable under current contribution rates.  
 
5.26 Another important aspect of financial management is how reserves are invested. Reasonably good 
investment returns can substantially improve the financial sustainability of the programs, especially the EOBI. 
During the last two decades, the EOBI has relied almost exclusively on investment through the National 
Savings Scheme. The National Savings Scheme was introduced at a point when the Government of Pakistan 
needed to raise domestic savings in the face of a difficult external environment. Interest rates paid on these 
accounts were higher than market rates and the EOBI and other institutional investors reaped relatively high 
returns. From 2001, however, the EOBI was no longer allowed to invest in National Savings Scheme bonds 
and has been forced to look for alternatives. With more than US$1 billion in assets and most of the portfolio 
maturing in 2006, the situation has become critical.  
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5.27 The annual collections of WWF are less than PRs. 1 billion but only a part of the receipts of the 
WWF are transferred to the Workers Welfare Board (WWB) which implements the program More than PRs. 
18 billion is held in trust (earning no interest) by the Federal Government (54percent of the actual collections 
to date). Investment policy statements and process are not clearly defined and disclosure is lacking. 
 
5.28 Managing social security reserves, at provincial or federal level institutions, requires professional asset 
management, modern accounting standards, and an appropriate investment policy, unencumbered by political 
interference in investment decisions. These elements do not appear to be in place in the public institutions 
that manage funds today.  
 
(d) Streamlining administration 
 
5.29 The current system is highly fragmented. Administrative costs, which reduce the resources available 
to finance benefits, may be reduced through consolidation of certain activities in one institution.54 This may 
also reduce transactions costs for employers that must deal with multiple institutions, further discouraging 
firms from participating in the formal sector.55 The idea of consolidating provincial schemes with the EOBI 
is not a new one and has been suggested by Pakistani and international experts.56 In this section we focus on 
EOBI due to the lack of information available for WWF and ESSI.  The latter, in particular, due to its direct 
financing of health infrastructure, would require a separate analysis.  The common denominator of all three 
schemes however, is that no independent monitoring takes place of what are essentially public monopolies.   
 
5.30 In the EOBI, there are concerns about efficiency in administration.  The collection of contributions 
and payment of benefits operate through the network of bank branches. At the time of contribution payment, 
employers submit special payment declaration that facilitates identification of payment source. The same 
document provides information on total number of employees covered by the payment (so EOBI can assess 
the total number of active and insured individuals). Details of the employees, however, get submitted on a 
separate annual report. There are significant delays and lack of compliance with the reporting requirements.  
The benefit payment system relies on banks playing a key role in keeping records of eligible beneficiaries. 
 
5.31 Operational costs have not fallen over time relative to standard comparators.  With only a very small 
fragment of labor force being covered by the scheme, operational cost of the EOBI run at least 20 percent of 
the collected contributions and almost one third of benefit payments as shown in Figure 5.5 Despite growing 
assets, the ratio of expenses to assets has remained flat at about 0.8 percent.  While it is difficult to determine 
when administrative costs are excessive in public pension schemes, the current ratios clearly reduce the long 
term sustainability of the scheme.  
 
 
                                                 
54 ADB (2004), in close consultation with the Ministry of Labor, was that “there should be some rationalization of the activities 
undertaken by social protection institutions …. to reduce duplication, concentrate on highest priority areas and to make accountability 
for outcomes clearer”. There is also an on-going ADB TA ADB on pensions in Pakistan. 
55 The rationale for different eligibility conditions is unclear and another example of a lack of overarching framework for social 
protection. For ESSI, notified establishments are covered regardless of the number of employees.  
56 See EOBI (2004). 
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Figure 5.5: Administrative costs as share of benefits and contributions in EOBI,  
1993-2003 
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Source:  EOBI. 
 
5.32 There appear to be considerable gaps in information regarding workers covered by the scheme.   
This is due to several factors:  First, the institution is struggling to maintain and consolidate several legacy 
databases. Second, many employers, while making required payments, fail to submit individual payroll reports.  
In part, this has been attributed to lack of enforcement powers, e.g., there is no penalty for no/late reporting.  
This leads to the situation where at the time of a benefit claim, it is often very difficult to assess individual 
eligibility. The benefit claim process typically involves verification of records with employers, and reportedly 
may be lengthy and not sufficiently based on evidence.   
 
5.33 Looking beyond EOBI, the current system is highly fragmented resulting in duplication of costs.  
Both ESSI and EOBI offer disability and survivors’ pensions, for example.  Administrative costs may be 
reduced through consolidation of certain activities (especially cash transfers) in one institution.57  This may 
also reduce transactions costs for employers that must deal with multiple institutions, further discouraging 
firms from participating in the formal sector.58  The idea of consolidating provincial schemes with the EOBI 
is not a new one and has been suggested by Pakistani and international experts.59  An initial step could be the 
harmonization of practices in a number of areas including reporting procedures, accounting standards, 
independent audits and actuarial evaluations. Also, given the overlap in membership and employer registers, 
some efforts to upgrade and centralize a common database might be considered.  This may be possible 
through NADRA, for example.  Simplifying the process for registration and collection for employers would 
also encourage participation by reducing their costs.  
 
 
5.34 An effort is currently being made to consolidate legislation in this area. While an important first step, 
ultimately the problem may lie in the lack of oversight in the system and mechanisms for enforcing the 
legislation. Boards are tri-partite in nature, but employer and employee representatives are appointed by 
government and have little autonomy. International experience with tri-partite and government controlled 
boards of monopoly social insurance institutions has shown that there is some need for external oversight. In 
a few countries, the financial sector regulator provides guidelines on basic governance issues such as reporting 
practices. 
                                                 
57  ADB (2004), in close consultation with the Ministry of Labor, stated that “there should be some rationalization of the 
activities undertaken by social protection institutions …. to reduce duplication, concentrate on highest priority areas and to make 
accountability for outcomes clearer”. 
58  The rationale for different eligibility conditions is unclear and another example of a lack of overarching framework for 
social protection. For ESSI, notified establishments are covered regardless of the number of employees.  
59  See EOBI (2004).  
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 (e) Inadequate coverage 
 
5.35 With fewer than 1 in 10 workers in Pakistan being covered by social security schemes, it is not 
surprising that expansion of coverage is a high priority. The EOBI for example, has made this one of the key 
objectives in its 2004 Institutional Strategy. Table 5.5 shows the provincial-level breakdown. 
 
Table 5.5: Coverage of EOBI, 2005 
Province Members Contributors* Labor force Members/ Contributors/ 
    labor force labor force 
Punjab 1,344,488 876,936 25,800,000 5.2 % 3.4 % 
Sindh 766,583 500,000 9,790,000 7.8 % 5.1 % 
NWFP 155,354 101,329 4,410,000 3.5 % 2.3 % 
Balochistan 33,322 21,734 1,750,000 1.9 % 1.2 % 
Total 2,299,747 1,500,000 41,750,000 5.5 % 3.6 % 
*Contributors are estimated based on ratio of total contributors to members. The latter refers to anyone with a contribution record since the scheme 
began in 1976. 
Source: EOBI; Labor Force Survey 2003-04. Notes: Labor force is for 2003-04. 
 
5.36 It is difficult to disentangle the reasons behind the low coverage, although it is a pattern observed in 
low-income countries across the world.60 Part of the reason is that not all workers are mandated to join the 
EOBI. Agricultural workers, for example, are not included. Of the remainder, about 30 percent are public 
sector workers covered under a different pension system. Nevertheless, even after excluding informal private 
sector workers, this implies that as many as half of the eligible employees are not contributing.  
 
5.37 Enforcement of the mandate would raise coverage to perhaps 8 percent of the labor force which, 
when combined with the public sector covered population, would mean that roughly one in ten Pakistani 
workers belonged to a pension scheme. Extending coverage further may require innovative approaches that 
recognize that many workers do not earn regular wages and therefore could not participate in a standard 
defined benefit arrangement. Their transaction costs on an individual basis would also be very high. Finally, 
the poorest will require a subsidy since reducing their consumption beyond a subsistence level is not an 
option. Further analytical work and innovative pilots are needed to explore if and how coverage might be 
extended beyond the formal sector. 
 
IV. Impact of regulation and social security programs on employment patterns 
 
5.38 The  review above of labor laws and its implementation has highlighted the issues with the existing 
hiring and firing regulations and their implementation; social security and welfare programs, their costs and 
implementation; working conditions regulation, and enforcement mechanisms. Despite limited coverage and 
enforceability, firms have gone to great lengths to adopt “innovative” means – some legal and some not so 
legal - to counteract the negative effects of the labor legislation. While the alternatives range from 
fragmenting large manufacturing units into smaller ones to increasing reliance on the “job contract” system,61 
                                                 
60 See Palacios and Pallares (2000). 
61 Job contract effectively means subcontracting of output and results in various “putting out” arrangements. Emergence of vendor 
industries owes its success to the job contract system. Although many studies claim that “putting out” has increased as a response to 
labor legislation, there is little evidence to suggest that employers have increased reliance on “putting out” system solely to avoid 
legislation. The widespread practice of a “putting out” system is in operation throughout the world and is a natural consequence of 
industrialization. When asked why there was increased use of a “putting out” system, most industrialists responded that it was more 
efficient and cost-effective way of running a business. The link between increased use of a “putting out” system and labor legislation 
does not seem very strong. 
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the predominant response has been preference for “temporary” or “contract” workers over permanent 
workers.62 Table 5.6 presents the main categories of “temporary” workers employed in Pakistan.  
 
5.39 The main reasons cited for heavy reliance on “temporary” workers relate to “firing” issues and 
avoidance of the costs incurred from social security programs.63 Research suggests that for permanent 
workers in industry, the legislated package of compensation has been binding. As table 5.4 indicates, legally 
formal sector firms are bound to provide the social security benefits to “temporary” workers but, in practice, 
manage to circumvent the law by either bribing and/or under-reporting. Studies have shown that 
“temporary” laborers work long hours under poor working conditions, and are denied health cover, accident 
compensation, leave, and other welfare measures prescribed by the relevant labor laws.64 The perception that 
“temporary” workers are denied coverage is thus not totally incorrect -- but it is important to underline that 
the issue lies with weak enforcement, dysfunctional institutions, and rent-seeking practices, and not the law 
itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 According to one earlier survey, covering162 sample large manufacturing enterprises from Punjab and Sindh, 99 percent of the 
firms employed irregular and contract labor. All firms were utilizing either the irregular or the contract or a combination of both types 
of workers. The firms in the province of Sindh were dominated by contract laborers whereas manufacturers in Punjab hired large 
numbers of irregular workers on daily wages (Systems Ltd.,1989). There are also sectoral variations, for instance, in labor intensive 
sectors like textiles, leather garments, there is greater use of temporary workers. 
63This was frequent in consultative workshops within the private sector. The conclusion that the most significant reason to hire 
temporary/contract labor is to lower the cost of production was in line with earlier studies. In some industrial subsectors, contract 
workers were noted to be comparatively better paid than the regular employees, but overall, in all cases the owner’s permanent (long-
term) liabilities were reduced. Other factors such as regular workers working less earnestly and the role of unions have also figured as 
important factors. These other factors could be viewed as contributing to lowering the marginal product of labor. (see Ilahi, Naqvi, 
Nasim, and Akhlaque (1995);  and Systems Ltd. (1989). 
64 See Ilahi, Naqvi, Nasim, and Akhlaque (1995). Also, contract workers can be subject to minimum wage legislation, but for one of 
the following reasons the actual wage paid may be non-binding. First, employers either do not report or under-report contract and 
temporary workers, thus avoiding the provisions of the law. Second, the minimum wage package for contract workers is less than 
permanent workers. And third, even if the regular and contract workers were paid the same wage, the poor work ethic that labor 
legislation engenders among regular workers, implies that contract or temporary workers have a higher marginal product than regular 
workers. 
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Table 5.6: Types of temporary employment  
 
 
Legal Definition and Provisions Practice/Implementation 
1 Contract workers who are recruited directly by the employer 
for temporary, short-term or piecemeal jobs, are paid or 
remunerated directly by the employers, and appear on 
the payroll of the establishment. In fact such contract 
workers can be included in the category of temporary 
workers. Legally, temporary workers can be hired on contract for 
a maximum period of nine months. 
 
Firing provisions – Not applicable 
 
Social Security laws – Yes, applicable 
Law is often circumvented when workers are hired on 
temporary contract even when (i) work is likely to extend 
beyond nine months at the end of which the temporary 
contract, workers are given a new contract -- a practice which 
can continue repeatedly; (ii) a worker classified as ‘temporary’ 
is hired against a vacancy in a permanent position.  A worker 
hired for a permanent position becomes “permanent” after 
90 days probation that entitles him to termination benefits of 
30 days gross wages as gratuity for every year of service or 
his entitlement in the provident fund. To circumvent the law, 
employers tend to terminate the employment of these 
workers during the period of probation. Some employers 
attempt to avoid the provisions of the law by rotating 
workers every 90 days, although these workers are engaged 
for indefinite periods on regular work.    
Social Security laws – Implementation weak with most temporary 
workers denied access to these benefits as firms and officials collude to 
bypass the laws. 
2 Contract workers who are employed by the industrial 
employer through contractors for certain specified jobs. 
Such workers work under the supervision and control 
of the employer in respect of their working hours, 
output, leave, discipline and other conditions of work. 
They are supplied to the employer by the contractor 
and the employer pays the contractor remuneration on 
the basis of the number of workers employed through 
him. The workers are shown paid by the contractor and 
are also shown in the books as employees of the 
contractor. However, the establishment of such a 
contractor is not recognized as an independent 
establishment. In fact, it is the industrial employer of 
the main establishment where these workers are 
working who is responsible for the implementation of 
all laws pertaining to the workers employed through 
contractors 
Firing provisions – applicable when the Contractor is taken 
as the employer) 
Social Security laws – Yes, applicable 
Social Security laws – Implementation weak and most temporary 
workers are denied from accessing these benefits – as firms and officials 
collude. 
 
3. Workers who are employed by a contractor for 
execution of a job contract which has been awarded to 
them (contractors) by the employer of an industrial or 
commercial establishment. The workers in this case 
work directly under the supervision of the contractor 
for producing the required output. The names of the 
workers do not appear on the pay roll of the 
establishment. The employer is concerned only with the 
completion of the job contracted to the contractor and 
the finished product.  
The employer has to ensure compliance of certain labor laws if 
the contracted job is executed on the employers’ premises. 
For example, the industrial employer may contract out 
loading and unloading of industrial output and then 
ensure that the contractor does not use child labor and 
that safety requirements are fulfilled. Once the job has 
been done, he pays the contractor at the agreed rate for 
the completed work. 
Firing provisions –  applicable when the Contractor is taken 
as the employer) 
Social Security laws – Yes, applicable 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION   
Strengthening the LM & VTT Reforms and Policy Options 
 
I. Introduction  
 
6.1 The preceding chapters of the report have reviewed existing labor market institutions and the current 
VTT systems of Pakistan. They have explored the links that exist between labor regulation, job creation and 
skills development. Successful reforms should harness these linkages towards better employment and 
productivity outcomes. While our analysis leads to the conclusion that less rigid labor laws lead to higher job 
creation rates and greater supply of and demand for skills, the question remains as to what exactly should be 
done to achieve a better functioning labor market. Which aspects of existing laws and implementation 
arrangements should be changed and how? And what exactly is being done and should be done to improve 
the VTT system?  
 
6.2 Compared to its South Asian neighbors, the scope and breadth of the labor market reform process 
underway in Pakistan is impressive. The labor legislation reform process at the federal level is well advanced – 
some key labor laws are in the final stages of re-drafting.65  At the same time, a couple of provincial 
governments have moved ahead with streamlined inspections. To help provide overall direction, the 
government has recently announced a Labor Protection Policy (LPP) 2006 and Labor Inspection Policy (LIP) 2006.66  
These policies focus on implementation of the laws based on new regulations, policies, and procedures at the 
federal and provincial levels, particularly as it pertains to the power and method of inspectors. In this chapter 
we review the on-going LM and VTT reforms. Key recurring areas of concern voiced by private sector are 
highlighted. Based on the preceding analysis and informed by good practices from international experience, a 
set of recommendations for strengthening the reform program is discussed.  
 
II. GoP LM Reform Program   
 
a. Labor Regulation Reforms 
 
6.3 In 2002 the Government enunciated a new Labor Policy which set in motion an impressive array of 
LM reforms covering legislative and institutional aspects. The objectives of the policy include: (a) 
consolidation, rationalization and simplification of labor laws; (b) revision of laws to allow for flexible 
working hours, and to encourage contracts for casual and temporary jobs thereby also improving flexibility in 
hiring; (c) regulation of contract labor to ensure the protection of workers rights through written contracts; 
(d) enhancing the autonomy of enterprises in retrenchment; (e) improving social security and labor welfare 
systems; (f) enhancing support for bilateral dispute resolution, with minimum regulatory intervention by the 
government; (g) instituting structural changes for accessible and speedy justice on labor-related matters; (h) 
appointing Labor Courts the court of first instance for labor disputes, with appeals directed to the High 
Court; (i) reviewing the minimum wage every 3 years; and (j) aligning all laws with core ILO conventions.  
 
6.4 Based on a comprehensive review, the existing body of labor-related legislation has been 
consolidated in the following five categories: (i) industrial relations; (ii) employment and services conditions; 
(iii) occupational safety and health; (iv) labor welfare and social security; and (v) human resource development 
(see annex 2.1). Given the complex and lengthy stakeholder consultations and political sensitivity of these 
                                                 
65 The World Bank has provided technical assistance for the drafting of the laws through a grant. Pl. see ‘The Industrial Relations, 
Employment and Labour Laws of Pakistan’, Unpublished Study 2002 by Walker Martineu Saleem, Advocates and Legal Consultants. 
Subsequently, through the PRSC programmatic dialogue, inputs have been provided, including an independent review of the two laws 
that have been drafted to-date. 
66 ADB is supporting the drafting of these policies with a TA.  The drafting of the policies has involved extensive stakeholder 
consultations at both federal and provincial levels. 
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reforms,67 however, a phased approach has been adopted. In the first phase, the GoP has concentrated on the 
finalization of the Employment and Services Conditions Act, 2006 (ESCA), along with amendments to the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance 2002 (IRO), while the remaining three laws will be drafted in phase two.68  While the ESCA 
draft law awaits cabinet and parliament approval, a few important amendments in existing labor laws have 
been approved under the Labor Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005.  
 
(i) Phase I Legislative Reforms  
 
6.5 Both ESCA (2006) and IRO (2006) draft laws are awaiting Cabinet approval.69 The assessment below 
is based on the objectives laid out for the revision of the laws, specifically: (i) striking an appropriate balance 
between social protection and flexibility so as to engender competitiveness; (ii) improvements in labor market 
flexibility, particularly in hiring and firing; (iii) increased enterprise autonomy in business related decisions; (iv) 
reduced compliance costs for businesses; (v) reduced incentives for informality. The changes proposed are 
calibrated against the existing provisions and lessons learned from good global practices.  
 
6.6 Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO) 2002 and the proposed Amendment 2006: Before reviewing the IRO 
2002 Amendments, it is important to provide a brief background on the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. 
The IRO 2002 sets out the rules and guidelines for labor management relations covering the formation and 
registration of trade unions, worker participation, and dispute resolution through judicial and non-judicial 
processes.70  The IRO 2002 was promulgated to improve the effective implementation of laws through: (a) 
removal of ambiguities in previous legislation; and (b) enhancement of its ambit to other categories of 
workers hitherto excluded, such as supervisors and workers engaged through contractors. While the overall 
changes suggested in the new legislation represented a move in a positive direction by enhancing the 
flexibility of labor markets, the Ordinance subsequently faced strong opposition from labor unions who felt 
their interests were compromised in a rush to pass the Ordinance.71 With the return of the Parliament, it was 
agreed that amendments would be made after further consultation, and approved as a law.  
 
6.7 Assessment of the Amendments to IRO 2002: The amendments primarily focus on the process for 
resolving labor disputes, better regulation of unregistered trade unions, and language that extends union 
activity to an industry in addition to a set of establishments. Overall, most of the amendments are neutral in 
effect. A positive institutional change has been the setting up of a provincially appointed Labor Appellate 
Tribunal as the appeal body for labor cases, thereby replacing the High Court. The latter has been deemed 
ineffective by both employers and employees.  
 
 
                                                 
67 Depending on the stakeholder interest being represented or not represented, positions are divided: workers consider that labor 
regulations constitute a warranty of fair employment conditions and welfare for workers, while employers point to regulations as an 
obstacle to formal employment growth.  The impact, viewed in the aggregate, varies then from the viewpoint of firms and individuals, 
and from the viewpoint of formal versus informal workers. 
68 The remaining three laws - Occupational Safety and Health Act; Human Resource Development Act; and Labor Welfare and Social 
Security Act - are yet to be fully drafted. One of the modest aims of this study is to help inform the final drafting of these laws, 
targeted in the latter half of 2006.  
69The ESCA and IRO Amendment drafts have gone through many revisions and the above assessment is based on the April 2006 and 
January 2006 version respectively that were shared with the Bank. As part of its on-going Poverty Reduction Structural Credit (PRSC) 
programmatic dialogue, the Bank team was provided an opportunity to comment extensively on the different versions of these two 
draft laws starting from 2003/04. As per the recent information received from the Government, the draft is expected to be sent for 
Cabinet approval by end of 2006. 
70 Comprising 83 separate sections, it is a significant piece of legislation. 
71 The Parliament in Pakistan was suspended in 1999, when the military took over. All new laws were promulgated as Ordinances. 
With the resumption of democracy, all ordinances need to be ratified by the Parliament as bills and called ‘Acts’. 
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6.8 Employment and Services Act, 2006 The Employment and Service Conditions Act (ESCA) has been 
created by consolidating 11 separate laws governing conditions of employment (including wages) for a 
number of sectors into a new draft Act.72  In drafting the new ESCA, 2006, the government focused on: (i) 
consolidating existing texts, (ii) removing overlaps and inconsistencies, and (iii) adjusting some of the 
provisions to allow a greater degree of flexibility - particularly on the hiring side and working hours - and 
restrictions on women’s working hours.  
 
6.9 Assessment: In many aspects, the current effort is impressive and represents a significant 
movement toward a more flexible regulatory framework for labor. It also opens an opportunity to work 
with provincial authorities to reduce compliance costs by setting national guidelines and standards. In other 
areas, the legislation remains restrictive by engaging in aspects of employer-employee relationships which are 
generally unpredictable and better left to market forces. The draft ESCA provides for a positive step toward 
the stated objectives associated with reform in the labor legislation, including: codification and rationalization 
of a set of overlapping and conflicting laws; improvements in labor market flexibility; potential reduction in 
labor-related compliance costs for enterprises; increased participation of women in the labor force; and 
alignment to key ILO conventions.  
 
6.10 The draft introduces a major and laudable change to the classification of workmen by eliminating the 
current classification of permanent (more than nine months) and temporary (less than nine months) worker.73  
The abolishment of “temporary worker” will increase labor market flexibility by eliminating the time 
limit on term contracts. The newly expanded conditions requiring that all contracts be in writing and 
allowing termination conditions to be incorporated is also a welcome addition, given that high explicit and 
implicit firing costs are important reasons why employers try to avoid hiring permanent workers. 
 
6.11 The draft law has also provided for reduced compliance costs. In addition to the clarity and reduced 
discretion resulting from the unification of labor legislation across sectors, it opens the possibility of a well-
structured set of regulations to guide inspection policy toward “best practice” management characteristics;74 
provide opportunities for Federal and Provincial authorities to limit rent seeking by consolidating the number 
of inspectors;75 and introduce the concept of regulated limits on the discretionary power of inspectors,  
enabling the notion of a “risk- based” inspection approach. These changes are enabled through the 
introduction of language which requires inspectors (i) obtain prior authorization to inspect a particular 
establishment, (ii) carry out their duties in a “prescribed manner,” and (iii) only enter establishments which 
are, or are reasonably believed be “liable to inspection”– in other words, at risk of violating the law.  
 
6.12 Given the arena of labor law reform is rife with political-economy ramifications, combined with the 
complex and myriad changes being proposed in the draft ESCA, building consensus among different 
stakeholders and striking a balance between equity and efficiency trade-offs has taken time and careful 
examination. In the interim period, the Government has fast-tracked the approval of select amendments in 
                                                 
72 The precedent laws include (i) Children (Pledging of Labor ) Act, 1933; (ii) The Payment of Wages Act, 1936; (iii) The Employment 
(Record of Service) Act, 1951; (iv) Coal Mines (fixation of rate of wages) Ordinance, 1960; (v) The Minimum Wages Ordinance, 1961, 
(vi) The West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders), 1968; (vii) The West Pakistan Shops and 
Establishments Ordinance, 1969; (viii) The Minimum Wages for Un-skilled Worker Ordinance, 1963; (ix) The Workers Cost of Living 
(Relief) Act, 1973; and (x) The Employment f Children Act, 1994.  At the same time, the Ministry reports that relevant portions of 
The Factories Act, 1934, (those covering employment conditions, wages, and so forth) will be replaced, while the other portions of 
The Factories Act will be incorporated into the new Health and Safety Act, under preparation.  Though the logic would also apply to 
the Mines Act, 1928, it was not confirmed by the Ministry of Labor.  
73
 The nine-month limit on contract term was one of the principal reasons Pakistan has one of the most inflexible hiring 
legislation in South Asia, according to the Doing Business report.  
74 Such characteristics include (i) a clear, coherent and consistent inspection policy, (ii) dialogue and consultation, (iii) a central 
authority responsible for enforcement and monitoring, (iv) operational and logistical guidelines, (v) defined rights for employees, 
employers and the inspection authority, (vi) suitably qualified inspectors trained in technical aspects, social skills and dispute 
resolution, (vii) transparency and documentation in the inspection process, and (viii) enforcement power.  
75 The Ministry of Labor indicates that while a separate inspector was required for each precedent law, under the consolidation, only 
one inspector will be appointed, reducing significantly the required number of inspectors.    
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existing laws that improve market flexibility on the hiring side.76 Specifically the Labor Laws (Amendment) Act,77 
2006 amended provisions related to working hours, including spread over, extension of women’s working 
hours, flexibility in choice of weekly holiday, overtime, and introduced the concept of contract labor (as a 
classification of workers) that: 
 
 increases the maximum hours per week to 60 from 48 and maximum hours per day from 10 to 12 , 
increasing the maximum number of overtime hours from 2 to 4 hours per day; 
 introduces of the concept of “contract worker” paid on a piece-rate basis without overtime and all 
benefits afforded to permanent workers;  
 enables women to work past sunset until 10 pm, provided employers arranges for transport facilities; 
and  
 increases the monthly wages compensation payable for workmen injured. 
 
 
6.13 The above changes are in line with stakeholder demands, and represent important moves in the right 
direction. To support Pakistan’s transition from a concentrated economic structure based on informal labor 
markets and low value added production to one based on flexibility, innovation and skills, more 
improvements are, nonetheless, needed. The areas of suggested improvements are generally in line with the 
Government’s Labor Policy 2002 and seek to:  
 rationalize coverage across establishments and while maintaining exemptions for small enterprises; 
 increase further hiring flexibility through prescribed terms and conditions of employment;  
 increase and clarify enterprise autonomy, particularly on retrenchment and redundancy; and  
 
6.14 One particular area of concern in the ESCA draft that may benefit from careful re-
examination relates to the introduction of joint liability between principal employer and 
“contractor”. 78  This proposed change is motivated by the ground reality that much of the labor force has 
been able to operate outside of the law due to a high degree of non-compliance. However, laudable the 
intention, the proposed approach may not be the right one. In addition, it may lead to other undesirable 
effects. The definition and use of the term contractor (and sub-contractor for labor) confuses whether a 
worker is an employee or a true contractor (in an outsourcing sense)79 by combining the two conflicting 
concepts.  It is highly unusual, in conflict with case law, and likely inoperable, to have a both a contractor and 
his client to be jointly responsible for ensuring that the law is applied to an employee of the contractor.  The 
provision requires that allows the client (principal employer) be ultimately responsible for compliance 
expenses which can then be recovered from the contractor.  It is likely that this approach will lead to 
considerable contract disputes between businesses (contractors and their clients).  Clarity over whether a one 
employer (e.g., a manufacturer) or another (e.g. a contractor) is responsible for compliance with the law is 
critical for clear and undisputable implementation.  This approach will ultimately prevent the emergence of 
“outsourcing”– a key business relationship to enhance productivity and competitiveness and to encourage the 
development of SMEs.   
 
                                                 
76
This Bill amends selected provisions in the following existing labor laws: The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923; The Factories 
Act, 1934; The West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968; and The West Pakistan 
Shops and Establishments Ordinance 1969. 
77
 This was formally passed as part of the Finance Bill 2006. However, the Amendment shall be superceded by the ESCA once it 
passed. 
78
 The draft introduces a new type of employer called “a contractor” as one who “undertakes to procure the labor or services of 
workmen for use of another person.” (Section 3, xvi, (f)).  At the same time, the definition of contractor “means any person who 
contracts with a principal to carry out …work under taken by the principal.” (Section 3, xiii).  
79
 Typically there are operational tests to distinguish whether a worker is an employee or a contractor based on the nature of the 
work, the type of supervision and conditions provided (i.e. the employer provides day to day instruction, provides the tools for 
working, etc. 
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(ii) Phase II:  Legislative Reform 
 
6.15 During phase II, the government intends to complete the legislative reform process by focusing on 
the remaining three functional areas: (i) occupational safety and health; (ii) labor welfare; and (iii) human 
resource development. Though the initial consolidation work has commenced,80 this phase of drafting 
requires a higher degree of complexity associated with health and safety issues, workers welfare, and human 
resource development, involving provincial dialogue. Two issues are under consideration in the process of 
consolidation: (i) the recommendations of the Task Force on Labor Welfare Levies of 2000, and (ii) inter-
provincial difficulties in providing social security for employees who live in one province but work in another.  
 
6.16 Given the technical complexities, fiscal implications, and overlap of the areas covered in the next 
round of reforms, as well as the need to continuously refine implementation and compliance framework,  the 
government may want to start afresh with new laws drafted based on agreed-upon analytical underpinnings, 
shared principles, clear objectives, and well-defined policies. To help provide overall direction, the 
government has recently announced a Labor Protection Policy (LPP) 2006 and Labor Inspection Policy (LIP) 2006.81  
These policies focus on implementation of the laws based on new regulations, policies, and procedures at the 
federal and provincial levels, particularly as it pertains to the power and method of inspectors. 
 
6.17 The Labor Protection Policy (LPP) 2006 aims to provide a focused approach towards labor protection 
issues, and to create a linkage and balance between issues of labor competitiveness, labor productivity, and 
labor protection perspectives. The LPP covers the following main areas of labor protection: basic rights; 
working conditions; working environment; and social security. The policy aims not only to improve the 
protection for formal sector workers but to extend protection to workers in all sectors engaged under various 
employment arrangements.82 Although there is no provision under existing law for fixed-term contract 
employment, employers increasingly seek to engage workers on this basis in order to provide the flexibility 
they seek in the operation of their enterprises. The government, while accepting the need for labor market 
flexibility, seeks to ensure that workers engaged on a contract basis are protected, particularly as relates to 
social security.  
 
b. Reforming enforcement and regulatory institutions  
 
6.18 Increasing coverage of labor laws may only work if accompanied by an effective compliance and 
enforcement strategy. Currently even with limited coverage, enforcement is weak and compliance costs of 
inspection high. As an essential element for the effective implementation of Labor Protection Policy 2006 - and 
as part of the objectives laid out in the Labor Policy 2002 - the government is committed to the 
reorganization and streamlining of labor inspection system at the provincial level.  Reform measures 
articulated in the Labor Inspection Policy (LIP) 2006 include: (i) integrating inspections; (ii) adopting new and 
innovative approaches to labor inspection – for example, self-inspection and self-reporting; and (iii) 
encouraging involvement of private sector in the provision of inspection services through accredited agencies; 
and (iv) developing capacity of provincial labor inspectorates. These are all progressive measures and if well 
designed, would help address the concerns of both workers and employers. To build trust among different 
stakeholders, establishment of an independent monitoring system would be important once the new regimes 
                                                 
80 This includes the consolidation of four federal and provincial welfare and social securities laws into a Labor Welfare and Social 
Safety Net, including the two main laws in the field, one in the Federal domain (Employees’ Old Age Benefit Act, 1976), and one in 
the Provincial domain (Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965). Other significant laws will also be incorporated 
including the Worker’s Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, the Worker’s Participation Act, 1968 and the Workman’s Compensation Act, 
1923. 
81 ADB is supporting the drafting of these policies with a TA.  The drafting of the policies has involved extensive stakeholder 
consultations at both federal and provincial levels. 
82 There is a discussion to extend selected aspects of labor protection to workers employed under non-traditional arrangements, 
including self-employed persons, workers engaged in the informal economy, home-based workers, seasonal workers, and workers in 
the agricultural sector. 
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are implemented. Given the existing issues with compliance and enforcement, the government would be well 
advised to move forward on this agenda.  
 
6.19 Institutional reforms at provincial level: Independent of the initiatives underway at the federal level, 
some of the provincial governments have moved ahead in instituting structural changes to reduce the cost of 
compliance of some of the laws. Responding to business demands, Punjab and Sindh have implemented new 
but different ways to lower compliance costs by reforming the inspection regime.83 Sindh has clubbed 
together labor inspections into six categories. Punjab has taken a radical step of discontinuing inspections by 
introducing a “self-declaration” system.84  Using a risk-based approach, Punjab has also piloted a “self-
assessment” scheme for collection of social security levies (see Box 6.1 for details).   
 
Box 6.1: Punjab: Pilot Schemes in Inspection Reforms 
 
I.  Replacing Inspections with Self Declaration System 
 
Motivation: Responding to business’ demands for lowering compliance costs by reforming the inspection regime, the Government of Punjab 
in July 2003 introduced the self-declaration system.  Prior to this scheme, the District Labor Officer or Assistant Director Inspections 
used to visit each factory once a year with pre-designed surveys and inspected each factory.   
 
Salient features:  
 Under this new system, all industrial units with 20 more fill out a simplified form, which will be a declaration of requirements 
under the law,85 and submit to Labor Dept. within the month of July each year. Forms in which they provide information on 
their labor situation. 
 Urdu version of the form will be enlarged and displayed at a prominent place (entry point) of each industrial unit so that 
employees are aware of their company’s declaration;  
 Labor Dept. will computerize all the returns and each year inspect only 5 percent of registered units thrown up a by 
computerized random process. A list of the business units chosen by the computer will be made public and communicated in 
advance to the units 
 The 5 percent inspections will be conducted in association with District Human Resource Boards in which Private sector is well-
represented. 
 
II.  Social Security Levies – Self Assessment Scheme 
 
Motivation: Recognizing that the current system for collecting the social security levy/taxes – that are used for provision of  medical & 
other benefits to employees – is not working; not only is it a source of harassment and rent-seeking for employers, it is also falling 
short of delivering adequate level of healthcare delivered. The Social security rules have been amended to make them more business-
friendly and non-intrusive. In the new concept, the discretionary powers of the authorities have been completed eliminated. At same 
time, delivery of Social Security Services shall be enhanced by expanding health facilities. 
 
Salient features:  
 The new regime is as follows: 
1. Fixed slab system for units employing from 10 to 49 employees within the purview of social security.  
 Three slabs have been created for units between (i) 1-10 employees – Rs.10,000 per annum; (ii)11-20 employees - Rs.25,000 per 
annum; and (iii) 21-50 employees - Rs.50,000 per annum; 
 The fixed slab system will be mandatory and such units will be exempted from inspections for three years as long as they 
keep paying the annual fixed contribution.  
 system, all industrial units with 20 more fill out a simplified form, which will be a declaration of requirements under the 
2. For units employing 50 or more persons falling with the purview of social security 
 A simple declaration will be required on a monthly basis and contribution due for that month will be sent, along with this 
declaration to the local social security office; 
 All such units will be exempted from retrospective penalties;  
 The list of units and their declaration will be widely circulated; it will also be posted on the Punjab Government website; 
circulated to the relevant associations and to each individual member of that association, and to the chambers of trade and 
industry. 
                                                 
83 Note the law empowers the provincial authorities to set the precise rules and guidelines for inspections.  
84 See Punjab Industrial Policy 2003. This scheme is considered by some as countervening the ILO convention regarding inspection. The 
Federal Government has formally expressed concern and underlined the need to comply.    
85 This includes information related to number of employees; holidays, female working hours; bonuses; minimum wages; overtime; 
canteen rules; and health and safety measures within the firm. 
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 No inspections shall be carried out during the first six months of the year. The system will then be evaluated by a steering 
committee with string private sector representation. 
 
Mixed results to-date:  According to the Directorates of Labor, Punjab, the response from the private sector on both the schemes has 
been to-date poor – indicated by (i) the very small percentage of completed Self-declaration forms that have been submitted; and (ii) 
the collection rates for the social security levies have gone down since this scheme has been introduced. 
 
Feedback from stakeholder workshops: The concerned government officials feel that the lackadaisical response of the private sector 
demonstrates their lack of interest in compliance. On the other hand, consultations with the private sector indicate that: (i) the private 
sector feel that self-assessment scheme is shrouded in red tape; no proper guidance is given on filling in the forms.  There seems to be 
a complete breakdown of communication between the government and private sector in this regard. The private sector seems to 
believe that the labor officers are intentionally undermining the scheme because they enjoyed ‘kick-backs’ in the previous system. The 
private sector feels the government has not created enough awareness about the scheme and has, as such, ensured failed compliance.   
Source: Punjab Industrial Policy 2003, Government of Punjab. 
 
6.20 According to the Directorates of Labor, Punjab, the self-compliance response from the private sector 
on both the schemes has been less than impressive.86  To date no formal impact evaluation of the two 
schemes have been undertaken. While there is recognition by the government that problems exist in 
implementation, no immediate plans for either strengthening the design of the schemes or discontinuance of 
the schemes are on the anvil. At this stage it is also not clear how the Labor Inspection Policy (LIP) 2006 will 
impact the on-going provincial initiatives. 
 
6.21 While the provincial authorities have demonstrated the desire to respond to business’ demands for 
lower compliance costs by reforming the inspection regimes, the LIP provides a unique opportunity for the 
federal government to engage with the provincial authorities in a common, formalized approach to 
inspections, drawing on innovations already being implemented in various provinces and empowered by the 
new language under the ESCA. As future legislative reforms, such as the labor welfare and heath and safety 
laws, will also include inspection requirements, the prospects of future regulation with lower compliance costs 
will benefit from having access to the experience and infrastructure from new inspection regimes under the 
ESCA.   
 
6.22 In this regard, following steps are recommended: (i) the adoption of national guidelines for provincial 
inspections based on best practice principals, (ii) new business process systems – preferably with electronic 
components to ensure efficient and equitable implementation, (iii) a training program for inspectors in the 
new aspects of the law, social skills, and dispute resolution, and (iv) a centrally or provincially managed third-
party monitoring and evaluation system to ensure that inspections are taking place in the prescribed manner. 
Where possible, global experience and best practice principles in design and implementation of a 
comprehensive program should be sought. 
 
c. Reforming Social Security Programs 
 
6.23 Although social security comprises various programs that provide everything from housing and 
education to health and pensions, these programs suffer from numerous flaws. Program coverage is very 
limited. The EOBI is by far the broadest program but even it reaches less than one in twenty workers. In 
addition benefits are generally not well defined and program financing is opaque.  Contributions can 
potentially be quite costly to employers who comply, in monetary terms and in terms of the hassle they entail. 
 
6.24 As in other reports, this one has suggested the possibility of efficiency gains from 
consolidation of programs at the national level and elimination of duplication. Some of these 
improvements could be achieved within the current framework as part of an incremental reform program. 
                                                 
86 While no statistics on returns have been formally tabulated, there is indication that a small percentage of completed Self-declaration 
forms have been submitted by the private sector; and that the collection rates for the social security levies have gone down since the 
self-assessment scheme was introduced. 
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Others suggest a rethinking of both the scope of the services provided as well as the institutional 
arrangements involved. 
 
6.25 Incremental or partial reforms would include : 
 
  Introducing standards for reporting and disclosure to the public and to members that were 
consistent across provincial and federal funds. This would include periodic independent audits. 
 Introducing guidelines for investment policy statements for provincial and federal funds. 
 Elimination of direct provision of health and education services. 
 Shift all disability and survivorship pensions to the EOBI and eliminate duplication in the 
provincial funds. 
 Introduce unified inspection of employers for all funds and mandates. 
 
6.26 However, several factors make a more fundamental reform package attractive at the present 
time. Rapid economic growth is raising incomes and making it possible for more households to save and 
insure. The international experience suggests that there will be more demand for consumption smoothing 
through public and private institutions. Population aging, albeit gradual at the national level, is more 
pronounced in the urban areas and salaried class. This could translate into greater demand for pensions.  
 
6.27 Related sectoral developments are also conducive to deeper reforms . Important reforms in the 
financial sector have taken place, especially in the banking sector providing a solid foundation for a new 
contractual savings sector. The first sign of this is the introduction in 2005 of the new Voluntary Pension 
Scheme (VPS), regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission Pakistan (SECP). Along with parallel 
capital market reforms, the conditions for managing long term savings instruments are improving. 
 
6.28 Finally, a fundamental or ‘systemic’ reform may soon be under way for pension schemes 
covering public sector workers. A proposal has been drafted that would replace the unfunded, non-
contributory, defined benefit scheme predating Independence with a modern, defined contribution scheme 
along with ancillary insurance for survivors and disability benefits. It would be sensible to consider an 
integrated solution for all formal sector workers, at least in the long term, in order to minimize administrative 
costs and ensure labor mobility between public and private sector. 
 
6.29 The first step towards fundamental reform would be to define the most important risks faced 
by households against which the system should offer protection presumably disability, death, old 
age, loss of earnings for various reasons and health. The next step would be to define a target benefit 
levels in each of the core areas (for example, a target replacement rate for pensioners). These targets would, in 
turn, imply certain costs based on actuarial projections. An explicit decision would then be needed as to what 
portion of these costs would be pre-funded or passed onto future taxpayers. Finally, the institutional and 
administrative arrangements that worked most efficiently in terms of cost and risk pooling would be 
determined. Transition from the current situation to the new long term vision may take a generation to 
unfold. Taking no action however, would simply maintain a system that is either inadequate or unsustainable 
or both. 
 
6.30 At present, what momentum that exists for reform appears to be focused on pensions, 
starting with civil service pensions.  Recommendations for a systemic reform which would change the 
paradigm for future public sector pensions has led to a more general reconsideration of issues such as 
funding, public management and parallel systems across pension provision in Pakistan.  A Pension Reform 
Working Group was announced in March 2006.  These developments may open the door to fundamental 
rethinking of pensions and other elements of social security for the first time in several decades.  
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d. VTT Reform and expansion  
 
6.31 To meet the needs of several and growing client groups including matriculation graduates, dropouts, 
the unemployed, and currently employed workers, the government has announced plans to expand the 
quantity and improve the quality of the VTT system.   
 
6.32 The government is considering major new investments to strengthen and provide leadership for 
VTT, coordinate what is now a rather fragmented system, and administer the construction of 2,949 new 
institutions with a total capacity of about one million. This would increase current capacity by 500 percent. 
There is clearly a need to identify an organization to manage this expansion efficiently, and to address 
problems with the existing VTT system including fragmentation, quality, scale, and lack of private sector 
“ownership”. To accomplish this goal the government has enhanced and modified the Punjab private/public 
partnership model to govern and administer VTT. The Punjab model is the PTEVTA (Punjab Technical 
Education and Vocational Training Authority) which operates under the PTEVA Ordinance of 1999. The 
replication at the federal level has led to the establishment of the National Vocational and Technical 
Education Commission (NAVTEC) which will initially have provincial offices in Punjab and Sindh.87 
NAVTEC is trying to establish a working group to formulate the policy framework for the Commission.  
Only when this framework has been determined will the commission go ahead and make-work plans, etc. The 
TEVTA approach, while conceptually sound, has been implemented with varying degrees of success in other 
countries. Pakistan needs to move forward carefully to ensure that the proposed NAVTEC is effective, does 
not run into the same problems as the existing NTB and similar organizations in other countries that new 
resources are used efficiently, and that implementation is sustained after initial investments. 
 
6.33 In general the most successful NTEVTA organizations appear to have the following characteristics: 
(a) are governing, not advisory boards, having a majority of private sector members representing broad 
groups of employers in the large and small scale sectors; (b) are removed from government civil service 
administration and hiring regulations, are able to pay market rates for staff, are linked to broad high-level 
government structures (i.e., Ministries of Economy, Prime Ministers Office), are sometimes linked to 
Ministries of Labor, but seldom to Ministry of Education;  (c) provide leadership in policy development, 
standards and accreditation, but in many cases do not actually own and operate their own training institutions 
(organizations that do own and operate training institutions often lose their flexibility and become less 
responsive to the labor market); (d) have a core of stable financing, often from state budgets or payroll taxes, 
but generate considerable revenue from sale of services to client groups; (e) have strong evaluation and 
planning units, and (f) at times are involved in curriculum development (but not always as this work is often 
left to service providers).  
 
Policy Recommendations for strengthening VTT  
 
6.34 Development of NAVTEC : The basic concept of NAVTEC appears to generally reflect international 
practices. This statement is based on discussions held with a broad range of stakeholders at the national and 
local levels, a briefing by PTEVTA management and staff in Punjab, review of the Gazette Notification for 
NAVTEC and meetings with NAVTEC officials. Review of the functions and governance of NAVTEC 
demonstrates that several policies being proposed may cause problems during implementation. The following 
points highlight issues which need to be addressed in the notification and following regulations. 
 
6.35 Governance, the Public Private Partnership The Notification provides for thirteen board members for 
NAVTEC, of which six are from the private sector. The chairperson currently appointed is from the Private 
                                                 
87 .  A Gazette Notification for the commission was published in December 2005.  The new Commission is currently working under 
the mantle of an Executive Order, but a Draft law is being worked upon in order for the Ordinance to be passed by Parliament.  The 
passing of this law will give the commission autonomous legal status. The NAVTEC organization structure is a three dimensional one 
- there is a Board of 13 directors, an administrative unit, and a technical body.   
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Sector, and as such at present the private sector representation on the board is seven with six members from 
the public sector. The Notification does not stipulate that the chairperson must be from the private sector, 
and so in the future the board member ratio can tip in the favor of the public sector. This imbalance should 
be corrected to ensure a majority of the members from the private sector). The chairperson is to be 
appointed and removed by the federal government. More autonomy would be ensured if the chairperson 
were a private sector individual elected by the members. There is no direct mention of representation of the 
SME sector, which is the largest employer group in the country; private sector membership categories appear 
to emphasize “individuals” as opposed to representatives of groups/associations of stakeholders (which 
would be preferred if they exist). Finally, currently encouraging the use of on-job-training (OJT) is not given 
any significant attention as part of the functions of NAVTEC. NAVTEC should as part of its mandate 
encourage the use of OJT in all VTT institutions, not only in the formal apprenticeship program.  OJT is 
virtually missing from the existing VTT system, except for the small formal apprenticeship program.  
Organized OJT would help build practical linkages between local enterprises and VTT training institutions. 
They should work together to implement regular short-term (i.e. several afternoons a week for several 
months) internships for students. These internships may be non-paid or paid.  If organized correctly they will 
ensure that both students and VTT instructional staff, who should supervise the OJT program, more fully 
understand private sector needs. 
 
6.36 Administration:  Currently the Commission works as an autonomous body by virtue of an Executive 
Order, although a bill is being drafted to be presented to the parliament. When this bill is accepted an 
ordinance will be passed and the Commission will be given autonomous legal status.  This legal status is the 
most effective because it helps ensure flexibility and autonomy (a strong government linkage does not). A 
strong affiliation with a government department is one of the major factors contributing to the failure of 
similar authorities in other countries due to administrative problems created by tying the organization to 
government regulations (i.e., the hiring and payment of staff). NAVTEC has been given the license to hire 
and fire its own staff; subject to some limited government overseeing. This issue has caused major problems 
at the Punjab TEVTA which is closely affiliated with the Ministry of Industries.   As noted previously, 
successful Authorities in other countries are usually linked with economic, labor, or industrial ministries, or 
directly to high level government institutions.  It is important that the draft law articulates clearly the 
relationship between the NAVTEC and other line ministries as regards technical and vocational training. 
Currently the Government Rules of Business 1973 have delegated some of the training functions to sector 
specific ministries (e.g., Ministry of Information, Ministry of IT and Telecommunications, etc). 
 
6.37 Finance:  The federal government will provide funds required for the Commission to perform its 
functions.  The federal government may also provide annual grants to the Commission to enhance its 
functions. All monetary receipts of the Commission are to be credited to the “NAVTEC Fund”. The 
mechanism for operation of this fund shall be prescribed by the Commission with the prior approval of the 
federal government.  The level and source of government funds to support investment and recurrent 
financing is unclear, and a lack of recurrent financing has contributed to the collapse of other organizations 
with roles similar to NAVTEC (that is, the National Training Board).  There are several enterprise tax-based 
funds available, and several senior private sector representatives have indicated that some of these funds 
should be allocated to finance VTT.  In addition, the role of NAVTEC in financing investment and recurrent 
costs at the provincial/district level is not defined.  No mention is made of the need to finance any part of 
recurrent costs, although this has been a major contribution to the weakness of existing VTT institutions.  
The current TEVTA plan also appears to focus on creating more “supply driven” institutions, and this 
approach is questioned. It is suggested that investment and recurrent financing be done on a competitive 
basis using pre-defined criteria. Existing private, public and NGO VTT institutions could request resources 
to upgrade current programs, add new programs, or both. Where needed, new institutions could be selected 
for financing, while following similar competitive procedures. This competitive approach is in contrast to the 
proposed approach of simply “allocating institutions” to provinces and districts.  There should be a provision 
to finance some portion of recurrent expenses (i.e. 5-10 percent) to help ensure sustainability as well as 
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continuing to leverage improvements in quality. Again, this should be competitive, with institutions agreeing 
to meet certain criteria to gain recurrent funding. 
 
6.38 Technical Functions:  The list of proposed functions for the Commission is fairly comprehensive. 
However, several policies need to be more clearly defined either in the Notification or subsequent regulations. 
First, the status of existing national and provincial public VTT institutions, such as Punjab TEVTA, the 
National Training Board, the Skill Development Councils, Provincial Training Councils, and vocational and 
technical training institutions needs to be clarified. In general, these should be incorporated within the related 
National and Provincial Authorities so as to reduce duplication, fragmentation, and reinvigorate some 
institutions (that is, NTB, VTT) which have withered due to lack of support from their existing parent 
institutions. The Commission’s mandate emphasizes standard setting and evaluation, accreditation, regulation, 
and financing as opposed to actual management of local VTT institutions.  This approach will help to ensure 
flexibility, and if an institution does not perform it will lose financing and accreditation. This approach would 
also support decentralization. However, in selected areas where there are national priorities (that is, staff 
training, labor market information, occupational standards and assessment, development of high priority 
national programs, and evaluation), the Commission should exert national leadership by funding and 
managing these efforts. 
 
6.39 There needs to be a special emphasis on evaluation of internal and external efficiency of VTT 
investments.  Information on the inputs (i.e., staff and financial resources) and outputs (i.e., completers from 
different programs) of VTT is fragmentary. Information on external efficiency is particularly weak (i.e., 
follow-up of completers of VTT programs, and of employers which hire graduates) and virtually non-
existent. SDCs and Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA) do undertake some 
follow-up, and the Punjab TEVTA is considering implementing a follow-up system. These experiences 
should be used in replicating evaluations in all VTT institutions. 
 
6.40 Vocational & Technical Training for School Aged Youth: VTT policy makers are attempting to address the 
school drop-out issue by determining how more youth can be retained in purposeful education up to the 
matriculation level (grade 10), which is increasingly becoming the minimum requirement for entry and 
upward mobility in the world economy.  In order to address this issue, Pakistan first needs to focus a 
significant portion of its limited education resources on upgrading quality and access to primary and 
intermediate general education so as to reduce dropouts. This level of education forms the base of all future 
education, including VTT, and provides essential skills for labor market entry in the emerging knowledge 
economy. Pakistan should not (as it had considered in the past) attempt to introduce VTT in intermediate 
schools, or a matriculation-tech stream the secondary matriculation level (grades 9-10).  Pakistan should, in 
addition to improving the quality of intermediate and secondary education, take specific steps to make this 
level of education, as well as grades 11-12, more purposeful and linked with the economy, labor market, and 
careers.  Pakistan needs to expand and upgrade its vocational and technical education capabilities to provide 
skill training to individuals completing matriculation. 
 
6.41 Vocational and Technical Training and Labor Services for School Dropouts and the Unemployed.  There is a need 
to provide assistance to help the large number of job seekers who are unemployed but want to gain entry to 
the labor market. Two approaches are recommended: (i) expand the VTT facilities in the country to provide 
additional infrastructure to address the skill development needs of the large number of unemployed and skill 
dropouts who may lack skills or be structurally unemployed; (ii) pilot and experiment with provision of other 
labor services, in addition to institutional training, as is done in other developed and developing countries 
(including those with high levels of employment, uneven economic development, and specific problems in 
rural areas). NAVTEC should advertise the availability of funds, and contract with existing private, public, or 
NGO service providers, to provide such services as: (a) in-depth job placement services, (b) subsidized on-
job training (to be provided by enterprises), (c) institutional training, (d) small business technical assistance, 
(e) incubator services including small amounts of working capital, and (f) local economic development 
planning grants (SMEDA should provide leadership for small business development activities. 
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6.42 Continuing Education and Training for the Employed: There is a need to improve the skills of the existing 
labor force, as well as to upgrade the skills of new labor force entrants. There is a large existing labor force in 
Pakistan, which in general has low levels of education and training as compared to other middle income 
countries.  Pakistan should support three existing and developing institutions which can directly address 
Adult Continuing Education (ACE) including:  the Technology Upgradation and Skills Development 
Company (TUSDEC); the ongoing Skill Development Council, and SMEDA, which organizes a wide range 
of technical and entrepreneurial services for micro, small, and medium businesses.  All three have different 
clientele and the initiatives should be supported and enlarged as purely private sector initiatives. The above 
initiatives should be demand-driven, and primarily be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by the enterprises 
requesting training services for their employees. Finally, existing VTT training institutions could organize 
themselves to provide customized quick-start training for enterprises although this requires very 
entrepreneurial and flexible VTT institutions. 
 
 
6.43 Finally, it is important to keep expectations from labor market reform realistic. LM outcomes depend 
as much on non-labor factors emerging from the microeconomic dimensions of investment climate, and 
macroeconomic factors, as the functioning of labor markets. Policymakers in Pakistan recognize that in 
tandem with maintaining macroeconomic stability, fostering a conducive investment climate (IC) for private 
sector growth, is pivotal to addressing the challenge of creating more and better jobs. Creating productive job 
opportunities depends on macroeconomic factors at least as much as labor laws; worker productivity levels 
depend as much or more on investments in human capital through education and training as they do on labor 
market institutions and interventions; and income security depends as much on factors such as social safety 
nets as labor market regulations.  While this report has identified the rationale for labor reform and helped in 
prioritizing the efforts in this difficult area of public policy, the report reinforces the findings of other studies 
that call for policy reform in areas that fall outside labor markets for creating productive jobs in Pakistan – i.e. 
improving overall investment climate, including human capital policies, and sustaining macroeconomic 
stability. 
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Annex Fig 1.1: LABOR FORCE, IN MILLION, VARIOUS YEARS 
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ANNEX 2: INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE OF PAKISTAN 
 
 
Annex Table 2.1 Industrial Performance of Pakistan  
    (Percent)    (Percent)   
    Manufacturing Share in GDP   Growth rates of    
       Manufacturing   
  Year Total 
Large 
Scale 
Small 
Scale Total 
Large 
Scale 
Small 
Scale   
  1949-50 6.39 1.83 4.56 8.39 23.42 2.34   
  1959-60 9.91 5.67 4.23 2.53 2.75 2.25   
  1969-70 13.44 10.46 2.98 11.32 13.95 2.98   
  1979-80 14.51 10.55 3.95 10.25 10.96 8.40   
  1989-90 17.59 12.70 4.89 5.72 4.73 8.40   
  1999-00 16.66 11.65 5.03 1.53 -0.01 5.31   
  2000-01 17.66 12.48 5.18 8.21 9.46 5.31   
  2001-02 17.94 12.66 5.28 5.00 4.87 5.31   
  2002-03 18.39 13.09 5.30 7.67 8.65 5.31   
      Period Average       
           
  1950s 8.78 4.38 4.41 7.73 15.75 2.30   
  1960s 12.41 8.85 3.56 9.91 13.39 2.91   
  1970s 13.99 10.42 3.57 5.50 4.84 7.63   
  1980s 16.65 12.26 4.38 8.21 8.16 8.40   
  1990s 17.68 12.32 5.36 3.88 3.54 5.06   
  1950-03 13.37 9.27 4.09 6.78 8.78 5.06   
                  
  Source: 50 Years of Pakistan Volume I Summary, Statistical Supplement of    
    Economic Survey, 2002-03 and Economic Survey 2003-04    
                  
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 2.2:  Market Positioning Matrix 
 
Share of product in world trade 
Share of country's export in world 
trade 
RISING (Dynamic) FALLING (Stagnant) 
RISING (competitive) Optimal Vulnerable 
"Champions" "Achievers in adversity" 
ex. Household linens, curtains, trousers, t-shirts, 
polycarboxylic acids. 
(% of total exports: 24.5%) 
ex. Clothing accessories, cotton fabric, 
carved & molded goods 
(% of total exports: 23.4%) 
FALLING (non-competitive) Weakness Restructuring 
"Underachievers" "Declining sectors" 
ex. Medical instruments, leather apparel, made-
up articles of textile materials 
(% of total exports: 7.8%) 
ex. Cotton yarn, sports goods, fabrics, 
woven of synthetic yarn, shirts  
(% of total exports: 22.2%) 
Source: WTO, Sherani (2004), quoted in GoP 2005. 
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Annex Table 2.3:  Trends in Total Factor Productivity in Manufacture Sector since 1960s 
              (Percent)     
        Sector    Growth Rates         
    
Value 
Added Capital   Labour TFP   
Period                   
1964-65 to 2000-01   6.39   2.23   0.94   3.21   
1964-65 to 1969-70   8.99   2.96   1.78   4.26   
1970-71 to 1979-80   5.48   2.04   1.43   2.01   
1980-81 to 1989-90   8.09   2.1   0.61   5.38   
1990-91 to 2000-01   3.99   2.09   0.25   1.64   
Source: A.R. Kemal's calculations using data from Pakistan Economic Survey, Various issues   
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ANNEX 3.1 A: ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF LABOR DEMAND ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS 
 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3  of the report are based on the estimation of an establishment level log-linear labor 
demand equation in which labor input is measured as employment, in turn considered as a function only of 
output and factor input prices. A simple specification of this kind is one in which all labor is assumed to be 
homogenous and the only other input is capital, also assumed to be homogenous, so that we can write: 
 
itiitititit uYWRN   lnlnlnln 3210                                             (1) 
 
where itY  is the output of establishment i  over period, t ; itN  is the corresponding employment, itW  the 
corresponding cost of labor per employee, and itR  is the price  of the services of capital; iu  a zero mean 
random variable summing up a range of unobservable firm fixed  effects on employment that could also 
influence output or the factor prices faced by the firm; and it  is a zero mean iid error term summing up 
other unobservable assumed to be orthogonal to factor  prices and output.  The parameters 2  and 3  are 
the (long run) constant-output wage elasticity and the output elasticity, respectively, of employment.  
 
To help mitigate the problem of heterogeneity bias we estimate equation (1) in first difference, which would 
in fact eliminate the bias entirely if all unobserved enterprise effects are time invariant.  A second problem 
one has to address in trying to estimate (1) in first difference is that we do not in fact observe itR . We 
approach this problem in tow alternative ways. One is to assume that itR  does not vary much over time or 
across firms over the period of interest. We refer to the model we estimate under this assumption as 
“Specification 1”. As an alternative to this we proxy  itR  by current capital stock. We refer to the equation we 
estimate under this assumption as “Specification 2”. The elasticity estimates that we arrive at do not differ a 
great deal between the two specifications.  
 
Assuming that either or both of these specifications is correct, there then remains the potential for bias in our 
estimates stemming from the endogeneity of both  itY  and itW . Output is clearly endogenous since what is 
produced depends on the level employment. The potential for the endogeneity of wages is less obvious, but 
one source of it is unobserved but evolutionary firm effects in wage rates stemming from efficiency wage 
payment schemes or match effects. The best we can do to address this problem given our data is to 
instrument output growth by beginning-of-period capital stock, and to instrument wage growth by city-sector 
cell means of annual wage growth. 
 
Wage Elasticity 
 
Our data are exclusively from the World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys. We measure output as annual sales 
revenue and labor demand in terms of end of year total number of workers. We report in Table A1, results of 
estimation of Specification 1, by two-stage least squares, having instrumented current output by initial capital 
stock.  Here, all-sector estimates of own wage elasticity range from a low of 0.12 (in absolute value)88 for the 
Latin American and Caribbean sample, to 0.32 for the sample from Europe and Central Asia. The estimates 
for manufacturing industries are generally significantly higher, ranging, again, from 0.12 for the Latin 
American and Caribbean sample, to 0.47 for the Latin America and Caribbean sample. Estimates for the 
                                                 
88 We report the absolute value of elasticity estimate throughout the text, although coefficients are all signed in regression tables. All 
of our own-price labor demand elasticity estimates reported below are negative as shown in the tables. All our estimates of the output 
elasticity of labor demand are positive.  
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garments and textiles industry separately are even higher for most regional samples, being more than 0.3 for 
the samples from Africa, Middle East and North Africa and Europe and Central Asia, and in the 
neighborhood of 0.2 for samples from China and South Asia. Own wage elasticity estimates fall in the 0.13 to 
0.15 range for the manufacturing sector and all sectors combined when we pool data across all the 33 
countries (column 8 of Table A1). The figure is several times higher at 0.54 for services.   
 
The own-wage elasticity estimates we obtain from the estimation of Specification 2, are given in Table A2. 
These too are obtained by two stage least squares using the same instrument for current output as used in 
Table A1, but with controls for the cost of capital services included.  Depending on the sector in question, 
estimates of own-wage elasticity of employment fall within the 0.12 to 0.57 band when we pool observations 
across all 33 countries (column 8 of Table A2). Elasticity estimates obtained from regional samples are quite 
close to corresponding estimates in Table A1, and range by region from 0.12 to 0.31 for all sectors combined, 
from 0. 12 to 0.47 for manufacturing firms, and from to 0.15 to 0.35 for garments producers among 
manufacturers.   
 
Irrespective which of the two specifications we use, our results suggest that the constant output own-price 
elasticity of labor demand is quite low. However, it is also important to note that our estimates fall within the 
range of long run plant level elasticity estimates reported for manufacturing industries in OECD economies 
as summarized in Hamermesh (1993, pp.81-86.). Considering more recent studies based on establishment 
level manufacturing data drawn from developing economies, our estimates are reasonably close to those 
reported in Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005) for plants for Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, and to estimates of 
Slaughter (2001) for US plants. The estimates are significantly smaller than those reported in Krishna et al. 
(2001) for Turkish firms. 
 
Output Elasticity 
 
Turning to the (partial) output elasticity of employment, our estimates for manufacturing and service sectors 
combined vary from a low of 0.21 for China to 0.58 for Europe and Central Asia, with values for Africa, 
South Asia, and Middle East and North Africa in between those extremes (Table A1). Estimates are a little 
larger when we focus on the manufacturing sector only. They are even larger when we further narrow down 
the focus to one industry-namely, garments and textiles. The estimates increase when we control for the cost 
of capital services in Table A2, this being even more so at more disaggregated level. They are also close to 
estimates of long run elasticities of that Mairesse and Dormont (1985) estimated for manufacturing industries 
in France, Germany and the United States based on firm level data for the 1970s.  Unfortunately we do not 
have more recent firm level long run output elasticity estimates for developing or developed economies with 
which to compare our results.  Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005), Slaughter (2001) and Krishna et al. (2001) all 
omit establishment output from the labor demand functions they estimate and do not consequently report 
output elasticity coefficients.89 
 
Temporary employment and the elasticity of labor demand. 
 
In trying to assess the role of the composition of employment to the responsiveness labor demand to factor 
price changes and output demand shifts one would ideally estimate elasticity coefficients or adjustment lags 
by work force categories including estimates for temporary workers and permanent workers separately. 
Unfortunately, our data on the division of enterprise workforce between these two types of workers consist 
only of one- year observations on the share of temporary workers in total employment although we do have 
two to three year data on total employment, output and wage rates for each firm. We have sought to make up 
for this by interacting the one-year observation on the share of temporary workers with wage and output 
                                                 
89 Their own-price elasticity estimates are nonetheless constant output elasticities since their specificication include regressors that in 
effect control for output including industry output, time effects and establishment effects, and, in the case of Fajnzylber and Maloney 
(2005), last period’s employment 
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growth rates when we estimate labor demand equations. This we do in Table A3 in the context of 
Specification 1 and Specification 2.  
 
As already noted, if it is easier for firms to adjust the employment of temporary workers than that of 
permanent workers because the latter enjoy greater employment protection by law, the demand for temporary 
labor workers should be more own-price elastic and output elastic than the demand for permanent labor. In 
that case the own-price and output elasticities of total labor should be higher for in firms where the share of 
temporary workers in total employment is higher. This is indeed what we see in Table A3 where the 
interaction of wage growth with the share of temporary workers is always negative and generally statistically 
significant under both specifications. The interaction term of output growth and the share of temporary 
workers is also always positive and often statistically significant. 
 
Interpreting labor demand elasticity coefficients  
 
The relationship between the elasticity parameters of equation (1) and labor regulation, on the one hand, and 
entry or product market regulation, on the other, can be described using the first and second of Marshall’s 
laws of factor demand, which Hamermesh (1993, pp.23-28) summarizes in the formula for the (total) wage 
elasticity of labor demand in a competitive industry: 90 
 
])1[(  ssLL                                                                                           (2) 
 
where LL  is the total own price elasticity of labor demand,   is the Allen partial elasticity of substitution 
of labor for non-labor inputs, s  is labor’s revenue share, and   is the own price elasticity of product 
demand. The first term on the right hand side is the constant-output wage elasticity labor demand, and is 
equal to 2 . It reflects the first of Marshall’s laws of derived demand, namely, that the elasticity of labor 
demand is higher the greater is the ease with which other factors inputs can be substituted for it. The ease of 
substitution, in turn is greater the greater is  and the smaller is s  . The second term reflects the second of 
Marshall’s laws, namely, that the demand for a factor is greater the greater is the own price elasticity of the 
product is used produce. An exogenous increase in wage rate then has two kinds of effects, namely, a 
substitution effect captured by the first term of (2), and a scale effect given by the second term.91In 
measurement in a regression of context as described in (1), the scale effect of wage changes should be 
absorbed in by the output elasticity coefficient, 3 .92  
 
Entry and product market regulation should influence the output elasticity of labor demand, 3 , through the 
effect they should have on industry demand elasticity very much along the lines of Slaughter’s (2001) analysis 
of the effect of trade liberalization on employment elasticities. A regulatory system that reduces the number 
of suppliers to a market through domestic competition policy or through trade policy should be expected to 
lower output elasticity of employment by lowering . Labor regulation in the form of employment protection 
laws or institutions should also influence 2 , through its effect on  .  
 
                                                 
90
 In this we follow Slaughter  (2001), who uses Hamermesh’s formula of Marshall’s first and second laws of derived demand to 
analyze the effects of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticities.  
91 The scale effect is arrived at by scaling up the own price elasticity of product demand by factor  share, because under competition, a  
percentage point increase in the factor price should increase the product’s price by the factor’s revenue share. 
92 The own-price elasticity formula given by (2) is what we would estimate by regressimg employment on factor prices without 
controlling for (the scale of) output. Since we are controlling for scale in equation (1) the coefficient of the wage rate captures only the 
substitution- effect component of LL . 
65 
Table A1.  Instrumental Variable Estimates of Elasticities of  Establishment Level Employment: Specification 1 
         
         
  Pakistan South Asia China Mid. East and  Africa Latin America and Europe and  All countries 
Elasticity with respect 
to  (excl. Pak.)  North Africa  the Caribbean 
Central 
Asia  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All sectors:         
  Output*** 0.196 0.400 0.213 0.419 0.361 0.483 0.581 0.312 
  (5.38)** (8.76)** (3.92)** (5.53)** (6.91)** (9.11)** (8.11)** (13.36)** 
 wage rate -0.035 -0.211 -0.154 -0.215 -0.169 -0.121 -0.326 -0.155 
  (3.43)** (10.17)** (6.24)** (4.73)** (7.06)** (10.52)** (10.67)** (17.58)** 
Observations 906 1836 1645 1252 760 2409 1001 11910 
          
Manufacturing plants         
  Output*** 0.164 0.401 0.197 0.444 0.344 0.483 0.877 0.292 
  (4.80)** (8.78)** (3.75)** (5.29)** (6.46)** (9.12)** (4.61)** (11.97)** 
 wage rate -0.029 -0.211 -0.144 -0.192 -0.185 -0.121 -0.474 -0.131 
  (2.99)** (10.15)** (6.09)** (4.21)** (6.87)** (10.49)** (6.48)** (15.19)** 
Observations 861 1835 1214 1188 727 2403 339 10272 
          
Garments and 
textiles         
  Output*** 0.166 0.355 0.375 0.712 0.166 0.616 0.656 0.315 
  (3.81)** (5.79)** (0.48) (4.30)** (2.03)* (6.41)** (3.45)** (5.80)** 
 wage rate -0.059 -0.194 -0.200 -0.340 -0.374 -0.164 -0.392 -0.150 
  (4.15)** (8.47)** (0.75) (4.11)** (5.16)** (7.71)** (4.83)** (7.71)** 
Observations 499 758 273 620 100 868 130 3777 
          
Selected services:         
  Output*** 0.916  0.340    1.473 0.697 
  (1.70)  (1.34)    (6.40)** (2.95)** 
 wage rate -0.062  -0.225    -0.299 -0.536 
  (0.36)  (1.84)    (1.38) (3.76)** 
Observations 45   431       84 972 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
***Instrumented by two-year lagged capital stock       
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 Table A 2: Instrumental Variable Estimation of Elasticities of Establishment Level Employment : Specifiation2 
         
         
Elasticity with respect 
to Pakistan South Asia China Middle East and  Africa Latin America and Europe and  All countries 
   (excl. Pak.) North Africa the Caribbean 
Central 
Asia  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All sectors:         
Output*** 0.089 0.390 0.281 0.412 0.360 0.529 0.596 0.320 
  (2.20)* (8.54)** (5.20)** (5.48)** (6.90)** (9.71)** (8.47)** (13.85)** 
Fixed capital stock -0.270 -0.071 -0.081 -0.052 -0.024 -0.075 -0.103 -0.089 
  (14.20)** (4.89)** (8.22)** (2.92)** (1.34) (9.34)** (4.82)** (19.21)** 
Wagerate -0.013 -0.202 -0.169 -0.208 -0.168 -0.116 -0.313 -0.146 
  (1.55) (9.59)** (6.81)** (4.61)** (6.98)** (10.01)** (9.96)** (16.58)** 
Observations 906 1836 1645 1252 760 2409 1001 11907 
          
Manufacturing plants:         
Output*** 0.084 0.391 0.254 0.436 0.343 0.530 0.871 0.294 
  (2.17)* (8.56)** (4.90)** (5.25)** (6.45)** (9.72)** (4.47)** (12.21)** 
Fixed capital stock -0.248 -0.071 -0.092 -0.054 -0.022 -0.075 -0.039 -0.085 
  (13.53)** (4.89)** (8.05)** (3.02)** (1.25) (9.33)** (0.71) (17.27)** 
Wage rate -0.010 -0.202 -0.152 -0.185 -0.183 -0.116 -0.466 -0.121 
  (1.20) (9.57)** (6.40)** (4.07)** (6.79)** (9.98)** (5.90)** (14.17)** 
Observations 861 1835 1214 1188 727 2403 339 10269 
          
Garments industry:         
Output*** 0.030 0.347 0.510 0.707 0.166 0.664 0.577 0.303 
  (0.67) (5.67)** (0.78) (4.32)** (2.02)* (6.70)** (2.96)** (5.69)** 
Fixed capital stock -0.206 -0.057 -0.022 -0.060 -0.006 -0.095 -0.193 -0.081 
  (10.15)** (2.95)** (0.44) (2.20)* (0.05) (6.21)** (2.37)* (9.04)** 
Wage rate -0.037 -0.188 -0.241 -0.332 -0.374 -0.146 -0.354 -0.136 
  (3.15)** (8.19)** (1.02) (4.07)** (5.14)** (6.95)** (4.65)** (7.07)** 
Observations 499 758 273 620 100 868 130 3777 
          
Selected services:         
Output*** 1.331  0.470    1.365 0.781 
  (0.08)  (1.78)    (7.23)** (3.30)** 
Fixed capital stock -4.857  -0.054    0.116 -0.053 
  (0.09)  (2.32)*    (2.81)** (2.29)* 
Wage rate -0.490  -0.281    -0.459 -0.569 
  (0.09)  (2.19)*    (2.41)* (3.86)** 
Observations 45   431       84 972 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
***Instrumented by two-year lagged capital stock      
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Table A3: Estimates of effects of labor regulation on labor demand 
 Dependent variable: annual rate of employment growth    
          
  Pakistan South Asia China Mid. East and  Africa 
Latin America 
and Europe and  
All 
countries  
   (excl. Pak.)  North Africa  the Caribbean 
Central 
Asia   
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Specification 1:          
 wage rate -0.022 0.013 -0.031 -0.561 -0.174 -0.052 -0.476 -0.051  
  (0.98) (0.12) (0.76) (1.85) (1.79) (2.53)* (5.59)** (3.70)**  
 wage rate* share of temp 0.011 -0.982 -0.285 0.367 -0.811 -0.333 0.415 -0.358  
  (0.21) (3.47)** (3.49)** (0.50) (1.67) (1.91) (0.77) (6.86)**  
  Output*** 0.021 0.417 0.097 0.611 0.341 0.368 0.840 0.102  
  (0.23) (1.60) (0.88) (2.07)* (1.94) (2.58)** (3.93)** (2.06)*  
output* share of temp**** 0.606 0.372 0.572 0.242 0.522 1.793 0.901 0.561  
  (1.78) (1.66) (3.53)** (0.29) (0.97) (1.49) (0.70) (4.69)**  
Observations 357 236 1214 171 333 849 338 5123  
           
Specification 2:          
Fixed capital stock -0.151 -0.038 -0.082 -0.079 -0.017 -0.066 -0.041 -0.092  
  (6.40)** (0.91) (6.08)** (1.83) (0.75) (3.94)** (0.71) (12.23)**  
 wage rate -0.019 0.014 -0.031 -0.596 -0.168 -0.047 -0.467 -0.043  
  (1.12) (0.13) (0.76) (1.93) (1.74) (2.22)* (5.13)** (3.16)**  
 wage rate* share of temp 0.023 -0.978 -0.299 0.504 -0.818 -0.381 0.428 -0.369  
  (0.57) (3.45)** (3.66)** (0.66) (1.69) (2.12)* (0.81) (7.16)**  
  Output*** 0.078 0.413 0.040 0.663 0.335 0.418 0.833 0.123  
  (1.17) (1.59) (0.35) (2.19)* (1.91) (2.76)** (3.82)** (2.52)*  
output* share of temp**** 0.270 0.392 0.556 0.138 0.530 1.874 0.863 0.544  
  (0.95) (0.69) (3.41)** (0.16) (0.99) (1.50) (0.68) (4.59)**  
Observations 357 236 1214 171 333 849 338 5122  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses        
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
*** Instrumenented by two-year lagged capital stock       
**** Instrumented by corresponding interaction with two-year lagged capital stock     
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ANNEX 4.1B:  LABOR FORCE COMPOSITION AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 
 
The report’s discussion of the relationship between labor regulation and on the job training through the 
formers effect on workforce composition is based on the estimation of a probit model of the sorting of 
employers between those who provide training to their workers and those who do not. Again this is done 
based entirely on the World Bank Group Enterprise Survey dataset.  Estimation results are reported in Table 
B1, where we pool data across all countries but do include industry and country dummies, and in Table B2, 
where we provide estimates by international regions, but again while controlling for industry and country 
fixed effects. The dependent variable in both tables is an indicator variable, iT  , that is equal to unity if 
enterprise i  provides on the job training to its workers or subsidizes such training. Two potential 
determinants of the probability  1Pr iTob  identified in the literature are  the extent of wage dispersion in 
the firm, iWD , and the share of temporary workers in the enterprise workforce, iTemp . We measure iWD  
as the log difference between the average wage rate of skilled workers and the average wage rate of skilled 
workers in the enterprises. The smaller is the gap the higher the rate of return to training from the firm’s 
point of view, and hence the greater the firms propensity to supply or subsidize training. On the other hand, 
the probability that a firm can recoup its expenditure on the training of a worker is smaller and the shorter the 
worker’s expected tenure. Since the expected tenure of temporary workers should normally be smaller than 
the expected duration of permanent jobs, we expect  1Pr iTob  to be smaller in enterprises that rely more 
on temporary workers. To these basic explanatory variables we should add standard controls including the 
size of the enterprise, iSIZE , which we measure by the log of the total number of employees, and its age, 
iAGE , which we measure by the log of the number of years of the enterprise has been in business.  Lager 
firms are more likely to provide on the job training as reported in numerous studies. Some studies have 
reported that employees of older establishments are more likely to have been trained on the current job. In 
addition to these, we also control for inter-firm differences in capital intensity ( ienistyK int ), export market 
participation ( iExporter), foreign ownership ( iForeign), and degree of unionization of the workforce 
( iUnion ). In our estimation we assume that all other possible influences on  1Pr iTob  are summed up in 
a zero mean and iid standard normal error term orthogonal to the variables just listed.   
 
Looking at Table B1, the results to focus on are those of the first column as the other columns are 
modifications of it intended to highlight the importance of selected repressors by excluding them from the 
specification in turns. The key finding in column 1 from our point of view is that the coefficient of the share 
of temporary workers is negative and statistically significant, which means that the probability of a firm 
providing on the job training to its workers or subsidizing such training in one way or another decreases in 
the proportion of temporary workers in its work force. We arrive at this result having controlled for inter-
firm differences in wage dispersion. The coefficient of our indicator of wage dispersion is also negative and 
statistically significant, which means that on the job training is more likely in firms where the wage structure is 
more compressed. One interpretation of this in turn is that a significant component of the skills that workers 
obtain from the training in question is portable from the workers’ point of view in the sense of being of use 
to other employers as well. One of our key controls, namely, size has the expected sign: larger firms are more 
likely to offer or subsidize on the job training. There is n o evidence, however, that any of business age, 
capital intensity, or foreign ownership matter for the incidence of training. Nor does unionization seem to 
matter. It is important that we draw these conclusions while controlling for industry and country fixed effects.  
 
The results of Table B1 broadly corroborate these findings with estimates for international regions separately, 
with the key difference that, with the exception of the regression for East Asia, the effect of wage structure 
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does not seem to hold here. Here also on the job training is less likely where the proportion of temporary 
workers is higher. 
    Table B1: Maximum likelihood estimates of sponsoring on-the-job training of employees: 
 
Dependent variable: enterprise dummy for sponsorship of on the job 
training 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
        
 
  
 
-0.128   -0.128 -0.126 -0.116 
  (2.33)*   (2.32)* (2.29)* (2.23)* 
 
  
 
0.306 0.288 0.296 0.306 0.312 0.334 
  (7.96)** (14.63)** (7.78)** (7.99)** (8.35)** (9.99)** 
 
  
 
-0.018 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.023 0.001 
  (0.31) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39) (0.02) 
 
  
 
0.116 0.142 0.108 0.113 0.119  
  (1.22) (2.65)** (1.14) (1.19) (1.25)  
 
  
 
0.089 0.099 0.063 0.093   
  (0.66) (1.60) (0.47) (0.69)   
 
  
 
-0.316 -0.220 -0.335 -0.333 -0.318 -0.381 
  (1.74) (2.07)* (1.43) (1.42) (1.35) (1.68) 
 
  
 
-0.009 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.028 
  (0.34) (0.64) (0.40) (0.36) (0.31) (1.41) 
 
 
 
0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.035 
  (1.01) (3.09)** (1.03) (1.06) (1.04) (0.75) 
Constant -1.644 -3.072 -1.769 -1.661 -2.233 -2.444 
  (2.27)* (3.32)** (2.43)* (2.29)* (2.25)* (2.48)* 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3457 4060 3457 3457 3457 3457 
Log likelihood -1671 -2199 -1813 -1791 -1790 -1801 
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 
       
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
       
 
iExporter
iForeign
iWD
iSIZE
iTemp
ienistyK int
iAGE
iUnion
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    Table B2: Maximum likelihood estimates of sponsoring on-the-job training of employees by region 
 
Dependent variable: enterprise dummy for sponsorship of on the 
job training  
       
  Pakistan South Asia China East Asia Mid. East and  
Latin America 
and 
        excl. China North Africa the Caribean 
 
  
 
-0.249 -0.151 0.014 -0.968 0.136 -0.115 
  (1.08) (1.02) (0.24) (3.57)** (0.50) (1.52) 
 
  
 
0.329 0.447 0.225 0.423 0.387 0.346 
  (2.45)* (4.31)** (3.55)** (3.31)** (2.12)* (6.58)** 
 
  
 
-0.262 -0.096 -0.378 -0.470 0.287 -0.012 
  (1.19) (0.59) (3.07)** (1.85) (0.90) (0.16) 
 
  
 
1.181 1.238 -0.081 -1.381 -0.171 0.017 
  (3.68)** (4.82)** (0.36) (3.37)** (0.44) (0.14) 
 
  
 
1.311 0.690 0.783 0.057 0.271 -0.053 
  (1.65) (1.56) (1.98)* (0.13) (0.71) (0.27) 
 
  
 
-0.226 -0.056 -0.250 -4.819 -1.694 -0.524 
  (0.35) (0.12) (1.22) (2.73)** (1.56) (1.68) 
 
  
 
-3.020 -0.335 -0.011 1.072 -0.807 0.029 
  (2.47)* (1.09) (1.83) (2.16)* (1.34) (0.68) 
 
  
 
-0.191 -0.442  -0.559 -0.744 0.016 
  (0.44) (1.02)  (1.20) (1.58) (0.22) 
Constant 1.442 -2.437 0.683 -2.486 -1.213 -1.236 
  (0.91) (2.78)** (1.13) (1.46) (0.92) (2.86)** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Indusry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 240 902 858 178 193 1086 
Log likelihood -67 -212 -160 -47 -57 -322 
Pseudo R-squared 0.32 0.37 0.11 0.34 0.24 0.14 
       
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
iWD
iSIZE
iExporter
iAGE
iForeign
iTemp
ienistyK int
iUnion
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ANNEX 5.1: LABOR LAWS – REPEALED/CONSOLIDATED 
 
 
Labor Laws Repealed/Consolidated 
 
1. IRO 1969 and 
2. Section 27B, Banking  Companies Amendment  
- Act, 1997 
1. Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 – Amendment Act 
proposed; draft expected to be presented to Cabinet 
for approval around Aug./Sept. 2006 
 
3. Mines Act, 1923  (Chapter VI & VIA) 
4. Children (Pledging of Labour Act), 1933 
5. Factories Act, 1934 (Chapter IV & IVA) 
6. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 
7. Employment (Record of Services) Act, 1951 
8. Coal Mines (fixation of rate of wages)   
Ordinance 1960 
9. Minimum wages Ordinance, 1961 
10. The Industrial and Commercial Employment  
(Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 
11. The West Pakistan Shops & Establishment 
Ordinance, 1969 
12. Minimum wages for Unskilled Worker 
Ordinance, 1969 
13. Employees cost of living (Relief) Act, 1973 
14. Employment of Children Act, 1991 
 
2.   Employment and Services Conditions Act; draft expected to 
be presented to Cabinet for approval around Aug./Sept. 
2006. 
 
Note: In the interim period -  a Labor Amendment Bill was 
passed earlier this year which amended certain provision 
related to working hours, including extension of women’s 
working hours, overtime, and introduced the concept of 
contract labor (as a classification of workers). The 
Amendment shall be superceded by the ESCA once it  
passed. 
15. Factories Act, 1934 
16. Dock Laborers Act, 1934 
 
 
3. Occupational Safety & Health Act - draft to be prepared in 
2007 
17. Apprenticeship Ordinance, 1962 
18. Control of Employment Ordinance, 1965 
 
4. Human Resources Development & Control of Employment Act - 
draft to be prepared in 2007 
19. Provincial Employees Social Security 
- Ordinance, 1965 
20. Excise Duty on Mineral (Labor Welfare)  
- Act,  1967 
21. Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 
22. Workers Children Education Ordinance, 1972 
23. Employees Old Age Benefit Act, 1976 
5. Labor Welfare & Social Security Act -  draft to be prepared 
in 2007 
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ANNEX 5.2: FIRING COSTS 
Economy 
Legally mandated 
notice period for 
redundancy dismissal 
(in weeks) after 
twenty years of 
continuous 
employment? 
Severance pay for 
redundancy dismissal as 
number of months for 
which full wages are 
payable after continuous 
employment of twenty 
years? 
What is the legally 
mandated penalty for 
redundancy dismissal 
(in weeks of wages)? 
Firing costs (sum of 
previous columns, in 
months) 
Bangladesh 4 10 0 10.8 
India 12 10 24 18.2 
Nepal 4 20 0 20.8 
Pakistan 4 20 0 20.8 
Sri Lanka 39.6* 38.4** 0 47.3 
Comparator countries    
China 4 20 0 20.8 
Hong Kong 4 2 0 3.0 
Malaysia 8 15.4 0 17.1 
Singapore 4 0 0 0.9 
Taiwan 4 20 0 20.8 
Thailand 4 10 0 10.8 
 
Source: Doing business database 2004. 
Notes: *In lieu of the notice, the average duration of the process of bringing the order about the application for a termination under the TEWA act is taken 
in Sri Lanka (this was 9.9 months in 2003). 
** For Sri Lanka, the number of average number of months of wages awarded in 2003 was taken (1.92 months of wages per year of past service)  
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ANNEX 5.3: PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES OF FIRING WORKERS 
 
The 
employer 
must notify 
a third 
party before 
dismissing 
one 
redundant 
employee? 
The 
employer 
needs the 
approval of 
a third party 
to dismiss 
one 
redundant 
worker? 
The 
employer 
must notify 
a third party 
prior to a 
collective 
dismissal? 
The 
employer 
needs the 
approval of 
a third party 
prior to a 
collective 
dismissal? 
The law 
mandates 
retraining or 
replacement 
prior to 
dismissal? 
There are 
priority rules 
applying to 
dismissal or 
lay-offs? 
There are 
priority rules 
applying to 
re-
employment? 
Is redundancy 
considered a 
“fair” ground 
for dismissal? 
Index of 
procedural 
difficulty 
of firing* 
Bangladesh No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 2 
India Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 9 
Nepal Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 9 
Pakistan No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 3 
Sri Lanka Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 6 
Comparator  countries        
China Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 4 
Hong 
Kong No No No No No No No Yes 0 
Malaysia No No Yes No No No No Yes 1 
Singapore No No No No No No No Yes 0 
Taiwan Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes 3 
Thailand Yes No Yes No No No No Yes 2 
Source: Doing business database 2004.  Note: *Maximum value of 10. 
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ANNEX 5.4: OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN PAKISTAN 
Employers in the private formal sector are required to contribute towards various labor welfare and social 
security arrangements for their workers. There are some seven different programs targeting low-income 
workers in the formal sector: Workers Welfare Fund, Education Cess, Employees Social Security, Group 
Insurance, Employees Old Age Benefits, Workers Profit Participation Fund, Provident Fund or Gratuity, and 
10C bonus. These programs provide different benefits in cash and kind to workers. Some of the programs are 
administered federally, others provincially, and still others are implemented by the enterprises themselves. All 
of these programs are funded by contributions from employers, in the form of taxes on profits, payroll, or 
headcount of workers 
 Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) is funded through 2 percent of the taxable income of the enterprise. 
The annual collections of WWF are less than PRs. 1 billion, from some 600 companies, indicating 
large-scale evasion by employers. However, only a part of the receipts of the WWF are transferred to 
the Workers Welfare Board (WWB), which implements the program, and more than PRs. 18 billion 
is held in trust (earning no interest) by the Federal Government (54 percent of the actual collections 
to date). The benefits provided include construction of houses, establishing schools and health 
facilities, and grants for dowry and scholarships. Workers of registered organizations earning less 
than PRs. 5,000 per month are eligible for the benefits from activities funded from the WWF. 
Although the WWB is supposedly a tripartite body comprising representatives of the Ministry of 
Labour, employers and employees, all are nominated by the federal government, and operations are 
de facto controlled by the government (Issues and Policies Consultants, 2005). 
 Education Cess. Establishments employing more than 10 workers (with wages not exceeding PRs. 
3,000) are required to pay Education Cess of PRs. 100 per worker per year. Education Cess funds are 
utilized to provide free schooling for two children of each eligible worker. Some of the capital 
expenditure on establishing such schools is financed by the Workers Welfare Fund, while recurring 
expenditures are met from Education Cess funds. 
 Provincial social security (Employees Social Security Institutions). Social Security is a provincial 
levy at 7percent of the wage of workers earning up to PRs. 5,000 per month. Social security is levied 
and collected by the Employees Social Security Institutions (ESSI’s), run by the provinces. Medical 
coverage is overwhelmingly provided in ESSI medical facilities. Workers are also entitled to receive 
cash benefits for loss of earnings in the event of sickness, maternity, injury or disability, and their 
dependents are eligible for survivors’ pensions. ESSI’s cover all workers of enterprises registered with 
an ESSI earning less than PRs. 5,000 per month. Presently some 40,000 organizations and close to 
825,000 workers are covered, corresponding to around 4percent of the non-agricultural labour force. 
Because of concerns over intrusive inspections, rent-extraction and high compliance costs of private 
businesses, the Governments of Punjab and Sindh have in recent years introduced a slab system and 
a self-assessment scheme, respectively (Issues and Policies Consultants, 2005).93  
 Employees Old Age Benefits (EOBI). The EOBI is financed with a very small payroll tax of 5 
percent paid by employers and a flat levy on employees of PRs. 20 per month. The latter constitutes 
a mere 0.25 percent of payroll charge for higher income workers. The EOBI has set a low 
                                                 
93 In the Sindh, employers can pay a flat rate contribution of Rs. 350 per month per secured employee. ESSI can only conduct a 
review of the books and records of such establishments after two years. In the Punjab slab system firms employing 5 to 10 persons 
pay an annual fee of Rs. 10,000, firms with 11 to 20 employees pay Rs. 25,000, establishments with 21 to 50 employees pay Rs. 50,000, 
while firms with more than 50 employees pay 7 percent of workers’ salaries as under the old system. Businesses complete a simplified 
form and only a random sample of firms is selected for inspection. 
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contribution ceiling of PRs. 5000 per month, earnings above which level are not subject to the 
payroll levy. Establishments with ten or more workers are covered.94 The old age pension benefit is 
calculated as number of years of contribution history times 2percent of the wage of the worker in the 
final year, with a minimum pension of PRs.1000 per month95, payable for life.96 This results in a 
replacement rate of 70 percent of the last wage for 35 years of contributions. The pensionable age is 
60 years for males and 55 for females, and there is also a survivor pension.97  
 Other levies include Group Insurance -- Employers are required to provide life insurance by covering 
each employee for a minimum of PRs. 200,000; 10C Bonus -- all companies declaring a profit are 
required to pay their workers a bonus equal to a minimum of one month’s salary; Gratuity or provident 
fund -- workers are also entitled to gratuity for 30 days wages for each completed year of service in 
excess of 6 months98; Workers Profit Participation Fund (WPPF) -- 5percent of the enterprise’s profit 
taxes are distributed among its workers up to a maximum of PRs. 5,000 per worker. Undistributed 
funds are given to the WWF. Firms are also required to operate a canteen. 
 
Name of 
scheme 
Source of 
funding 
Target group of 
beneficiaries 
Implementing 
agency 
Type of benefits 
provided 
Issues 
Workers 
Welfare Fund 
(WWF)  
2 percent of 
the taxable 
income of the 
enterprise  
 
 
 
Workers of 
registered 
organizations 
earning less than 
PRs. 5,000 per 
month are eligible  
Projects are 
planned and 
implemented by 
Provincial 
Workers Welfare 
Board (WWB)  
Construction of 
houses, establishing 
schools and health 
facilities, bicycles, 
sewing machines and 
fans for workers, 
provide grants for 
education and 
marriage  
Allocations for WWB 
only about half of 
collections; duplicate 
activities; workers in 
the companies that 
contribute the most, 
benefit the least since 
their salaries generally 
exceed the PRs. 5000 
monthly ceiling. 
Education cess PRs. 100 per 
worker per 
year 
Workers in 
establishments with 
more than 10 
workers and earning 
below PRs 3000 per 
month 
Special schools 
run by WWF 
Free schooling for two 
children of each 
eligible worker 
Most children enrolled 
are from families that 
do not work in cess-
paying enterprises; 
duplicates regular 
government schools 
Provincial 
social security 
(Employees 
Social Security 
Institutions) 
Employers 
contribute 7 
percent of the 
wage of 
workers 
earning up to 
PRs. 5,000 
All workers of an 
enterprise registered 
with an ESSI, 
earning less than 
PRs. 5,000 per 
month. 
Employees Social 
Security 
Institutions 
(ESSI’s), run by 
the provinces 
Insurance against 
natural death, 
disability, and injury; 
medical care, cash 
benefits, and 
survivors’ pensions 
covered. Health care 
Firms may under-
report the number of 
their employees, 
despite allegedly 
intrusive inspections 
by ESSI staff. High 
administrative costs 
                                                 
94 Defense personnel, police, railway, local bodies, banks and the carpet industry are exempted from the provisions of this law. 
95 Revised from PRs.700 to PRs.1,000 per month in December, 2004. 
96 Pensioners must have accumulated at least 15 years of service in which contributions were made. 
97 If a worker with at least 3 years of membership dies during insured employment the spouse is paid a life pension equal to the 
minimum pension. 
98 Gratuity is not mandatory if the establishment runs a provident fund scheme. 
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Name of 
scheme 
Source of 
funding 
Target group of 
beneficiaries 
Implementing 
agency 
Type of benefits 
provided 
Issues 
per month provided in specially-
run hospitals. 
and poor quality of 
services delivered; 
duplication of health 
facilities 
Group 
insurance  
Premiums 
paid by 
employers 
  Employers are 
required to provide 
life insurance by 
covering each 
employee for a 
minimum of PRs. 
200,000 
 
Employees 
Old age 
Benefit 
(EOBI)  
 
6 percent of 
minimum 
wage (PRs. 
3000 as of 
July 2005). 
Workers in 
establishments with 
10 workers or more 
(defense police, 
railway, local 
bodies, banks and 
the carpet industry 
are exempted) 
EOBI is headed 
by a Board which 
works under the 
guidance of the 
Federal 
Government 
Old age pensions of 2 
percent of the wage in 
the final year, with a 
minimum pension of 
PRs. 1000 per month, 
payable for life to 
males of 60 years and 
above and females age 
55 and above, with a 
minimum of 15 years 
of service  
Financially 
unsustainable 
(contributions will not 
cover promised 
benefits); Very high 
administrative costs 
(35 percent of benefits 
paid out); investment 
regime 
Workers Profit 
Participation 
Fund (WPPF) 
 
5 percent of 
the annual 
profit tax of 
the enterprise 
  Funds distributed 
among the workers of 
the company up to a 
maximum of PRs. 
5,000 per worker  
 
 
10C Bonus All companies 
declaring a 
profit are 
required to 
pay bonus 
  Bonus equal to a 
minimum of one 
month’s salary 
 
 
Gratuity   Firms themselves 30 days wages for each 
completed year of 
service in excess of 6 
months 
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Figure 1.5: 
Labor force 
participation 
rate for men 
and women, 
by age, 
2001/02 
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Source: LFS, 
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